Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This was the second of two related lawsuits filed by Torrington Livestock Cattle Company (TLCC) against Daren and Jennifer Berg. In the first suit, Daren was found liable for breach of contract, conversion, and fraud. The court entered judgment in the favor of TLCC in the amount of $517,635, but the judgment remained unsatisfied. While the first suit was pending, the Bergs signed a promissory note with the First Bank of Torrington. As collateral, the bank acquired security interests in a variety of the Bergs' property, including livestock and ranching equipment. Later, the bank assigned the promissory note to TLCC. After the Bergs did not make the first payment, TLCC commenced the instant action, alleging breach of contract for promissory note and to enforce security agreement. The district court determined that no material issues of fact existed and TLCC was entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court based upon the deficient brief offered by the Bergs and their failure to follow the rules of appellate procedure.

Maine School Administrative District 61 (MSAD 61) contracted with International WoodFuels for the installation of a heating system at a school owned by MSAD 61. Woodfuels contracted with Thayer Corporation to assemble and install the boiler. Thayer provided the materials and performed the work as required under the contract, but WoodFuels failed to make payments to Thayer. Thayer timely recorded a mechanic's lien against the school for the materials and services it provided to WoodFuels and subsquently filed an action to enforce the lien against WoodFuels and MSAD 61. The superior court granted MSAD 61's cross-motion for summary judgment and denied Thayer's motion for summary judgment with respect to the lien action, concluding that Thayer's services were not lienable pursuant to the mechanic's lien statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in concluding that WoodFuels's heating system was not intended to become a permanent part of the school's property and was therefore not lienable by Thayer.

After an inspection revealed deplorable health conditions for its residents, an intermediate care facility for the developmentally disabled was decertified for Medicaid reimbursement. As a result, until the State appointed a receiver nine months later, the facility operated without receiving federal or state funds. This case was a common-law claim for expenses the facility laid out in the meantime for the individuals still residing there. The trial court denied the facility restitution for the unpaid months under a theory of quantum meruit, afforded relief under related breach of contract claims, but offset that judgment by the amount the State paid for its receiver. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ultimate judgment, which resulted in neither party taking anything from the action, holding (1) the facility exhausted its administrative remedies; (2) the facility's quantum meruit claim failed; and (3) the state was entitled to set off the amount owed to the facility on the breach of contract claim against the amount the State paid in operating the receivership of the facility and which the facility then owed.

Several family members were injured in a car accident and divided the benefits paid by the tortfeasor's insurer. One family member, Hannah Lakes, also sought to recover under the underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement of an insurance policy provided by Grange Mutual Casualty Company that applied to all the family members involved in the accident. The trial court granted Grange's motion for summary judgment, holding that the tortfeasor's vehicle was not underinsured because the per-accident limit of his policy was equal to the UIM coverage under the family members' policy. The Supreme Court reversed after reaffirming its decision in Corr v. American Family Insurance, holding that the tortfeasor's vehicle was underinsured because the amount actually paid to Lakes was less than the per-person limit of liability of the under-insurance endorsement.

This case involved a dispute over operation of an Exxon gas station located next to the Watergate in Washington, D.C. Metroil sued Exxon and Anacostia, claiming three violations of federal and D.C. law relating to the sale of the station by Exxon to Anacostia. The court concluded that the Retail Service Station Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. Code 36-304.12(a), did not take effect until after Exxon's sale to Anacostia and the law therefore did not give Metroil a right of first refusal in this case. Because it was undisputed that Metroil still operates the gas station, buys and sells Exxon fuel, and uses the Exxon trademark, the franchise relationship has continued. Therefore, Metroil's Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 2802, claim was properly dismissed. All of the burdens and risks alleged by Metroil were permitted by the original contract and were not attributable to the assignment. Therefore, the court rejected Metroil's claims that Exxon violated the D.C. Code's prohibition against contract assignments that materially increased the burden or risk on the non-assigning party. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The predecessor insurance companies to Plaintiff, Arrowood Indemnity Company, brought a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. district court claiming they did not have a duty to defend or to indemnify Defendants, the King family, for liability arising out of injuries sustained by a third party while the King's child was driving his parents' ATV on a private road in a private residential community, claiming that the accident had not occurred on an insured location and the Kings' notice of a claim was untimely. The district court rendered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of unresolved state law and concluded (1) with respect to a claim for negligent entrustment under a liability policy that provides coverage for accidents involving ATVs that occur on insured locations, the relevant location is the site of the accident; (2) the private road in this case did not fall under the coverage provision; and (3) social interactions between the insured and the claimant making no reference to an accident do not justify delayed notice, but an insurer must prove prejudice to disclaim its obligation to provide coverage based on untimely notice.

Stiles Apartment filed suit asserting ownership over a parking area and sought interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief to prohibit ACC from exercising any control over the parking area. ACC counterclaimed for declaratory judgment, ejectment, and breach of contract. The trial court issued an order granting the request for injunctive relief against ACC's efforts to assert ownership or control over the parking area but denied a request to enjoin ACC from arresting Mr. Stiles for towing vehicles from the parking area. ACC appealed from the order. The court held that there was evidence authorizing the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court rejected ACC's defenses of laches, waiver, and the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

BB&T brought suit against Borrowers and Guarantors for more than $19 million then due under certain promissory notes at issue. The promissory notes were executed as a result of BB&T's issuance of 16 loans for residential housing development. In Case No. S1161728, appellants argued that the Court of Appeals in holding that no valid foreclosure sale occurred, erroneously relied on its determination that BB&T did not satisfy the Statue of Frauds. The court held that there were no valid foreclosure sales to prevent BB&T from suing on the notes in the absence of confirmation under OCGA 44-14-161, regardless of whether there was a valid executory sales contract which satisfied the Statute of Frauds. In Case No. S11G1729, the court held that, although the Court of Appeals correctly held that none of BB&T's claims was barred by its failure to seek confirmation after the foreclosure auctions, that court did err in holding that the 2008 guaranties did not sufficiently identify any pre-2008 notes and that the 2008 Guarantors were estopped by BB&T's part performance from asserting a Statute of Frauds defense to BB&T's claims against them on pre-2008 notes.

In 2007, Sea Gardens petitioned under OCGA 23-3-60 to quiet title to waterfront property in McIntosh County. Appellants appealed from the trial court's entry of a consent judgment purporting to resolve their ongoing dispute with Sea Gardens over title to the property at issue. Because both parties did not in fact consent to all terms of the consent judgment, the trial court erred in issuing it, and therefore the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings in the trial court.

These consolidated appeals arose from the same facts: in 1990, Richard L. Parker applied to American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus (Aflac) for a cancer-indemnity insurance policy. Aflac issued Parker a policy. The term of the 1990 policy was month-to-month; the monthly premium was $28.50. Aflac received payments for the 1990 policy from August 25, 1990, to August 17, 1996. Parker applied for a new policy in May 1996 for when the 1990 policy was set to terminate. The 1996 policy took effect August 16, 1996, and used the same number as the 1990 policy. Parker renewed the policy once again in 2009, but the 2009 policy contained an arbitration clause. By a special waiver, the 2009 policy's language stated that Parker would give up his "current" policy and its benefits for the benefits in the new one. Parker paid according to the term of the 2009 policy. But in 2010, Parker sued Aflac asserting a claim of bad faith for Aflac's alleged failing to pay policy benefits owed under the 1990 policy. Aflac responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration according to the terms of the 2009 policy. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion and denied it. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Aflac satisfied its burden of proving that an arbitration agreement existed that applied to Parker's claims against it. Because there was no issue as to whether the contract containing the arbitration agreement affected interstate commerce, the burden then shifted to Parker to offer evidence refuting the evidence offered by Aflac and Hunter; Parker offered no evidence to refute that evidence and presented "no persuasive argument" that Aflac failed to meet its burden. The Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.