Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The parties in this case signed an arbitration agreement providing that arbitration would occur in accordance with the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) Code of Procedure, but the NAF became unavailable to administer its Code and the arbitration. Defendants moved the circuit court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The circuit court concluded that a substitute arbitrator could not be appointed under Section 5 because the NAF Code of Procedure was integral to the parties' agreement to arbitrate and the NAF was unavailable to administer its Code. The Supreme Court reversed after considering the language of the arbitration agreement, the language of the NAF Code, and the federal policy expressed in the FAA, holding that Section 5 applied, and that absent some other defense, Section 5 required the appointment of a substitute arbitrator.

Sellers hired Agent to list their ranch for sale. Buyers purchased the ranch after Agent represented that the well on the ranch would produce as much water as they would need for their farming and ranching operation. Later, Buyers sued Sellers and Agent for negligent misrepresentation, maintaining that they were misled about the condition of the well and its potential to meet their farming and ranching needs. Buyers sought $513,000 in damages, which was the estimated cost of installing a new well. The circuit court (1) granted Sellers' motion to prohibit evidence of the cost of a new well as a measure of damages, and (2) prohibited Buyers from testifying on the cost of the well as a means of proving the devaluation of their property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the proper measure of damages in South Dakota for negligent misrepresentation; (2) plaintiffs asserting misrepresentation claims may recover reliance damages but not expectation damages, and therefore, Buyers' evidence of the estimated cost for a new well was properly excluded; and (3) the circuit court properly precluded Buyers from testifying on their land's value.

A casino-hotel filed for bankruptcy. Appellant, the administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders that loaned money to the casino's developers, and Respondents, contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers who asserted statutory liens against the property, entered into a dispute over the priority of their respective liens on the property. The Supreme Court accepted questions certified to it from the bankruptcy court regarding the application of contractual subordination, equitable subordination, and equitable subrogation in the context of a mechanic's lien. Appellant moved to strike Respondents' appendix, contending that the included documents contained information beyond the facts certified to the Court by the bankruptcy court. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the additional information was necessary for the Court's understanding of the certified legal questions. The Supreme Court granted the motion to strike after determining that Respondents' appendix was filed solely to contradict the certification order and the complaint, holding that while an appendix may be filed to assist the Court in understanding the matter, it may not be used to controvert the facts as stated in the certification order.

Appellant, an LLC, purchased an "all-risks" insurance policy for an office building it owned from Insurer. The building was significantly damaged after a general contractor Appellant had hired to renovate the building removed the waterproof membrane on the roof and the building was exposed to substantial rainfall. Insurer denied coverage, concluding that the damage did not result from a covered cause of loss. Appellant sued Insurer, alleging that Insurer breached the insurance policy and denied coverage in bad faith. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer, concluding that the policy unambiguously excluded from coverage for the damage sustained to the building. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the damages sustained by the building were excluded from coverage based on the policy's rain limitation and the contractor's faulty workmanship in repairing the roof. In addition, although the doctrine of efficient proximate cause did not provide relief under the facts of this case, the Court adopted the doctrine of efficient proximate cause in Nevada.

This case arose out of a contract entered into by Iraq's Ministry of Defense (IMOD) and Wye Oak for the refurbishment and disposal of Iraqi military equipment. At issue was whether, for purposes of analyzing subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-11, a foreign state and its armed forces were separate legal persons. The court concluded that, for jurisdictional purposes, they were not. Therefore, the court held that Wye Oak's claim against Iraq alleging breach of contract entered into by IMOD fell within the FSIA's commercial activities exception. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Iraq's motion to dismiss Wye Oak's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff brought suit against her insurer, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith. After a jury awarded plaintiff the full amount of her underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, but denied her bad faith claim, the district court found the insurer's refusal to pay was "vexatious or without reasonable cause" and awarded plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 58-12-3. The insurer appealed arguing that the jury's rejection of plaintiff's bad faith claims should preclude an award of fees under the statute. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err when it determined it could consider whether plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees on her successful contract claim, notwithstanding the defense verdict on the bad faith claim. The court also held that the district court did not err in finding the insurer's refusal to pay was vexatious or without reasonable cause.

Plaintiff brought suit against her insurer, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith. After a jury awarded plaintiff the full amount of her underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, but denied her bad faith claim, the district court found that the insurer's refusal to pay was "vexatious or without reasonable cause" and awarded plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 58-12-3. The insurer appealed arguing that the jury's rejection of plaintiff's bad faith claim should preclude an award of fees under the statute. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err when it determined the statutory fee award did not hinge on the outcome of the bad faith claim and the district court did not err in finding the insurer's refusal to pay was vexatious or without reasonable cause.

In a national emergency, the Department of Defense can augment its own capabilities with aircraft drawn from the "Civil Reserve Air Fleet," composed of aircraft owned by commercial carriers but committed voluntarily for use during emergencies. The Fleet is divided into teams of airlines. The Department awards mobilization value points; the more points a member has, the more non-emergency Department air transportation the member can bid on. Points are transferrable within teams. Members of defendant's team have a contract with a one-year term and a separate three-year agreement concerning distribution of business among members. Plaintiff's suit is based on a 2006 three-year agreement in the form of a letter. A change from what members of the team had been doing ultimately led to plaintiff's withdrawal from the team. Plaintiff subsequently went into bankruptcy. Plaintiff won a jury verdict of almost $66 million. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the "agreement" did not include crucial terms and was so indefinite as to be unenforceable. The court also criticized the regression analysis on which the award was calculated. A promissory estoppel claim, while not preempted, failed on the facts.

In 1995, defendant signed a 10-year lease with plaintiff's predecessor and occupied about 20% of the building. In 1999, defendant's corporate parent decided to consolidate operations and needed up to an additional 60,000 square feet. During negotiations, defendant's CEO allegedly asserted that defendants should not rent to anybody else. Negotiations failed. Defendant ultimately vacated the building but paid rent and looked for a sublessor until December 2000, when it sent notice that it was cancelling the lease. Plaintiffs sued in state court for breach of lease, breach of guaranty, consequential damages and fraud. Defendants prevailed. In 2004, while the corporate suit was pending, plaintiffs filed the individual suit, alleging fraud against defendants; CEO and general counsel. The suit was dismissed. In 2010, plaintiffs filed a diversity suit in federal court, bringing claims for breach of lease, breach of guaranty, and fraud. The district court dismissed, based on res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the the individual suit barred the federal suit.

Aequitas Enterprises and Interstate Investment Group entered into a real estate contract for the sale of 388 properties, all located outside the state. Aequitas subsequently sued Interstate Investment for breach of contract. To protect its interest in the properties, Aequitas also filed a motion requesting an extraterritorial prejudgment writ of attachment on all the properties. The district court granted Aequitas's motion for prejudgment writ of attachment and entered an order vesting title to all the properties in Aequitas. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and vacated its order, holding that the state's rules of civil procedure did not authorize a district court to enter an order directly affecting interests in real property located in other states.