Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Gregory and Kerry Brown appealed the circuit court's confirmation of an arbitration award that was granted to their former general contractor C-Sculptures. C-Sculptures built the Browns' house. The Browns claimed C-Sculptures was precluded from enforcing a contract between them because the contractor's license limited the contractor to work totaling $100,000. C-Sculptures' final invoice totaled over $800,000, and when the Browns refused to pay, the contractor placed a lien on their property for the unpaid amount. The arbitrator awarded C-Sculptures the money it was owed, and the Browns appealed the arbitrator's award to the circuit court, arguing that the statutory limit on the contractor's license limited payment to $100,000. On review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrator followed the statutory scheme to make his determination in favor of the contractor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award.

Gregory and Kerry Brown appealed the circuit court's confirmation of an arbitration award that was granted to their former general contractor C-Sculptures. C-Sculptures built the Browns' house. The Browns claimed C-Sculptures was precluded from enforcing a contract between them because the contractor's license limited the contractor to work totaling $100,000. C-Sculptures' final invoice totaled over $800,000, and when the Browns refused to pay, the contractor placed a lien on their property for the unpaid amount. The arbitrator awarded C-Sculptures the money it was owed, and the Browns appealed the arbitrator's award to the circuit court, arguing that the statutory limit on the contractor's license limited payment to $100,000. On review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrator followed the statutory scheme to make his determination in favor of the contractor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award.

"The Hamlets" is a subdivision within Crowfield Plantation. Covenants for the subdivision were drafted and recorded in 1991. The covenants created an Architectural Review Board that would enforce the terms of the covenants of the subdivision. Respondents John and Pamela Matsell live in the Hamlets, and their lot abuts a golf course. Their next door neighbors built a fence that covers the majority of the backyard that can be seen from the street that fronts the property, in violation of the covenants. In 2007, the Matsells filed a complaint with the Architectural Review Board to have the Board order the neighbors to remove the fence. When the Board did not comply, the Matsells filed their complaint with the circuit court. The Board argued that it had discretion in interpreting and enforcing the subdivision covenants. The trial court read the "clear language" of the covenants, and found the fence was in violation. The court granted the Matsells summary judgment, and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court found the language of the covenants was plain and unambiguous, and did not allow for a fence that could be seen from the street. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision granting the Matsells summary judgment.

"The Hamlets" is a subdivision within Crowfield Plantation. Covenants for the subdivision were drafted and recorded in 1991. The covenants created an Architectural Review Board that would enforce the terms of the covenants of the subdivision. Respondents John and Pamela Matsell live in the Hamlets, and their lot abuts a golf course. Their next door neighbors built a fence that covers the majority of the backyard that can be seen from the street that fronts the property, in violation of the covenants. In 2007, the Matsells filed a complaint with the Architectural Review Board to have the Board order the neighbors to remove the fence. When the Board did not comply, the Matsells filed their complaint with the circuit court. The Board argued that it had discretion in interpreting and enforcing the subdivision covenants. The trial court read the "clear language" of the covenants, and found the fence was in violation. The court granted the Matsells summary judgment, and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court found the language of the covenants was plain and unambiguous, and did not allow for a fence that could be seen from the street. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision granting the Matsells summary judgment.

American Media Services, LLC (AMS) appealed an arbitration award that was decided in favor of former employee, Respondent Mark Steinmetz. Steinmetz claimed AMS breached his employment agreement, and the parties agreed to settle the dispute through arbitration. The arbitrator found in favor of Steinmetz. AMS filed a motion to have the award reconsidered by the circuit court, but the court entered judgment in accordance with the arbitrator's findings. The Supreme Court found in submitting its appeal, AMS did not appeal the order of the circuit court, it appealed the order of the arbitrator. Accordingly, the Court did not have jurisdiction over AMS' claim and dismissed it.

American Media Services, LLC (AMS) appealed an arbitration award that was decided in favor of former employee, Respondent Mark Steinmetz. Steinmetz claimed AMS breached his employment agreement, and the parties agreed to settle the dispute through arbitration. The arbitrator found in favor of Steinmetz. AMS filed a motion to have the award reconsidered by the circuit court, but the court entered judgment in accordance with the arbitrator's findings. The Supreme Court found in submitting its appeal, AMS did not appeal the order of the circuit court, it appealed the order of the arbitrator. Accordingly, the Court did not have jurisdiction over AMS' claim and dismissed it.

An insurance policyholder, TD Banknorth Insurance Agency, Inc., appealed from a declaratory judgment awarding to its insurer, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, all funds in escrow as proceeds from settlement of the policyholder's claims against third parties. The policyholder challenged the allocation of the escrowed funds on the ground that Connecticut's common law "make whole" doctrine entitled it to recover its deductible before its insurer could collect as subrogee. The court held that this issue was undecided under Connecticut law and certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Connecticut: "Are insurance policy deductibles subject to Connecticut's make whole doctrine?"

ConAgra Foods, Inc. ("ConAgra") sued Lexington Insurance, Co. ("Lexington") alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. ConAgra's claims arose from the alleged 2007 contamination of certain Peter Pan and Great Value peanut butter products that ConAgra manufactured. ConAgra subsequently sought coverage under its insurance policy with Lexington for personal injury claims arising from its contaminated products and Lexington denied coverage. At issue was whether the provision in the insurance policy provided coverage in light of the "lot or batch" provision in the policy. The court held that the "lot or batch" provision was ambiguous where, under one of the two reasonable interpretations, Lexington's duties to defend and indemnify were triggered. The court also held that, because the policy arguably provided coverage to ConAgra, Lexington's duty to defend was thereby triggered when ConAgra satisfied the applicable "retained limit" for a single "occurrence." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to ascertain the intent underlying the ambiguous policy language for purposes of determining whether there was ultimate policy coverage.

Claimant filed a claim against Government Insurance Company ("GEICO") for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage after sustaining serious injuries as a result of a car accident. At issue was whether the coverage provisions of the GEICO policy entitled claimant to underinsured motorist benefits under the policy. The court held that claimant was not entitled to uninsured/underinsured coverage where Exclusion number 4 in the GEICO insurance policy was authorized by section 19-509(f)(1) of the Insurance Article, Maryland Code, 1997, 2006 Repl.Vol., and was applicable to the facts of this case.

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners alleging that petitioners had breached their agreement to pay the "Advisory Fee" that respondent earned while acting as petitioners' broker in the sale of petitioners' real property. At issue was whether the seller of real property was entitled to refuse to pay an agreed upon fee to the broker who represented seller on the ground that the broker was a "dual agent." The court held that it was questionable whether there was any legally sufficient evidence of dual agency; and if there was any evidence, the jury was entitled to decide as a matter of fact that a dual agency did not exist. The court also held that there simply was no evidence of any other material fact that respondent had a duty to disclose but did not. Therefore, the court affirmed the jury award of damages to respondent.