Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and defendant, investment trusts that specialize in healthcare-related properties, participated in a two-step auction to purchase the assets of a Canadian company. The defendant's efforts derailed. Plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase the assets, but before the agreement was approved by shareholders, the defendant made a higher bid and made a public announcement. After a flurry of press releases and a ruling by a Canadian court concerning a confidentiality clause that was part of the bidding process, the defendant revoked its bid. The stockholders rejected the agreement with the plaintiff; the deal closed after plaintiff increased its bid. The district court awarded the plaintiff $101,672,807 for tortious interference with contract and with prospective advantage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but remanded for consideration of punitive damages. The declaratory proceedings in Canada did not preclude the claims at issue. Jury instructions concerning tortious interference involving competitors, motive, causation, and breach of the confidentiality agreement as wrongful conduct were appropriate.

Petitioner The Galloway Group (Galloway) is a partnership of lawyers with an office in West Virginia. Galloway entered into an agreement with Respondents Fredeking & Fredeking Law Offices, LC (Fredeking) wherein the parties agreed to share attorney fees generated in litigation. Fredeking filed a complaint against Galloway in Wyoming circuit court, alleging that Galloway failed to pay under the agreement. Galloway responded in the Wyoming courts, arguing that Wyoming was not the proper venue for the dispute. After a hearing, the Wyoming court denied Gallowayâs motions, and concluded that the dispute could move forward in Wyoming. Galloway sought a writ of prohibition from the West Virginia Supreme Court to prevent the Wyoming court from enforcing its order. Upon review, the West Virginia Supreme Court found that Wyoming was indeed improper venue, and it granted Galloway and writ for prohibition. Consequently, the Wyoming action was dismissed.

Respondent Lincoln General Insurance Companyâs insured drove a rental car under the influence of methamphetamines, and led police on a high-sped car chase that ended when he struck a vehicle containing Petitioner Julie Bailey and her son. Her son was killed. The insured pled guilty to five felonies, including second-degree murder. The insured assigned his rights to Petitioner to collect on a $1 million excess-insurance policy issued by Lincoln General. Lincoln General denied coverage for damages caused by the insured, relying on an exclusion in the rental agreement that voided coverage if the car was used to commit a crime that could be charged as a felony. The trial court and the court of appeals held that the criminal-acts exclusion of the policy was enforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions to uphold the criminal-acts exclusion of the insurance policy, finding that Lincoln Generalâs use of the exclusion was a proper exercise of its freedom to contract and provide coverage or damages caused by fortuitous events instead of for damages caused by intentionally criminal acts.

In the first lawsuit, retirees, funded by the union, obtained a preliminary injunction preventing plaintiff from terminating their healthcare benefits. The case is still pending. In the second lawsuit, the plaintiff claims that the union's participation in the first lawsuit violated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and that the union, during negotiation of the CBA, committed breach of an implied warranty of authority, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation. The district court dismissed the second suit, holding that the union did not breach the CBA and that federal law preempted the state law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the union did not breach the CBA, which did not include a covenant not to sue, as claimed by the plaintiff. The court reversed with respect to preemption of the tort claims, which are "analytically distinct, but of a piece for purposes of" jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. 185(a).

Claimant Cynthia Auck appealed the district courtâs order that found Respondent Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) acted with substantial justification when it refused to pay her benefits on the death of her husband. By this refusal, Ms. Auck was precluded from seeking attorneyâs fees. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding for Respondent. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision, and dismissed Ms. Auckâs claim for attorneyâs fees.

Appellant Baptist Health (Baptist) appealed the circuit courtâs order that granted Appellee Andre Hutsonâs class-certification motion. In her underlying claim, Appellee argued that Baptist breached a contractual obligation by assessing medical services at higher rates than its âregularâ rates. Appellee concluded that a class action suit was the only feasible method to address the allegation for over a thousand patients like her. Baptist argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by stretching the rules in order to certify the class action suit. The trial court agreed with Appellee, and certified the case as a class action. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Appellant Kim Crockett appealed the circuit courtâs order in favor of Appellee C.A.G. Investments, Inc. (CAG). CAG was created as an investment vehicle to provide funds to Omni Holding and Development Corporation (Omni). Omni operated a crop-dusting and farm-equipment export business. CAG purchased equipment and land for Omniâs operations and a house for Omniâs manager. Ms. Crockett became Omniâs sole stockholder, president and chairman of the board in 2005. CAG made a series of loans to Omni. The loans were secured by the property Omni used in the businessâ operation, and by the house in which Ms. Crockett lived. In late summer 2003, Omni suffered numerous financial difficulties, resulting in the deterioration of the business relationship between the management of CAG and Omni. While Omni contemplated filing for bankruptcy protection, CAG sought to recover the collateral pledged for the loans it had made to Omni. CAG asked Omni to remove all personal property Omni owned from the premises, and demanded to take possession of the real property. Omni refused to comply, and CAG sued for possession, believing the property to be unlawfully detained. The circuit court entered an order against Omni for unlawful detainer, and found that CAG was entitled to a writ of possession. Omni did not vacate the premises, and appealed the circuit courtâs order. The appellate court dismissed Omniâs appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the circuit and appellate courts.

Appellants appealed an order revoking their pro hac vice admissions in connection with a putative class action suit where the suit alleged that appellants' clients breached supplemental cancer insurance policies that they had issued. At issue was whether the district court erred in revoking appellants' pro hac vice status where the revocation was based on motions appellants filed in response to plaintiffs' request for class certification, chiefly a motion to recuse the district judge based on his comments during an earlier hearing. The court vacated the revocation order and held that, even though the recusal motion had little merit, the district court erred in revoking appellants' pro hac vice admissions where it did not afford them even rudimentary process.

Wanting to retire from the trucking business, the owner entered into employment contracts so that the plaintiffs would act as CEO and vice president and a stock purchase agreement. The relationship broke down while they were negotiating a buy-sell agreement. The owner fired the plaintiffs and paid benefits specified in the employment contract. The plaintiffs did not purchase stock or place $750,000 into an escrow, as they were entitled to do to secure their position. The district court ruled in favor of the owner. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that neither party violated a clause in the stock purchase contract that required that they use "best efforts" to enter into a buy-sell agreement. The plaintiffs retained the right to purchase stock, but chose not to do so, which entitled the owner to terminate their employment. The owner took full advantage of his rights under the contracts, but did not exploit the plaintiffs.

Defendant-Appellant Randall Peterson appealed the district court order that denied his motion for reconsideration of a judgment entered against him for credit card debt owed to Plaintiff-Appellee Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (Citibank). Citibank sued Defendant alleging he failed to pay his bill. Defendant filed what he called a âspecial appearanceâ only to ask that the complaint be dismissed. The district court denied Defendantâs motion to dismiss. Subsequently Defendant filed a letter he had sent to the lawyer disciplinary board to the district court. The district court eventually entered a default judgment in favor of Citibank, and ordered Defendant to pay his bill. On appeal, Defendant argued that the two documents (the âspecial appearanceâ and the letter to the disciplinary board) were âbrush offsâ by the court, and constituted an abuse of discretion by the court in entering the default against him. The Supreme Court noted many of the technical problems with Defendantâs submissions to the lower court. Even in his application for appeal, Defendant addressed no errors at the lower court, and raised no real issues for the Courtâs review. Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.