Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved Continental's pursuit of a breach of contract claim against Thorpe in Thorpe's Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying Continental's motion to compel arbitration and disallowing its claim. The court held that the bankruptcy court had discretion not to enforce the arbitration clause at issue and that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Continental's motion to compel arbitration. The court also held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Continental further opportunity for discovery and Thorpe could not contract away its right to avail itself of the protections of 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the lower courts correctly disallowed Continental's claim.

This case involved a dispute between Insured and Insurer regarding underinsured motorist benefits. The district court denied Insurer's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Insured with interest running from the date Insured filed his action against Insurer. Insured filed a motion to modify the judgment, asking the court to amend the judgment to start the running of interest from the date Insured filed his action against the original tortfeasors. The district court granted the motion and modified the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) found that the order denying Insurer's motion for summary judgment was not reviewable; (2) vacated the court of appeals; (3) affirmed the district court's judgment required Insurer to pay its underinsured motorist limit to Insured; and (4) reversed the part of the judgment awarding interest from the date Insured filed the original action against the tortfeasors, holding that Insured failed to timely file his posttrial motion and that the district court erred when it considered the motion. Remanded.

Plaintiffs, David and Barbara Smith, asserted various claims arising out of the construction of their home against Defendants, Donald L. Mattia, Inc. (DLM), Donald Mattia, and Barbara Joseph (Barbara). The Chancery Court (1) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on (i) Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim and (ii) Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim; (2) denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment on (i) Plaintiffs' claim for misappropriation of Plaintiffs' backfill and money paid to DLM that was not applied to their project and (ii) Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to purchase excess lumber and misappropriated $8,836 in connection with the purchase of excess lumber; (2) granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, as Defendants did not articulate a viable cause of action in their counterclaim; and (3) denied Barbara's motion for Chan. Ct. R. 11 sanctions where there was no evidence that Plaintiffs' attorney did not have a good faith belief in the legitimacy of the claims asserted against Barbara.

Appellee Wayne Manning told Appellant Diane Roberson he would give her his share of their jointly purchased mobile home. Without her knowledge, he then transferred title of the mobile home to his name only and sold it to co-Appellee Dennis Wilson. Wilson attempted to terminate Roberson's tenancy in the mobile home. Roberson filed suit in the superior court to be declared the owner of the home. The court concluded that Manning did not give his share of the home to Roberson and that Wilson was a good-faith purchaser and therefore the owner. Roberson appealed, arguing that she is the owner because Manning's gift to her was valid and the sale to Wilson was invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court's conclusion that Manning did not give Roberson the home. The Court also vacated the superior court's determination that Wilson was a good-faith purchaser. The case was remanded for additional findings.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Randolph Farber, Scott Becker, and Critter Clinic (Farber) alleged that the Manager of the Defendant-Respondent State Insurance Fund (SIF or "the Fund") failed to comply with I.C. 72-915, which provides the means by which the SIF Manager may distribute a dividend to policyholders. The district court determined that the gravamen of Farber's claim implicated the statute and held that the three-year statute of limitation provided by I.C. 5-218(1) barred all claims that accrued prior to July 21, 2003. Farber timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the five-year statute of limitation in I.C. 5-216 applied to Farber's claim. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant-Respondent Croft & Reed, Inc. and Plaintiff-Appellant Steel Farms, Inc. had a preexisting landlord-tenant relationship when they entered into a written agreement granting Steel Farms a lease and option (Option A) to purchase a farm in Bonneville County (the Property). The lease had an express four-year term. Steel Farms believed the four-year term was a mistake because the option to purchase the Property did not mature until after the four-year lease term expired. In response to a request from Steel Farms, Croft & Reed’s secretary made a handwritten interlineation on the lease agreement which purported to extend the lease term for an additional year. While Steel Farms was a tenant, it purchased and installed irrigation equipment on the Property, which was attached to the Property’s irrigation system. Steel Farms later granted Walker Land, Inc. an option to purchase the Property (Option B) from Steel Farms. Steel Farms sought to exercise Option A after leasing the Property for four years. Croft & Reed refused. Steel Farms sued, and the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Croft & Reed. Steel Farms appealed the certified judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded, finding that the secretary's initialed interlineation was insufficient to amend the lease and option.

Petitioner Lachlan MacLearn and Intervenor Simon Hutchings appealed a superior court order that denied their motion for summary judgment. Petitioner was driving his 2006 Prius when he was involved in an accident with Hutchings. At the time of the accident, Petitioner also owned a 2000 Audi A6 that was insured by Respondent Commerce Insurance Company. Hutchings sued Petitioner for damages from his injuries. Hutchings made a demand upon Commerce for defense and indemnification. Commerce denied the claim, stating that coverage was barred by the terms of the policy it held on Petitioner's Audi. Petitioner petitioned for a declaratory judgment that Commerce was obligated to defend and indemnify him against Hutchings' suit. The trial court granted Commerce's motion and denied Hutchings', finding the policy barred coverage. Upon review of the policy and the arguments submitted by the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding the policy did not cover Petitioner's use of the Prius, nor grant him indemnification from Commerce for the accident arising out of his use of it.

Michael Warfel filed a sinkhole claim with Universal Insurance Company, with whom he had an all-risks homeowners insurance policy that covered sinkhole claims. Universal relied on a report by an outside firm, which determined that the damage was caused by factors that were excluded from coverage under the policy, to deny the claim. Warfel subsequently filed an action against Universal for breach of contract, seeking the recovery of insurance benefits for the loss caused by damage to his home. The trial court granted Universal's motion to apply Fla. Stat. 90.304 to the burden shifting presumption articulated in Fla. Stat. 627.7073(1)(c). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Universal. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court misapplied the presumption at work in this case and gave the jury an instruction improperly shifting the burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of section 627.7073(1)(c) does not create a presumption affecting the burden of proof under section 90.304 nor does the language create a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence under Fla. Stat. 90.303.

Employee was injured in an automobile accident while working for Employer. Employer had a state-certified workers' compensation plan in effect that provided coverage to Employee, and some of Employee's medical bills were paid by the workers' compensation carrier. Employee had a policy with State Farm that included no-fault medical coverage. State Farm, however, denied coverage to Employee under a policy exclusion that denied coverage for an insured if any workers' compensation law applied to the insured's bodily injury. Employee filed an action against State Farm, seeking recovery of benefits under the no-fault medical provision. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law where, in accordance with previous precedent, the exclusion clearly applied in all scenarios where workers' compensation benefits either had been paid in whole or in part or could be paid in whole or in part.

As a result of Hurricane Katrina, the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association (MWUA) sustained great losses well in excess of its reinsurance. MWUA assessed its members to cover the loss. Members are required to share in MWUA’s expenses, profits, and losses based on their percentages of wind and hail insurance premiums written in the previous calendar year. After the initial assessments, several member companies complained that they had incorrectly reported the previous year's figures. The Board of Directors gave the members a one-time opportunity to submit corrected data (a true-up). Some members (most of whom did not submit corrected data) appealed the assessment following the true-up. The Board denied their appeals. The members appealed their claims to the Insurance Commissioner, and the Commissioner denied their requested relief. Thereafter, the members appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the chancery court, which granted the members relief on all but one issue. Aggrieved, MWUA appealed the chancery court's judgment, and the members filed a cross-appeal. MWUA presented eight issues on appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's judgment on two issues: grouping and reinsurance allocation. But the Court reversed and remanded the chancellor's judgment on the remaining issues.