Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

A jury in the district court concluded that plaintiff did not breach its homeowners insurance policy with defendants and that one defendant had committed fraud when applying for the policy. Defendants appealed a district court order denying their motion for summary judgment and motions in limine and granting plaintiff's motion that defendants order and pay for additional transcripts on appeal. The court held that defendants were not entitled to estopp plaintiff from defending itself because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the one defendant applied for the policy in good faith. The court held that the district court appropriately permitted plaintiff's customer service representative to testify as to her recollection of the defendant's statements. The court further held that the district court acted within its discretion in permitting plaintiff to defend itself via section 33-15-403, MCA, by allowing the customer service representative to testify about the defendant's alleged fraudulent statements. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion in limine. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering additional transcripts under Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(3)(b).

Appellee sued appellant for breach of contract stemming from an agreement between the parties under which appellant would produce, package, and deliver a rice milk product to appellee. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial because the court failed to give jury instructions regarding the proper standard of breach of an installment contract and the law pertaining to delegation of a contract. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in denying appellant's motion for judgment as a matter of law because appellee failed to prove a breach of the entire installment contract. The court held that the jury instructions, taken together, fairly and adequately submitted the breach of contract issue to the jury and that the district court properly declined to instruct the jury on the issue of delegation because the issue was irrelevant to the case presented to the jury. The court also held that appellant failed to preserve the issue of whether there was insufficient evidence to prove a breach of the entire installment contract and therefore, the court had no power to review this issue. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Saint Francis Medical Center ("St. Francis") brought a class action suit against C.R. Bard, Inc. ("Bard"), a supplier of medical supplies, alleging that Bard's contracts with Group Purchasing Organizations violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 14, and Missouri antitrust law, Mo. Rev. Stat. 416.121.1. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for Bard. The court held that, based on the precedent of Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., and specifically Saint Francis's failure to identify a relevant submarket, the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Bard was affirmed.

Plaintiff alleged that the two vehicles that it purchased from defendant, a used Ford and a new 2008 Dodge, had mechanical problems and body damage. The parties disputed responsibilities for repairs. At issue was whether the court could rely upon testimony on appeal for a vacated default judgment hearing and whether the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. The court held that the district court afforded the parties sufficient opportunity to refute affidavits through depositions, interrogatories, and through witness testimony at a hearing. Defendant elected not to depose plaintiff's owner and opted not to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses at a rescheduled hearing. Defendant waived its right to the hearing and presented its own evidence in the form of affidavits. Therefore, defendant's argument that the court must disregard certain testimony or any of plaintiff's affidavits presented to the district court was unconvincing. The court also held that the Montana court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant through long-arm provisions did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs claimed they were fraudulently induced to sell their ownership interests in a company they co-owned with one of the defendants, and fraudulently induced to release defendants from claims arising out of that ownership. At issue was whether the appellate court erred in finding that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the general release they granted defendants in connection with the sale of their interest. The court held that the release was intended to bar the very claims that plaintiffs have brought and that plaintiffs failed to allege that the release was induced by any fraud beyond that contemplated in the release. The court also held that the fraudulent statements plaintiffs point to could not support a conclusion that the release was fraudulently induced, since plaintiffs alleged that they released defendants from claims relating to the sale of their Telmex Wireless Ecuador LLC units without conducting minimal diligence to determine the true value of what they were selling. The court further held that the appellate division majority was therefore correct in concluding that, fully crediting plaintiffs' allegations, they would not be able to prevail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the order of the appellate division was affirmed.

Plaintiffs executed a general agreement with defendant regarding management of their real estate business which contained a general release. At issue was whether the appellate court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' fraud cause of action. The court held that plaintiffs have failed to allege that the release was induced by separate fraud and failed to allege that they justifiably relied on defendant's fraudulent misstatements in executing the release. The court also held that plaintiffs, by their own admission, who were sophisticated parties, had ample indication prior to June 2005 that defendant was not trustworthy, yet they elected to release him from the very claims they now bring without investigating the extent of his alleged misconduct. Accordingly, dismissal of plaintiffs' fraud cause of action was therefore appropriate.

In 2004, Plaintiff-Appellant Vick Hubbard filed suit against Defendants Kaiser-Francis Oil Company, Texas Southwest Gas and GBK Corporation for breach of an oil and gas lease and a gas purchase contract. Pursuant to 12 OS Supp. Sec. 1101.1(B), Defendants offered Plaintiff $275 for each of the seven alleged breaches. Plaintiff did not accept the offers and did not submit a counteroffer. By the statute, the offers were deemed rejected. Defendants moved for summary judgment that was granted and entered by the trial court. Plaintiffs appealed. Thereafter, Defendants filed a joint motion to recover their costs and fees based on Plaintiff's failure to obtain a judgment for more that the combined amount of Defendants' offers. In 2005, the parties reached an agreement on litigation costs and attorney fees that were to be paid by Plaintiff. Plaintiff paid that amount and Defendants withdrew their motion. Because of Plaintiff's appeal, the case was remanded to district court. The parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted Defendants' motion. Judgment for Defendants was entered in 2007. Defendants subsequently filed a supplemental joint combined motion for attorney fees for costs they incurred since 2005. In 2008, the district court granted Defendants' motion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the issues presented for review were matters of first impression. Of import in this case was: (1) whether Defendants were entitled to attorney fees under Sec. 1101.1 because they received a summary judgment, and (2) whether a judgment that was appealed and remanded negated Defendants' 1101.1 offer of judgment made prior to the appeal. Upon careful consideration of the arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions in this case. The Court held that Defendants were entitled to litigation costs, and that the offer of judgment was applicable throughout the case, including through any appeals and remand.

The Board of Trustees of Stanford University filed suit against Roche Molecular Systems ("Roche") claiming that their HIV test kits infringed upon Stanford's patents. The suit stemmed from Stanford's employment of a research fellow who was arranged by his supervisor to work at Cetus, a research company developing methods to quantify blood-borne levels of HIV. The research fellow subsequently devised a PCR-based procedure for measuring the amount of HIV in a patient's blood while working with Cetus employees. The research fellow had entered into an agreement to assign to Stanford his "right, title and interest in" inventions resulting from his employment there and subsequently signed a similar agreement at Cetus. Stanford secured three patents to the measurement process. Roche acquired Cetus's PCR-related assets and commercialized the procedure into HIV test kits. At issue was whether the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. 200 et seq., commonly referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act ("Act"), displaced the basic principle that rights in an invention belonged to the inventor and automatically vested title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors. The Court held that the Act did not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions and therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that the research fellow's agreement with Cetus assigned his rights to Cetus, and subsequently to Roche; that the Act did not automatically void an inventor's rights in federally funded inventions; and thus, the Act did not extinguish Roche's ownership interest in the invention and Stanford was deprived of standing.

Plaintiffs Steven Thomas and Thomas Properties, Inc. brought a contract-related claim against New Frontier Bank. The Bank had been placed in receivership. Defendant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), in its capacity as receiver of the bank, moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs received proper notice of the administrative procedures under FIRREA, but failed to comply with them. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim.

Petitioner Timothy Gognat appealed an appellate court's decision that awarded summary judgment to Respondent Chet Ellsworth, Steven Smith and MSD Energy, Inc. In his suit, Mr. Gognat alleged that Respondents misappropriated certain trade secrets he disclosed to them. In the late 1990s, Mr. Gognat developed information relating to "probable" oil and natural gas reserves in the Western Kentucky Area. This information included technical, geographical, geological and business maps, charts, plans, interpretations, calculations, summaries, and other documents. Mr. Gognat shared this information with Mr. Ellsworth, and the two created a joint venture, MSD Energy, to eventually develop the reserves. Mr. Gognat maintained that Respondents misappropriated the trade secrets in the documents by acquiring leases in Western Kentucky without adequately compensating him pursuant to the joint venture. The district court found that the statute of limitations barred Mr. Gognat's claim, and the appellate court affirmed that decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Gognat argued that his claim against Respondents was premised solely on activities dating from 2005. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. The Court found that the undisputed facts demonstrated that all of the proprietary information alleged to have been misappropriated constituted a single trade secret and this was known to Mr. Gognat more than three years prior to filing his complaint. Therefore, Mr. Gognat's claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.