Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This dispute arose from a contractual relationship between Appellant, a provider of audio, Web, and video conferencing services, and Appellee, a corporation engaged in the sale of business software. After Appellee failed to pay for certain services Appellant provided pursuant to a contract, Appellant sued Appellee, asserting breach of contract. Appellee asserted affirmative defenses and a counterclaim to recover what it claimed to be overpayments. The district court granted Appellant's motion with respect to its claim for unpaid invoices but ruled in favor of Appellee on its counterclaim that it was fraudulently induced by Appellant to enter into the original service agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) not finding as a matter of law that Appellee failed to prove that Appellant misrepresented a fact that Appellee relied upon; (2) allowing Appellee to amend its counterclaim to allege material misrepresentation; (3) instructing the jury; and (4) overruling Appellant's motion for new trial or motion to alter or amend the judgment. View "Intercall Inc. v. Engenera, Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Defense issued a solicitation seeking offers for a multiple award, indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract for information technology services. The agency described the services as “Net-Centric Integrated Enterprise Information Technology Services,” including help desk, server, network, and applications support services. The solicitation instructed bidders to submit separate bids for the Basic Contract, Task Order 1, and Task Order 2. Every bidder, including Comint, submitted separate bids. The Department then limited the initial award to the Basic Contract and amended the solicitation. Comint acknowledged the amendment. The Source Selection Evaluation Board evaluated each proposal according to factors in the solicitation, the most important of which was “Quality/Capability.” The Board rated Comint’s proposal as “marginal,” concluding that Comint had a “moderate to high associated risk of unsuccessful performance.” The district court rejected Comint’s challenge of the award to another bidder; Comint lacked standing to challenge the solicitation or award because the agency had not erred in rejecting Comint’s bid on technical grounds. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Comint failed to preserve its right to challenge the solicitation by failing to raise objections before award and that Comint has not demonstrated standing to protest the agency’s failure to award it a contract. View "Comint Sys. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

While driving a car owned by her divorced parents, Plaintiff was hit and injured by an uninsured drunk driver. Plaintiff's father's policy specifically covered Plaintiff's car and paid Plaintiff $100,000 in uninsured motorist benefits. This amount did not fully compensate Plaintiff for her injuries, however, and Plaintiff filed a claim under her mother's policy with Farmers Mutual Insurance Company of Nebraska (Insurer). The policy did not specifically cover Plaintiff's car but covered Plaintiff as an insured. Farmers denied Plaintiff's claim for uninsured motorist benefits under an "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion in its policy. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action seeking a declaration that the "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion was void and that she was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits from Farmers. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers, concluding that the exclusion was valid and enforceable in relation to uninsured motorist coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court incorrectly applied the law when it used the Supreme Court's statements in previous cases to conclude that the exclusion was valid and enforceable under S.D. Codified Laws 58-11-9; and (2) the "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion was void in this case. View "Wheeler v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. of Neb." on Justia Law

Appellee, a graduate of a foreign medical school, was required to be certified by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (commission) before applying for medical residency in Ohio. Appellee thus applied to take a United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) examination administered by the commission. Appellee took and failed Part I of the examination. Fifteen years later, Appellee sued the commission for breach of an express written contract, alleging that the commission had failed to administer part I of the USMLE in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in an informational pamphlet provided by the commission, and the breach caused him to fail the examination and suffer damages. The trial court granted the commission's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the documents attached to the complaint did not constitute an express written contract and that, even if a contract existed, the statute of limitations for oral contracts barred recovery. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the informational pamphlet was not a written contract, and thus, Appellee could prove no facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief, and the commission was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Rayess v. Educ. Comm'n for Foreign Med. Graduates" on Justia Law

Appellant contracted to provide traffic control on a road improvement project coordinated and facilitated by Respondent. The parties' contract required Appellant to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless Respondent to the extent that Appellant caused any injury or damage. After a woman was injured in connection with the road improvement project and sued the parties for negligence, Respondent sought indemnification and defense from Appellant. Appellant, however, denied that it was obligated to provide indemnification and defense. After a jury trial in which the jury found Appellant did not proximately cause the underlying accident, the district court granted Respondent's motion to enforce indemnification, concluding that Appellant presented no evidence to suggest a lack of its potential liability under the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a plain reading of the contractual indemnity language imposed a causal limitation on Appellant's duty to indemnify and defendant Respondent; and (2) because the jury found Appellant did not proximately cause the underlying accident, Appellant did not have a duty to indemnify or defend Respondent. View "United Rentals Highway Techs. v. Wells Cargo Inc." on Justia Law

In this divorce action, Appellant Michael Grisham and Respondent Susie Grisham negotiated based on a draft property settlement agreement (PSA). At the end of an uncontested divorce prove-up hearing, the district court orally accepted the settlement. Michael, however, refused to sign the PSA. After several months, Susie moved for entry of a divorce decree based on the PSA. The district court entered a final written decree incorporating the PSA and denied Michael's motion for mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's procedure complied with applicable district court rules, which obviated any issue as to the statute of frauds, and the PSA otherwise met the requirements for an enforceable contract. View "Grisham v. Grisham" on Justia Law

P.E. Systems, LLC (PES) offered to analyze and reduce the credit card processing costs of CPI Corp. (CPI). The parties signed an agreement that appeared to be a contract. CPI later repudiated the contract, disputing its validity. PES sued for breach. CPI attached a copy of the contract to its answer to PES's complaint, and then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the "contract" was a mere agreement to agree and therefore unenforceable. PES responded to the motion and attached an identical copy of the contract and a PowerPoint presentation it had given to CPI. The trial court found the contract was not binding but merely an agreement to agree and granted CPI's motion, thereby dismissing the case. PES appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed holding that both the contract was enforceable and that CPI had breached it. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals to the extent it held the contract was a valid with an open term, but reversed the balance of the Court of Appeals' opinion. View "P.E. Sys., LLC v. CPI Corp." on Justia Law

Appellants, the M/V Akili, its owner, and manager, appealed from the district court's judgment holding that it was liable in rem for damage to cargo shipped aboard the vessel. Ferrostaal cross-appealed from the holding that the owner and manager were not liable in personam under a bailment theory. At issue was whether (1) an in rem proceeding rendering the Akili liable for damage to, or loss of, cargo was unavailable in this matter because a vessel was not a "carrier" within the meaning of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 30701, and (ii) the free-in-and-out provision in the Voyage Charter Party purportedly absolving the Akili of in rem liability was enforceable. The court held that the first issue was essentially irrelevant because a vessel's in rem liability for damage to cargo existed under maritime common law, not COGSA, for a violation of a carrier's contractual or statutory obligations. The court resolved the second issue against enforcement of the free-in-and-out provision so far as it might be construed to prevent in rem liability of the vessel. In doing so, the court did not decide whether COGSA applied as a matter of law to this voyage because, even if it did not, the Voyage Charter Party's Clause Paramount contractually incorporated the Hague-Visby rules prohibiting a carrier from contracting for a waiver of its obligations regarding damage to cargo. The court also held that there was no in personam liability for the owner and manager where the carriers remained responsible for delivery of the goods and maintained exclusive control and custody over the cargos through agents they hired directly. View "Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Akili" on Justia Law

Bowen's Wharf was a tourist destination including a marina and a variety of retailers, restaurants, and art galleries. In this appeal, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide a question that would clarify the rights and obligations of two adjacent landholders whose combined property comprised the entirety of Bowen's Wharf. The question presented for review was whether the trial justice erred in finding that a right of first refusal granted to Defendant, Bowen's Wharf Company, Inc., by Plaintiff, Ronald Fatulli, in 1969 had expired by expiration of law. The trial justice found the parties' right of first refusal agreement expired in 1979, and accordingly, Plaintiff was not obligated to offer a parcel of the property, a wharf, and a business to Defendant in the event of a bona fide third party's offer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that, on these facts, a wharf or dock may properly be characterized as real property; and (2) Defendant's right of first refusal expired by operation of R.I. Gen. Laws 34-4-26, which governs the expiration of recorded rights affecting real estate. View "Fatulli v. Bowen's Wharf Co." on Justia Law

In this dispute over real property, Roslyn Shephard, in her capacity as personal representative of the estates of real property owners (Lessors), terminated the third lease of Lessees based on an alleged violation of the terms of the lease. Shephard then sued Lessees, seeking to invalidate Lessees' third lease due to the fact that she had not signed it on Lessors' behalf. Shephard alternatively sought an order declaring that Lessees had breached the terms of the lease. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging that Shephard had breached the terms of the lease by wrongfully terminating the lease and by failing to provide notice to them of the alleged breach. The district court found in favor of Lessees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the lease was valid without Shephard's signature; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Lessees had not violated the lease; and (3) the district court correctly determined that the terms of the lease entitled Lessees to notice of their alleged breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Shephard v. Widhalm" on Justia Law