Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Plaintiff-Appellant Vick Hubbard filed suit against Defendants Kaiser-Francis Oil Company, Texas Southwest Gas and GBK Corporation for breach of an oil and gas lease and a gas purchase contract. Pursuant to 12 OS Supp. Sec. 1101.1(B), Defendants offered Plaintiff $275 for each of the seven alleged breaches. Plaintiff did not accept the offers and did not submit a counteroffer. By the statute, the offers were deemed rejected. Defendants moved for summary judgment that was granted and entered by the trial court. Plaintiffs appealed. Thereafter, Defendants filed a joint motion to recover their costs and fees based on Plaintiff's failure to obtain a judgment for more that the combined amount of Defendants' offers. In 2005, the parties reached an agreement on litigation costs and attorney fees that were to be paid by Plaintiff. Plaintiff paid that amount and Defendants withdrew their motion. Because of Plaintiff's appeal, the case was remanded to district court. The parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted Defendants' motion. Judgment for Defendants was entered in 2007. Defendants subsequently filed a supplemental joint combined motion for attorney fees for costs they incurred since 2005. In 2008, the district court granted Defendants' motion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the issues presented for review were matters of first impression. Of import in this case was: (1) whether Defendants were entitled to attorney fees under Sec. 1101.1 because they received a summary judgment, and (2) whether a judgment that was appealed and remanded negated Defendants' 1101.1 offer of judgment made prior to the appeal. Upon careful consideration of the arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions in this case. The Court held that Defendants were entitled to litigation costs, and that the offer of judgment was applicable throughout the case, including through any appeals and remand.

The Board of Trustees of Stanford University filed suit against Roche Molecular Systems ("Roche") claiming that their HIV test kits infringed upon Stanford's patents. The suit stemmed from Stanford's employment of a research fellow who was arranged by his supervisor to work at Cetus, a research company developing methods to quantify blood-borne levels of HIV. The research fellow subsequently devised a PCR-based procedure for measuring the amount of HIV in a patient's blood while working with Cetus employees. The research fellow had entered into an agreement to assign to Stanford his "right, title and interest in" inventions resulting from his employment there and subsequently signed a similar agreement at Cetus. Stanford secured three patents to the measurement process. Roche acquired Cetus's PCR-related assets and commercialized the procedure into HIV test kits. At issue was whether the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. 200 et seq., commonly referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act ("Act"), displaced the basic principle that rights in an invention belonged to the inventor and automatically vested title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors. The Court held that the Act did not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions and therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that the research fellow's agreement with Cetus assigned his rights to Cetus, and subsequently to Roche; that the Act did not automatically void an inventor's rights in federally funded inventions; and thus, the Act did not extinguish Roche's ownership interest in the invention and Stanford was deprived of standing.

Plaintiffs Steven Thomas and Thomas Properties, Inc. brought a contract-related claim against New Frontier Bank. The Bank had been placed in receivership. Defendant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), in its capacity as receiver of the bank, moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs received proper notice of the administrative procedures under FIRREA, but failed to comply with them. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim.

Petitioner Timothy Gognat appealed an appellate court's decision that awarded summary judgment to Respondent Chet Ellsworth, Steven Smith and MSD Energy, Inc. In his suit, Mr. Gognat alleged that Respondents misappropriated certain trade secrets he disclosed to them. In the late 1990s, Mr. Gognat developed information relating to "probable" oil and natural gas reserves in the Western Kentucky Area. This information included technical, geographical, geological and business maps, charts, plans, interpretations, calculations, summaries, and other documents. Mr. Gognat shared this information with Mr. Ellsworth, and the two created a joint venture, MSD Energy, to eventually develop the reserves. Mr. Gognat maintained that Respondents misappropriated the trade secrets in the documents by acquiring leases in Western Kentucky without adequately compensating him pursuant to the joint venture. The district court found that the statute of limitations barred Mr. Gognat's claim, and the appellate court affirmed that decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Gognat argued that his claim against Respondents was premised solely on activities dating from 2005. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. The Court found that the undisputed facts demonstrated that all of the proprietary information alleged to have been misappropriated constituted a single trade secret and this was known to Mr. Gognat more than three years prior to filing his complaint. Therefore, Mr. Gognat's claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Plaintiff John Stuart decided to build a new house on a small farm. He contacted his insurance agent of nineteen years, Defendant Ronald Pittman for "course-of-construction" insurance to cover any problems in the course of building his house. Mr. Pittman discussed the scope of coverage that the policy would provide. Relying on Mr. Pittman's oral assurance of what the policy would cover, Plaintiff agreed to it. Construction started in 2003. Plaintiff received a premium statement, but not a written copy of the policy. An ice storm struck Plaintiff's building project. Plaintiff contacted Mr. Pittman to initiate an insurance claim. Mr. Pittman told Plaintiff that damage should be covered by the policy. In 2004, Plaintiff received a declaration page from Country Mutual Insurance Company, and found that damage to his house was not covered. Plaintiff brought an action against both Mr. Pittman and the Insurance Company alleging breach of the oral "policy" that he and Mr. Pittman agreed to at the onset of the building project. At the conclusion of the trial's evidentiary phase, Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Plaintiff failed to prove that the oral insurance binder covered his project. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury would later rule in favor of Plaintiff. The verdict was overturned on appeal. The court held that there was no evidence from which a jury could have found in favor of Plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that the appellate court misinterpreted the Oregon law that required him to prove that the oral binder superseded the "usual exclusions" of the written policy. The Supreme Court found that the written policy was, as a matter of law, deemed to include all terms of the oral binder. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

A group of homeowners brought suit against respondent, a developer and general contractor. Respondent then filed a third-party complaint against appellant, its subcontractor, pursuant to the indemnity clause in their contract. During trial, the district court granted respondentâs motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury found respondent ninety-nine percent at fault, and the district court held appellant liable for the resulting judgment. Appellant appealed. At issue was whether an indemnity clause in a construction contract obligates the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for its partial negligence for constructional defects, regardless of whether the subcontractor is also negligent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the indemnification clause in the partiesâ contract did not explicitly or expressly state that appellant would need to indemnify respondent for respondentâs own negligence but linked appellantâs indemnification duties to defects caused by appellant only.

Appellant brought an interlocutory appeal from the circuit courtâs denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The appellee argued that appellantâs appeal was untimely filed. To be timely, appellant was required to file its notice of appeal within thirty days of the order denying the motion to compel arbitration, which was entered on December 28, 2009. At issue was whether appellantâs January 4, 2010 motion to dismiss constituted a post-order motion that would have extended the time for filing the notice of the appeal under Ark. R. of App. P. Civ. 4(b). The Court concluded that because the motion substantively sought to correct procedural defects in a December 21, 2009 motion, the January 4 motion was not a new motion and was treated by the circuit court as one for reconsideration. Because it was a collateral motion, it did not extend the time for filing the notice of appeal. The Court held the appellantâs notice of appeal filed on March 19, 2010 was untimely and dismissed the appeal.

This matter involved a stockholder challenge to a merger in which a third-party strategic aquiror had agreed to merge with the target corporation for consideration valued at $35 per share. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and requested that the court delay the target's stockholder vote and enjoin the deal protections for a period of 45-60 days so as to allow the target to seek higher bids. The court first addressed the issue of whether and in what circumstances Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. applied when merger consideration was split roughly evenly between cash and stock. Based on its analysis, the court held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their argument that the approximately 50% cash and 50% stock consideration triggered Revlon. Therefore, when the board explored whether to enter into the proposed transaction, which warranted review under Revlon, its fiduciary duties required it to obtain the best value reasonably available to Smurfit-Stone stockholders. The court held, however, that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to prove they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, would suffer imminent irreparable harm in injunctive relief was not granted, and were favored by the equities. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was denied.

The Plaintiffs in this action were participants and beneficiaries of a life insurance plan offered by Defendant Qwest Communications International. In 2007, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Qwest, arguing that the Plan made certain changes in violation of ERISA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Qwest. Plaintiffs raised seven issues on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the sum of which was that the Plan misrepresented certain changes that unreasonably impacted employees' retirement benefits. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit found that any misrepresentations were not material or in violation of ERISA. The Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plan.

"Homes by George," run by Adelaide and Rick George, developed residential real estate known as "Esther's Estates" in Newton. Homes by George entered into a written contract with Defendant Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., in which Defendant agreed to perform certain work in connection with the development. Defendant was paid but did not complete the work. Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and claimed that Defendant violated the State Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Defendant counter-claimed that Plaintiff failed to pay amounts due in accordance with the contract. The trial court bifurcated the proceedings to allow a jury to first determine liability claims. A second trial was held on the contract claims. Plaintiffs won on all liability claims in the first trial, and received damages on its breach of contract and CPA claims at the second. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs challenged the amounts of damages they were awarded by the trial court. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its finding of violations under the CPA, and in its damages awarded to Plaintiffs. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the grant of damages was appropriate in light of the terms of the contract, the state case law, and the evidence presented at trial. However, the Court questioned how the trial court arrived at the amount of damages. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings on its damages award to Plaintiffs. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other aspects of its decision.