Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Under the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the City of Newport provided health insurance benefits to its retired firefighters. After the City decided to modify those benefits, Local 1080, International Association of Firefighters, ALF-CIO (Union) filed grievances and sought arbitration. The City responded by seeking relief in the superior court to determine the arbitrability of disputes over changes to these benefits. The superior court determined that this dispute was not arbitrable. The Union disagreed and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the parties did not intend to arbitrate disputes regarding retiree healthcare, and therefore, such disputes must be resolved, if at all, judicially rather than through arbitration. View "City of Newport v. Local 1080, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

LSED sought to rescind an agreement to purchase bond insurance from FGIC and recover its $13 million premium payment. LSED based its claim on failure of cause, a tenet of Louisiana law that required all contracts be supported by cause. Because the court found that the principal cause of the agreement between the parties was the purchase of bond insurance to protect the bondholders in the event of default, not to reduce the interest rate LSED paid to borrow money, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "In Re: Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his declaratory judgment, contract, unjust-enrichment, tort, and shareholder claims. Applying a choice-of-law analysis, the district court dismissed the contract and unjust-enrichment claims as barred by a Delaware statue of limitations and dismissed the tort and declaratory judgment claims as derivative of the contract claims. The district court dismissed the shareholder claims as insufficiently pleaded. The court held that plaintiff's pleadings were minimally sufficient to present plausible shareholder claims. Therefore, the court reversed as to the shareholder claims but affirmed in all other respects. View "Whitney v. The Guys, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

This dispute between The Saint Consulting Group (Saint) and its liability insurer, Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company (Endurance), stemmed from Endurance's refusal to defend Saint in a lawsuit against Saint in the Northern District of Illinois. The district court dismissed Saint's lawsuit against Endurance based on an exclusion in the policy that stated explicitly that the policy does not apply to any claim based upon or arising out of any actual or alleged violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act or any similar provision of any state law. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the second complaint alleged that Saint engaged in an anti-competitive scheme the exclusion was triggered; and (2) the policy did not cover the negligent spoliation claim in the first complaint. View "Saint Consulting Group, Inc. v. Endurance Am. Specialty, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was severely injured in a workplace accident and sued Trail King, the custom manufacturer of the trailer involved in the accident. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's finding that Defendant had not been negligent nor in breach of any warranty. In the trial court in that diversity case, Plaintiffs belatedly attempted to amend their complaint to add another claim, one under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A for unfair and deceptive trade practices. The trial judge denied the motion, finding the effort to amend untimely. Plaintiffs did not appeal this denial in their earlier appeal. This case concerned whether Plaintiffs may now maintain an independent suit for the ch. 93A claims against Trail King. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice, finding that the doctrine of claim preclusion applied. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that ch. 93A, 9(8) provides an exception to the normal rules of res judicata. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that under the facts of this case, Plaintiffs may not now bring this ch. 93A claim because of the failure to appeal from the denial of the motion to amend. View "Hatch v. Trail King Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought coverage under his homeowners' insurance policy issued by Insurer for damages allegedly caused by sheets of drywall manufactured in China that were installed in his home during its construction. Insurer denied Plaintiff's claim and brought an action in the U.S. district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff's homeowners policy did not provide coverage for such losses. The district court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the policy did not provide coverage for the damages allegedly caused by the drywall because of certain policy exclusions. The U.S. court of appeals certified to the Virginia Supreme Court the question of whether the policy exclusions were applicable to Plaintiff's claimed losses. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that the policy unambiguously excluded from coverage damage caused by the Chinese drywall installed in Plaintiff's residence. View "TravCo Insurance Co. v. Ward" on Justia Law

HPD, LLC and TETRA Technologies Inc. entered into an agreement for HPD to supply equipment to be used in TETRA's future facility. The contract contained a provision for binding arbitration. After the construction of the plant was completed, TETRA filed a complaint against HPD, alleging that the equipment designed by HPD did not perform to expectations. TETRA also sought a declaratory judgment that the contract and the embedded arbitration clause were illegal and thus void because HPD performed engineering services without obtaining a certificate of authorization as allegedly required by Ark. Code Ann. 17-30-303. HPD moved to compel arbitration. After a hearing, the circuit court rule in TETRA's favor that it would determine the threshold issues of arbitrability before deciding whether the case must proceed to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the entry of an order compelling arbitration, holding that the circuit court erred by not honoring the parties' clear expression of intent to arbitrate the existing disputes. View "HPD LLC v. TETRA Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

After Appellant was treated for injuries at a medical center, Appellant filed a complaint against the Center, Phillips Hospital Corporation, and Exigence, LLC, alleging causes of action for negligence, breach of contract, and vicarious liability. Exigence had entered into an agreement with Phillips, under which Exigence had specifically contracted with the physician who treated Appellant to provide emergency medical services for the Center. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's complaint against Exigence based on the two-year statute of limitations of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act (AMMA). Appellant appealed, and Exigence cross-appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed on cross-appeal, holding (1) Appellant served Exigence outside the time limit in which to serve process, and while Appellant obtained an extension of time for service of process from the circuit court, he did so without demonstrating good cause and, as such, that service was defective; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in denying Exigence's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process. View "Baylark v. Helena Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a home construction contract between the contractors, Big-D Signature Corporation and two LLCs. Morris Sterrett was the owner of the property on which the home was built. Big-D filed suit against the LLCs and Sterrett, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The LLCs and Sterrett counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract. The district court entered a partial summary adjudication that was later partially vacated. A jury trial then commenced, but a mistrial was declared. A partial summary judgment order followed. The remaining issues were disposed of by the district court under a sua sponte dismissal with prejudice. Both sides appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting partial summary judgment for Plaintiff; (2) the court did not err in finding that Sterrett was individually liable; (3) the court erred in dismissing the issue of whether Big-D could obtain relief under some of the prime contract change orders (PCCOs); (4) the court erred in finding some of the items in the PCCOs were consequential damages barred by the contract; and (5) the court correctly dismissed the damages claims of the LLCs and Sterrett. View "Big-D Signature Corp. v. Sterrett Props., LLC " on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned and operated a ranch with an 18,000 square-foot lodge. Defendant was a custom manufacturer of high-end wood flooring from whom Plaintiff brought wood flooring while building the lodge. After it was installed, the wood flooring began buckling and had to be replaced. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligent misrepresentation, breach of an implied warranty of suitability for a particular purpose, and violation of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The jury returned a verdict in Defendant's favor on all of Plaintiff's claims. The district court then granted Defendant attorney fees as the prevailing party under the MCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it found good cause to amend the scheduling order to allow Defendant's late disclosure of an expert witness; and (2) did not err when it awarded Defendant attorney fees under the MCPA. View "B Bar J Ranch, LLC v. Carlisle Wide Plank Floors, Inc." on Justia Law