Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The manufacturer notified franchise dealers that it was discontinuing the Sterling (a subsidiary of Daimler) line of trucks. The letter offered dealers the opportunity to continue as a service dealership under a new agreement. Plaintiff, a dealer, was warned that, following the termination of the existing agreement, if it did not sign the general release and agree to terminate its Sterling franchise, Daimler Trucks would not renew its Detroit Diesel Direct Dealer Agreement. Daimler later terminated that agreement, which plaintiff alleges prevented it from obtaining parts at wholesale and performing warranty work on Detroit Diesel engines. Plaintiff alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, 815 ILCS 710/1 and claims of breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and fraud. The circuit court dismissed all but two counts. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear several counts under the Act, because those counts should have been brought before the Motor Vehicle Review Board. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Plaintiff sells, installs, and services fire extinguishers and fire suppression and fire alarm systems, which it designs for commercial customers. Defendant Garcia, hired as a systems technician in 1992, became a sales person. In 1997 he signed a noncompetition agreement. Defendant Arredondo, a salesperson, signed a noncompetition agreement about a week after being hired in 1998. The agreement prohibited competition during their employment and for one year after termination in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin and prohibited solicitation of plaintiff's customers, referral sources, and employees. In 2004 defendants formed a competing company; Arredondo resigned, Garcia was fired. The trial court found the covenants unenforceable and a divided appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded. Assessment of a covenant includes analysis of the employer's legitimate business interest, based on the totality of the circumstances.Factors include, but are not limited to, the near-permanence of customer relationships, the employee’s acquisition of confidential information through his employment, and time and place restrictions. No factor carries any more weight than any other,

The Heins rented a house from Julia Benintendi and the Perkerwicz family (hereinafter B&P). B&P alleged the Heins caused considerable damage to the property when they vacated the premises. The Heins countered that B&P unlawfully retained their security deposit and refused to reimburse the Heins for home and lawn improvements. B&P sued and obtained a default judgment. The district court subsequently set aside the default judgment and held a jury trial. B&P were awarded damages but not attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees to both parties; (2) the district court incorrectly required each party to bear its own costs because, as the prevailing party, B&P was entitled to its costs under Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-101; and (3) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment because it had good cause to do so.

This case arose out of the 2007 collapse of the Interstate 35W Bridge. Individual plaintiffs commenced lawsuits against two contractors that performed work on the bridge pursuant to contracts entered into with the State. The contractors brought third-party complaints against Jacobs Engineering Group on the basis that Jacobs' predecessor negligently designed the bridge. One contractor also filed a third-party complaint against the State. The State cross-claimed against Jacobs for contribution, indemnity, and statutory reimbursement. Jacobs moved to dismiss the State's cross-claim as time-barred, arguing that the reimbursement provision of the compensation statutes compensating survivor-claimants of the collapse did not retroactively revive causes of action against Jacobs that had been previously extinguished by a prior version of the statute of repose. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provision retroactively revived the State's action for statutory reimbursement against Jacobs; (2) the provision did not violate Jacob's constitutional right to due process; and (3) revival of the action for statutory reimbursement did not unconstitutionally impair Jacobs' contractual obligations.

This case arose out of the 2007 collapse of the Interstate 35W Bridge. Individual plaintiffs commenced lawsuits against a contractor that performed work on the bridge pursuant to a contract entered into with the State. The contractor brought a third-party complaint against Jacobs Engineering Group for indemnity and contribution on the basis that Jacobs' predecessor negligently designed the bridge. Jacobs moved to dismiss the lawsuits as time-barred and argued that the 2007 amendments to Minn. Stat. 541.051 did not revive actions for contribution or indemnity that had previously been extinguished by a prior version of the statute of repose. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the 2007 amendments to section 541.051 did not retroactively revive the contractor's action for contribution against Jacobs.

Plaintiffs DISH Network Corporation and DISH Network LLC (Dish) filed a diversity action in the District of Colorado seeking a judgment declaring that Dish's insurers had a duty under Colorado law to defend Dish in a patent infringement suit. The district court held that the underlying complaint did not allege an "advertising injury" under the policies issued to Dish by the five defendant Insurers. The court granted Insurers' motion for summary judgment, and Dish appealed. In its amended complaint, Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing (RAKTL, the Plaintiff in the underlying suit) alleged that Dish had infringed one or more claims in each of twenty­ three patents. Applying Colorado law, the district court concluded that a claim for patent infringement could "properly give rise to coverage, or even the specter of coverage, such that an insurer will have a duty to defend." For purposes of the summary judgment motion, the court ruled that RAKTL's reference to "customer service functions" in its complaint was sufficient to allege that Dish engaged in "advertising." The court granted summary judgment for Insurers without addressing the third element of its test-­- causation --or the additional arguments certain insurers had raised under their individual policies. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the RATKL complaint potentially alleged advertising injury arising from the misappropriation of advertising ideas. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings: "the scope of advertising injury coverage in this case is at least ambiguous with regard to patent infringement allegations. Although the cases are rare in which an allegedly infringed patent is itself an advertising idea rather than merely an advertised product, ... we hold that '[d]epending on 'the context of the facts and circumstances of th[e] case,' patent infringement can qualify as an advertising injury if the patent 'involve[s] any process or invention which could reasonably be considered an 'advertising idea.'"

In the Chapter 13 case of appellees, Countrywide sought the recovery of attorney's fees incurred in connection with the bankruptcy as well as a determination that compliance with Federal Bankruptcy Procedure 2016 was not necessary for the recovery of such fees. The bankruptcy court held that Countrywide was not entitled to recover its attorney's fees and determined that there was no justiciable issue to resolve regarding the applicability of Bankruptcy Rule 2016 because Countrywide had already complied with the rule. The district court affirmed. The court held that the bankruptcy court and district court misconstrued the provision of the contract governing the availability of attorney's fees and that Countrywide was entitled to recover the fees sought in its Fee Application. Like the bankruptcy and district courts, however, the court declined to address whether Bankruptcy Rule 2016 applied. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose from an automobile collision in which a police officer employed by the City of Newman was driving a City police car when it was struck by a motor vehicle owned and operated by the insured, who had $25,000 of motor vehicle liability coverage. The City had a Member Coverage Agreement (Agreement) with the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency (GIRMA), established under OCGA 36-85-1 et seq. The officer subsequently sued the insured in tort and served a copy of the complaint on GIRMA to notify GIRMA that it might be held responsible as an uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. The court subsequently granted a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals to consider whether that court properly determined that a municipality's motor vehicle liability coverage secured through an interlocal risk management agency was not statutorily obligated to satisfy the requirements for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that were applied to commercial insurance policies and private self-insurance plans. The court held that the district court reached the correct conclusion when it determined that there was no authority for the conclusion that an interlocal risk management program such as that offered by GIRMA must include uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. Therefore, the Agreement was limited to its express terms and did not include the underinsured motorist protection that the police officer sought. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

John and Betty Vlasin leased the oil and gas rights to their land to Ranch Oil Company. Ranch Oil operated on one-half of the land in the lease and Byron Hummon operated on the other half. After the primary term of the lease expired and the wells stopped producing oil, the Vlasins entered into a new lease agreement with Hummon which encompassed the entirety of their land. Thereafter, Ranch Oil took action to revive one of its dormant wells, relying on a savings provision of the lease, which stated that the lease shall not terminate if the lessee commences operations for drilling a well within sixty days from such cessation. Plaintiffs, the Vlasins and Hummon, brought suit against Ranch Oil for declaratory judgment, trespass, and conversion. The court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs but awarded only nominal damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding (1) Ranch Oil's activities on the Vlasins land did not operate so as to extend Ranch Oil's interest in the lease, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to prove they were entitled to damages under trespass and conversion claims, and the Vlasins were entitled only to nominal damages.

McNeese Title, LLC, a Florida limited liability company owned and operated by Richard McNeese, and Richard McNeese and Peggy Owens petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying their motions to dismiss the action filed against them by James Atchison, and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of in personam jurisdiction. This dispute arose out of Atchison's purchase of two residential lots in the Villa Lago subdivision, which was originally a 14-acre tract of land in the Golf and Beach Resort of Sandestin, Florida. According to Atchison, purchase agreements were sent to him by the "developers," who, he says, "developed, marketed and sold the lots" in the subdivision. Mr. Atchison signed a "compliance agreement limited power of attorney," designating Richard McNeese or Ms. Owens as Atchison's "attorney in fact for [his] use and benefit, ... for the purpose of ... signing or initialing on [his] behalf, any and all documents affecting the closing or refinance of the [lots]." The closing was held in 2005, however, many of the other lots in the subdivision had not closed, contrary to the purchase agreements. Eventually, Atchison sued a number of individuals and entities, including C-D Jones, 331 Partners, McNeese, and Owens, alleging that he had suffered damage as a result of activities conducted by C-D Jones and 331 Partners after the closing. McNeese and Owens unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the McNeeses and Ms. Owens. Accordingly, the Court granted their petition and issued the writ.