Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 1990, Pedicini purchased a LICOA supplemental cancer-insurance policy that provided for unlimited cash benefits, payable directly to Pedicini, equal to “usual and customary charges” for radiation or chemotherapy received as treatment. In 2001, Pedicini obtained assistance from an insurance agent, who negotiated a policy with LICOA that capped benefits for treatments at $25,000 per year, lowering the premium. The policy, effective October 2001, tied benefits to “actual charges” made by a person or entity furnishing services treatment or material. Unbeknownst to Pedicini, in February 2001, LICOA changed its practices. It had paid benefits tied to the amount billed by medical providers regardless of the amount accepted in payment, but began paying benefits equal to the amount accepted as full payment by providers. LICOA did not notify policyholders, but did notify its agents. In 2007, Pedicini was diagnosed with cancer. His benefits were only equal to the discounted amount accepted by his provider due to his status as a Medicare recipient. Pedicini won summary judgment on a breach of contract claim, but the court ruled in favor of LICOA on bad faith claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the contract claim, but reversed with respect to bad faith claims.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Oceania Cruises after he became ill on the cruise and received allegedly substandard care. Plaintiff claimed that Oceania negligently hired, retained, and supervised the ship's doctor. Oceania attempted to bring this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3), contending that the district court erred when it held that a limitation-of-liability provision in Oceania's ticket contract was unenforceable. The district court concluded that the provision, which incorporated by reference portions of international treaties and the United States Code, was so confusing that it did not reasonably communicate to the passengers the cruise line's liability limits. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Ford Motor Co. v. S.S. Santa Irene, which held that the application of the limitation-of-liability provision was not an immediately appealable order under section 1292(a)(3).

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of CGI in its action seeking "appropriate equitable relief" under section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. CGI appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendant's counsel and codefendant, dismissing the codefendant from the action. CGI also appealed the district court's grant of proportional fees and costs to the codefendant, deducted from CGI's recovery from defendant. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the codefendant, dismissing it from the action. However, because the court saw no indication that in fashioning "appropriate equitable relief" for CGI, the district court did more than interpret the plain terms of the reimbursement provision, and no indication that the district court considered traditional equitable principles in assigning responsibility to CGI for attorneys' fees and costs, the court vacated the judgment in favor of CGI, vacated the judgment that the codefendant deducted fees and costs from CGI's entitlement, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Starski claims that he had a business relationship with a Vietnamese enterprise (Sovico) and sought to facilitate a $1.5 billion debt swap between the governments of Vietnam and the Russian Federation; that Starski joined with (defendant) Kirzhnev, said to have high level contacts in the Russian government; that Kirzhnev agreed to pay Starski a substantial commission; that $1 billion of the debt swap was completed and $100 million in commissions paid to some combination of Kirzhnev, Kirzhnev’s company, and Sovico; but that Kirzhnev paid Starski nothing. Starski’s suit, seeking at least $25 million in damages, included claims for conversion, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud and unfair business practices in violation of Massachusetts' Chapter 93A. The jury held that no contract had been proved by Starski. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the exclusion of evidence of Kirzhnev's convictions in Russian court for bribery and the bar on cross-examination of Kirzhnev about documents that were seized or destroyed during his arrest by Russian authorities for those same crimes. Starski did not adequately authenticate the convictions and offered nothing to support the fairness of the convictions or the Russian criminal justice system generally.

The State appealed the dismissal of its complaint against seventeen pharmaceutical companies, which the State alleged defrauded Utah's Medicaid program by reporting inflated drug prices. In its complaint, the State pursued two causes of action, violation of the Utah False Claims Act (UFCA) and fraudulent misrepresentation. The district court dismissed the claims based on three alternative grounds. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) although the State's complaint was insufficiently particular under the appropriate Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) standard for claims alleging a widespread scheme to commit fraud and submit false claims, it was in the interest of justice to grant the State leave to amend its complaint under the new standard; (2) the district court erred in dismissing the State's claims under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the State alleged all the elements of its causes of action; and (3) the district court properly applied the one-year statute of limitations to the State's UFCA cause of action and its dismissal of those claims alleged to have arises before April 30, 2006. Remanded.

Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen employed in international disaster relief assistance, returned from an overseas business trip and was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement at Dulles International Airport. An agent seized his laptop and two flash drives after permitting him to copy and retain one computer file and providing Customs Form 6051D indicating that the equipment would be detained for up to 30 days. While the laptop was detained, its hard drive failed, destroying much of its business software. A Customs representative sent a letter seeking to assure plaintiff that a prompt resolution of the issue would be addressed. About 10 weeks after its seizure, the laptop was returned. Plaintiff’s suit alleged breach of an implied-in-fact contract and a taking, with damages totaling $469,480.00 due to lost contracts resulting from inability to access files as well as replacement hardware, software, and warranty costs. The Claims Court dismissed, finding that the complaint did not sufficiently allege a bailment contract and that the property was not taken for a public use within the context of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The Federal Circuit affirmed.

This case arose when the owner of a gas-fired electric power generating plant sued the owner of the pipeline that supplied fuel to the plant for negligence in allowing interruptions in service and in delivering gas below contractual quality standards. The court held that Wolf Hollow could not assert its delivery and quality claims against Enterprise in an action for negligence, and though it could assert its quality claim against Enterprise through an assignment from El Paso, the damages it sought would be barred by the consequential damages waivers. Those waivers also precluded Wolf Hollow's recovery of plant damages from El Paso, but El Paso had not established that they precluded recovery of replacement-power damages. Because Wolf Hollow's replacement-power claim survived, the trial court's declaratory judgment was not moot. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings.

Bill Kuhl brought wrongful termination claims against his former employer, Wells Fargo Bank, asserting claims for breach of an express contract of employment, breach of an implied contract of employment, promissory estoppel, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After the parties engaged in discovery, Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment. Kuhl resisted that motion. After a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on any of Kuhl's claims.

Jackman Construction, Inc. was awarded a contract to improve the Town of Baggs' water treatment plant. After the project suffered significant delays, payments were submitted and accepted, and a dispute ensued as to whether or not the last payment constituted "final payment." Jackman filed a governmental claim as well as a complaint for breach of contract, seeking damages from the Town. The Town filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract, Jackman agreed to waive all claims by accepting "final payment," which it did.

Defendant-Appellee McKinley Hyten obtained a provisional driver's license in April 2004. In January 2007, Defendant's driver's license was suspended because of multiple moving violations and two minor traffic accidents. In light of what she perceived as assurances from her probation officer, Defendant anticipated that her license would be restored at a district court hearing scheduled for later that year. Defendant's mother Anne Johnson gave Defendant a vehicle, and given the anticipated restoration of the driver's license, sought to obtain automobile insurance for Defendant. Johnson telephoned an independent insurance agent who, after being told that the license had been suspended, informed Johnson that Defendant could not be insured until her license had been restored. Nonetheless, an application for insurance from Titan Insurance Company was filled out on Defendant's behalf, postdated to August 24, 2007. August 22, 2007, Defendant signed the application for insurance. At an August 24, 2007, hearing, Defendant's driver's license was not restored. Plaintiff-Appellee Titan Insurance Company was not informed of this fact. Subsequently, in February 2008, Defendant was driving the insured vehicle and collided with the vehicle of Howard and Martha Holmes, causing injuries to both. Titan then learned Defendant did not have a valid driver's license when the policy was issued. In anticipation that the Holmeses would be filing claims against Defendant for their injuries, Titan filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, asserting that once an insurable event occurred and a third party (the Holmeses) possessed a claim against the insured arising out of that event, the insurer was not entitled to reform the policy to avoid paying the third party. Titan appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: in accordance with the Supreme Court's precedent in "Keys v Pace,"(99 NW2d 547 (1959)), the Court found "nothing in the law to warrant the establishment of an 'easily ascertainable' rule." The Court overruled "State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Kurylowicz," (242 NW2d 530 (1976)) and its progeny, and remanded the case for further proceedings.