Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

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Life Investors Insurance Co. of America filed a breach of contract action against John Corrado and Federal City Region, Inc. (collectively, Carrado) for allegedly breaching a settlement agreement that existed between the parties. Life Investors also sought a declaratory judgment that it had not violated the agreement and that if the agreement was not valid, then Corrado was bound by the original agreement between the parties. The district court determined the agreement was enforceable and that Corrado had violated it. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Life Investors. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred by extending the doctrine of ratification based on inapplicable Iowa case law and Restatement sections to a case such as this where Corrado did not argue a circumstance invalidated Corrado's signature on the written contract but instead that Corrado never signed the contract; and (2) accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Life Investors. View "Life Investors Ins. Co. v. Fed. City Region, Inc." on Justia Law

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Whiteman was employed by the FAA and reported violations of regulations, mismanagement, and abuses of authority. Whiteman alleged that colleagues and supervisors began to threaten and intimidate her. She filed EEO actions and reported one incident to police. She was excluded from the radar room and stripped of duties, then reassigned to the control tower instead of her previous job. In 2003, Whiteman settled with the FAA resolving all claims, “known or unknown” in exchange for guaranteed priority consideration for the next available supervisor position. December 9, 2003, Whiteman applied for a position. No other applicants were considered. December 18, 2003, the FAA adopted pay scale changes, which reduced the salary of the position. Whiteman accepted the position, but sued, alleging that the FAA’s delay in notifying her of the vacancy breached the settlement agreement and caused loss of earnings. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Whiteman appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board contending that the FAA had unlawfully retaliated against her for whistleblowing. The Board concluded that the claim was barred. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The MSPB incorrectly concluded that Whiteman’s post-settlement retaliation claim was collaterally estopped, but its conclusion that the settlement agreement is enforceable is supported by substantial evidence. View "Whiteman v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

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The original opinion in this case was filed on June 15, 2012. Because this Texas diversity law case involved important and determinative questions of Texas law as to which there is not controlling Texas Supreme Court precedent, the panel withdrew the previous opinion and substituted the following certified questions to the Texas Supreme Court: (1) Does a general contractor that enters into a contract in which it agrees to perform its construction work in a good and workmanlike manner, assume liability for damages arising out of the contractor's defective work so as to trigger a contractual liability exclusion in a CGL insurance policy; and (2) if the exclusion is triggered, do the allegations in the underlying lawsuit alleging that the contractor violated its common law duty to perform the contract in a careful, workmanlike, and non-negligent manner fall within the exception to the contractual liability exclusion for "liability that would exist in the absence of contract." View "Ewing Constr. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Respondent/cross-appellant Precision Construction, Inc. solicited bids from subcontractors for the design and installation of an early suppression, fast response sprinkler system. Certified Fire Protection, Inc. submitted a bid. Precision notified Certified that it won the bid, and Precision entered into a contract with the owner to complete the project. Certified obtained a copy of the subcontract along with a set of construction plans and sprinkler system specifications. The subcontract’s provisions required Certified to complete the preliminary design drawings of the sprinkler system within two weeks and to obtain a certificate naming Precision as an additional insured. Over the next few weeks, Precision asked Certified several times to sign the subcontract and provide the additional-insured certificate. Certified objected to the subcontract as imposing terms that differed from the bid specifications. It complained that the unanticipated terms changed the scope of work and that it would have to amend its bid accordingly. Certified also took exception to some of the generic contractual provisions, including the additional-insured requirement. Nonetheless, Certified hired specialists to work on the Precision contract, and began work. Precision and Certified communicated several more times about getting the subcontract signed. Eventually Precision terminated its relationship with Certified for refusing to sign the subcontract, for not providing the additional-insured endorsement, and for incorrect designs. At Precision’s request, Certified submitted an itemized billing for the work it had performed; its bill reported costs of $25,185.04, which included design work and permit fees for the project. Precision deemed the costs too high and never paid. Certified placed a mechanic’s lien on the property and sued to recover for its design-related work. Certified’s complaint sought to foreclose the mechanic’s lien and damages for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and breach of contract. On appeal, Certified argued that the district court failed to determine whether a contract for the design-only work existed but conceded that the parties never reached agreement on the full design and installation contract. Certified also asserted that the district court erred in concluding that Precision was neither unjustly enriched nor liable to Certified in quantum meruit because Precision did not benefit from the work performed. On cross-appeal, Precision argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying Precision’s motion for attorney fees. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Certified did not provide sufficient evidence to establish either an implied-in-fact contract or unjust enrichment, the Court affirmed. Additionally, the Court affirmed on cross-appeal the district court’s order denying attorney fees. View "Certified Fire Prot. v. Precision Constr." on Justia Law

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In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court addressed whether a claim for fraud in the inducement was available when the basis for the claim contradicts the very language of the contract at issue in the parties’ dispute. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Court concluded that when a fraudulent inducement claim contradicts the express terms of the parties’ integrated contract, it fails as a matter of law. Additionally, the Court addressed the propriety of the damages awarded by the jury under a separate claim for breach of contract. The Court affirmed the compensatory damages award in this case, but reversed the punitive damages award, as the Court reversed the finding of fraud on which the punitive damages were based. View "Road & Highway Builders v. N. Nev. Rebar" on Justia Law

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Pro se litigant Sharon McCrea appealed a district court's judgment that awarded over eight thousand dollars to CBM Collections, a Missoula collection agency. McCrea owned a business which had an outstanding credit card bill with the Missoula Federal Credit Union (MFCU). She was notified that the debts were being assigned to CBM for collection. CBM subsequently filed its complaint to seek the full amount owned plus interest. McCrea answered, arguing that MFCU was unfairly and deliberately targeting her for collection and that the matter should be "remanded" to the credit union so that she could continue making incremental payments. McCrea did not deny owing the debts. She sought discovery of credit card statements and cell phone billing statements to establish she had been in regular contact with MFCU in an attempt to resolve the matter. The district court granted CBM's motion for judgment on the pleadings without ruling on McCrea's discovery request and entered the award. Finding no error in the district court's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "CBI Inc. v. McCrea" on Justia Law

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Krystal Kinghorn and Kelly Clay agreed that Clay would co-sign for a loan for Kinghorn's benefit. In order to protect Clay in the event that Kinghorn defaulted on the loan, Kinghorn agreed to execute a quitclaim deed to real property that Clay could record if King defaulted. When Kinghorn defaulted, Clay recorded the deed and conveyed the property to BRP Incorporated (BRP). Kinghorn filed suit, and the district court unwound the conveyance, granting summary judgment that the deed was a mortgage and that Kinghorn had a right to redeem the property. BRP filed and prevailed upon a cross-claim against Clay for breach of its warranty deed. BRP later petitioned for a writ of attachment. The district court held that Kinghorn had not timely exercised her right to redeem and ordered Clay to foreclose the mortgage. Kinghorn and Clay stipulated that Kinghorn would purchase the property and that the court should perform an accounting and set off of their liabilities. The court found that a balance remained due to Clay, and entered judgment in his favor. Clay's attorney, Brian Smith (Smith), then moved to perfect an attorney's lien as to the judgment. Kinghorn deposited the amount due with the court, and after the court denied Smith's motion, the court awarded the deposited funds to BRP. Smith appealed the court's denial of the motion for lien, as well as the order for transfer of funds to BRP. Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding Smith was not a party to the action, and therefore had no standing to assert his claim. View "Kinghorn v. Clay " on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, Lewis, Ross and Jennings, were limited guarantors of loans owed by River City, which filed for bankruptcy. Defendant acquired the original lender’s position and reported to credit reporting agencies that the plaintiffs were obligated in the full amount of the underlying loans rather than in limited amounts. In a suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C.1681–1681x, defendant counterclaimed on the guaranty agreements. The district court found defendant liable to each plaintiff for FCRA violations and the plaintiffs in breach of their guaranty agreements. The court awarded Lewis $30,000 in actual damages and $120,000 in punitive damages and each remaining plaintiff $25,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The court jointly awarded plaintiffs $20,024.55 in costs and $218,674.00 in attorney’s fees. On the breach of guaranty claims, the court found Lewises liable for $256,797.29, Jennings liable for $255,367.29, and Ross liable for $306,726.14. Defendant objected to Lewis’s garnishment, arguing that defendant was the net judgment creditor because the proper method of calculation required the court to: add the amounts defendant owed plaintiffs (including attorney’s fees and costs); add the amount paintiffs collectively owed defendant; then set off the former sum from the latter. The district court rejected the argument. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Lewis v. United Joint Venture" on Justia Law

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EAR, a seller of manufacturing equipment, defrauded creditors by financing non-existent or grossly overvalued equipment and pledging equipment multiple times to different creditors. After the fraud was discovered, EAR filed for bankruptcy. As Chief Restructuring Officer, Brandt abandoned and auctioned some assets. Five equipment leases granted a secured interest in EAR’s equipment; by amendment, EAR agreed to pay down the leases ($4.6 million) and give Republic a blanket security interest in all its assets. Republic would forebear on its claims against EAR. The amendment had a typographical error, giving Republic a security interest in Republic’s own assets. Republic filed UCC financing statements claiming a blanket lien on EAR’s assets. After the auction, Republic claimed the largest share of the proceeds. The matter is being separately litigated. First Premier, EAR’s largest creditor, is concerned that Republic, is working with Brandt to enlarge Republic’s secured interests. After the auction, EAR filed an action against its auditors for accounting malpractice, then sought to avoid the $4.6 million transfer to Republic. The bankruptcy court approved a settlement to end the EAR-Republic adversary action, continue the other suit, divvy proceeds from those suits, and retroactively modify the Republic lien to correct the typo. First Premier objected. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. First Premier was not prejudiced by the settlement. View "First Premier Capital, LLC v. Republic Bank of Chicago" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Gol TV produces soccer-related television programming, while Defendants EchoStar Satellite Corporation and EchoStar Satellite L.L.C. (known as DISH Network) distribute television programming to individual viewers via satellite. From 2003 until 2008, Gol TV’s programming was made available to subscribers of certain EchoStar service packages in exchange for EchoStar’s payment to Gol TV of contractually determined licensing fees. Gol TV brought a breach-of-contract suit against Echostar to recover monies due under the contract. The issue on appeal central to this dispute involved: (1) the calculation of licensing fees for the final ten days of the contract period; and (2) the accrual of interest for overdue payments. Upon review of the contract at issue, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's interpretation and affirmed its disposition of the case. View "Gol TV v. Echostar" on Justia Law