Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Chad Jones sued his insurance company, Farmers Insurance Exchange, for breach of contract, bad faith breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after Farmers denied his claim. Farmers defended by arguing that it did not breach its contract because Jones's claim was "fairly debatable." Farmers claimed this defense must be resolved through summary judgment. The district court granted Farmers' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fairly-debatable defense should not be resolved through summary judgment if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the defendant's conduct measures up to the standard required for insurance claim investigations. Remanded. View "Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether an appellate court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court order confirming an arbitration award in part and vacating the award in part based on the existence of unresolved questions of law or fact necessary to a ruling, yet the trial court did not expressly direct a rehearing. The court of appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal, holding (1) the judgment was not final because it did not contain finality language or otherwise state that it was a final judgment and necessarily contemplated resolution of the remaining issues by way of a rehearing, and therefore, the appeal was interlocutory; and (2) no statute permitted an appeal in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed and, for different reasons, dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding (1) the appeal was interlocutory; (2) the Texas Arbitration Act did not provide jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal; and (3) there is no jurisdiction over arbitration awards that are incomplete unless, under certain circumstances, the parties file a writ of mandamus, which neither party here filed. View "Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge" on Justia Law

This case, which involved the summary suspension of the medical privileges of Plaintiff by Defendant, Bradley Memorial Hospital and Health Center, Inc., came to the Supreme Court for the second time. In Plaintiff's appeal, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denying Plaintiff's motion for punitive damages. On remand, Plaintiff was awarded punitive damages and offer of judgment interest. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that Defendant was entitled to immunity as a matter of law under the federal health Care Quality Improvement Act from money damages arising from its summary suspension of Plaintiff's privileges. Remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of Defendant. View "Harris v. Bradley Mem'l Hosp. & Health Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Seagate, alleging a violation of Minnesota Statutes section 181.64, false statements as inducement to entering employment, and a common law claim of promissory estoppel. On appeal, Seagate argued, among other things, that the district court submitted an erroneous jury instruction. Plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that if a new trial was ordered on the statutory claim, his promissory estoppel claim should likewise be retried. The court concluded that the district court erred in instructing the jury, and thus the court reversed. The court vacated the order dismissing the promissory estoppel claim and remanded for a new trial on both claims. The court also vacated the order granting attorneys' fees. View "Vaidyanathan v. Seagate US LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a lease with Defendant containing optional renewal terms. The parties disputed whether the option was properly exercised. Defendant then informed Plaintiff that if it failed to vacate the leasehold, Defendant would pursue legal action. Plaintiff brought this action to forestall that eventuality. At issue in this case was whether the Court of Chancery can exercise jurisdiction over what is essentially a real estate possession action, notwithstanding that the Legislature has vested exclusive jurisdiction over such matters with the Justice of the Peace Courts. The Court of Chancery granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding (1) the Court does not have jurisdiction, under the facts of this case, to enjoin Defendant from seeking relief from the Justice of the Peace Court in this matter where that court has exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) a claim does not exist in equity to nullify Defendant's contractual rights arising from Plaintiffs' purported failure to timely exercise an option. View "Heartland Del. Inc. v. Rehoboth Mall Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a post-trial decision and final judgment of the Court of Chancery that awarded more than $2 billion in damages and more than $304 million in attorneys' fees. The Court of Chancery held that defendants-appellants, Americas Mining Corporation (AMC), subsidiary of Southern Copper Corporation's (Southern Peru) controlling shareholder, and affiliate directors of Southern Peru (collectively, Defendants), breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to Southern Peru and its minority stockholders by causing Southern Peru to acquire the controller’s 99.15% interest in a Mexican mining company, Minera Mexico, S.A. de C.V., for much more than it was worth (i.e., at an unfair price.). Plaintiff challenged the transaction derivatively on behalf of Southern Peru. The Court of Chancery found the trial evidence established that the controlling shareholder, Grupo Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V., through AMC, "extracted a deal that was far better than market" from Southern Peru due to the ineffective operation of a special committee. To remedy the Defendants’ breaches of loyalty, the Court of Chancery awarded the difference between the value Southern Peru paid for Minera ($3.7 billion) and the amount the Court of Chancery determined Minera was worth ($2.4 billion). Defendants raised five issues on appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that all of the Defendants' arguments were without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed. View "Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault Southern Copper Corp." on Justia Law

Defendants presented themselves as president and vice president of ESG, Inc. in order to purchase assets from the predecessor of Plaintiff, Envo, Inc. Unfortunately, after the assets had been transferred, Defendants learned that ESG did not exist. Defendants kept the assets, however, and used them to run a business under the name Environmental Solutions Group, Inc. Defendants subsequently refused to pay Envo for the assets. Envo filed this claim under the doctrine of promissory estoppel and other legal and equitable doctrines, claiming it was damaged by Defendants' action. The Chancery Court found (1) Defendants and Environmental Solutions Group were liable to Envo under the doctrine of promissory estoppel; and (2) Envo was entitled to damages in an amount equal to the purchase price of the assets, plus pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest, and costs. View "Envo, Inc. v. Walters" on Justia Law

This action arose from a technology-sharing relationship between companies engaged in the manufacture of industrial "sand-core" pipe for water and sewer applications. In 2002, the parties entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiffs agreed to provide Defendant with their technology for more efficient manufacturing sand-core pipe in exchange for data, reports, software, and other information developed by Defendant through use of Plaintiffs' process. Over time, the relationship between the parties disintegrated. As a result, in 2009, Plaintiffs brought this action asserting breach of contract and other causes of action related to Defendant's alleged nonperformance under their agreement. The Chancery Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, as well as claims under California Uniform Trade Secrets Act and for common law misappropriation, finding the claims were barred by laches. View "Petroplast Petrofisa Plasticos S.A. v. Ameron Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

In a diversity action involving an insurance dispute, Union Electric appealed the district court's grant of EIM's motion to dismiss. Union Electric is a Missouri Utility and EIM is a mutual insurance company incorporated in Barbados and with a principal place of business in Florida. At issue was an insurance contract, which specified that New York law applied, which was drafted by the member insureds, in contrast to the insurer-drafted contracts commonly found in insurance disputes. While the district court correctly determined that M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. provided the standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss based on a contractual forum selection clause, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether Missouri's public policy against the enforcement of mandatory arbitration provisions invalidated the forum selection clause. View "Union Electric Co. v. Energy Ins. Mutual" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over the proper calculation of royalty payments on state oil and gas leases. Over the years, the Legislature has enacted several versions of the statutory oil and gas lease, and Lessees have entered into “hundreds” of oil and gas leases with the State. Specifically, the New Mexico Legislature enacted statutory oil and gas leases in 1919, 1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1945, 1947 and 1984. This appeal concerned the royalty clauses contained in the 1931 and the 1947 statutory lease forms. Both the 1931 lease and 1947 lease specified that the payment of royalty was to be calculated as a percentage of the “net proceeds” resulting from the sale of gas. During 2005 and 2006 Commissioner audited ConocoPhillips Company and Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company’s royalty payments. Following the Audit, Commissioner notified Lessees that they had been underpaying their royalty obligations and issued them assessments for the underpayment. The Commissioner claimed that pursuant to the terms of the statutory lease forms Lessees could not deduct the post-production costs necessary to prepare the gas for the commercial market when calculating their royalty payments. Commissioner claimed that the improper deductions for post-production costs resulted in ConocoPhillips underpaying royalties by approximately $18.9 million and Burlington underpaying by approximately $5.6 million. In response to Commissioner’s audit and assessments, Lessees filed a complaint in the district court seeking a declaration that Commissioner’s assessment of additional royalty constituted a deprivation of due process, an unconstitutional impairment of contract, and breach of contract. In addition, Lessees claimed that Commissioner had exceeded his constitutional and statutory powers by issuing the assessments and had effectively usurped legislative power by seeking royalty payments under calculation methods not approved by the Legislature. In response, Commissioner alleged a host of counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of the implied covenant to market. This appeal pertained to three orders granting summary judgment on behalf of Lessees and a fourth order denying Commissioner’s motion for reconsideration of the district court’s previous dismissal of his counterclaim for breach of the implied covenant to market. In the first order, the district court granted Lessees’ motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the several orders and claims before the Supreme Court on appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "ConocoPhillips Co. v. Lyons" on Justia Law