Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Super Wings sued defendant for failing to pay on a promissory note and defendant asserted that he did not have to pay because Super Wings had breached an agreement it had with defendant's company, JLI. JLI intervened. The district court ruled that Super Wings had fulfilled its contractual obligations to JLI, that defendant was liable for failing to pay on his note, and that JLI's claim against Super Wings should be dismissed. The court affirmed, concluding that there was substantial evidence supporting the district court's finding that Super Wings had released JLI's property as required by the December 2008 agreement. Since the district court did not err in entering judgment for Super Wings against defendant and in dismissing JLI's claim, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Super Wings Int'l v. J Lloyd Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the court concerned whether monetary damages are available to a prisoner for violations of the terms of a judicial decree approving the "Cleary Final Settlement Agreement." In 2004 appellee Corrections Corporation of America contracted with the State to house Alaska inmates at Corrections Corporation's Red Rock Correctional Center in Arizona. Byran Perotti was an Alaska inmate at Red Rock. He filed a complaint against Corrections Corporation alleging that Corrections Corporation violated provisions of its contract with the State, as well as various State Department of Corrections policies. He asserted standing as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the State and Corrections Corporation. He based his argument on his status as a Cleary class member and the provisions of the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement, which settled the class action involving various inmate claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Corrections (DOC). Perotti's complaint sought liquidated damages under the DOC-Corrections Corporation contract, as well as compensatory damages, nominal damages, and punitive damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement did not contemplate the award of monetary damages to enforce its provisions. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court's decision granting Corrections Corporation's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Perotti's claims. View "Perotti v. Corrections Corporation of America" on Justia Law

Servicios, a Venezuela corporation, filed suit in district court against John Deere, a Louisiana corporation, for breach of contract providing for Servicios' exclusive distributorship of John Deere products in Venezuela. Servicios appealed the district court's judgment dismissing the complaint. The court concluded that there was no per se rule against standing for non-resident aliens in federal courts, as John Deere contended, and that the principles of prudential standing did not call for the dismissal of Servicios' suit. The court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Servicios' complaint to the extent that it did so as a penalty for its perceived failure to properly brief its opposition to John Deere's motion. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Servicios Azucareros de Venezuela, C.A., et al v. John Deere Thibodeaux, Inc." on Justia Law

This was the second appeal from a judgment of the superior court finding that Annabelle Robbins had breached implied covenants in her deed when she sold land to David and Vickie Lloyd. On appeal, Robbins' estate argued that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the six-year statute of limitations had not expired, (2) finding that the neighboring landowners never possessed or occupied the disputed land and that it misquoted the neighbor's testimony in its decision, and (3) awarding damages in the amount agreed to by the parties in a stipulated judgment because the court vacated that judgment in 2010. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly found the statute of limitations had not expired at the time when the Lloyds filed their complaint alleging Robbins's breach; (2) the court's misstatement in its decision was harmless; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages because the Estate failed to present any evidence that the stipulated damages were manifestly unjust and should be set aside. View "Lloyd v. Robbins" on Justia Law

LVNV Funding, LLC filed a complaint against Rae Nardi for an amount due on her credit card account with Citibank. LVNV claimed, as an assignee, it had a contractual relationship between Nardi and Citibank and a cause of action for recovery of the amount due on the account. Nardi filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the failure to attach to the complaint a copy of the agreement between Nardi and Citibank constituted a violation of Ark. R. Civ. P. 10(d). The circuit court granted summary judgment for Nardi, finding that LVNV violated Rule 10(d), which requires that a copy of the "instrument or document" upon which the claim is based be attached to the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with Rule 10(d) is mandatory, and therefore, entry of summary judgment was proper. View "LVNV Funding, LLC v. Nardi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff-appellants, Bruce Bermel and Pamela Jurga, as husband and wife, appealed the final judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion for summary judgment of the defendant-appellee, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The appellants contended that the Superior Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Liberty. Bermel was injured in an automobile accident when his personal motorcycle was struck head-on by another driver. Bermel, then an employee of the Siemens Corporation, contended that the business policy issued to Siemens by Liberty on a company car that was assigned for his business and personal use, provided him with $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage even when he was operating a non-work vehicle in circumstances unrelated to his employment. Bermel brought this action for underinsured benefits (“UIM”) against Liberty arguing: (1) that the Liberty Policy covering the company car he used was personal to him, even though Siemens was the named insured; (2) that he was entitled to personally access the Liberty Policy because Siemens automatically deducted a nominal fee from his paycheck for his personal use of the vehicle assigned to him that was insured by the Liberty Policy; and (3) that the Liberty Policy was ambiguously drafted and should have been construed in his favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court correctly found Siemens, and not Bermel, to be the named insured on the Liberty Policy, that the nominal fee charged to Bermel by Siemens for the use of the car did not make Bermel a named insured under the Liberty Policy, and that the Liberty Policy was unambiguous. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "Bermel v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Policyholder obtained a title insurance policy from Insurer for a parcel of property it owned. Because an ambiguity in the legal description of the property prevented Policyholder from reselling the property, Policyholder filed an action seeking a declaration of Insurer's obligations under the policy and alleging breach of contract against Insurer. The district court held in favor of Policyholder, concluding that Insurer was liable because the title to the property was unmarketable. The court, however, limited Policyholder's recovery to the face value of the policy. The court of appeals affirmed the finding of liability but held that Policyholder was entitled to recovery in excess of the policy limit. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to Policyholder on the question of Insurer's liability for its failure to defend and indemnify Policyholder; but (2) reversed the court of appeals' award of damages to Policyholder in excess of the policy limit and remanded for reinstatement of the district court's award of damages. View "Mattson Ridge, LLC v. Clear Rock Tile, LLP" on Justia Law

The parties in this case entered into a written contract under which Plaintiff, a contractor, agreed to install a fence around real property owned by Defendant. Defendant paid a deposit of half of the amount due upon execution of the contract but refused to pay the balance owed on the contract upon substantial completion of the fence. Plaintiff sued Defendant. In his answer, Defendant alleged he was not liable under the contract because Plaintiff failed to comply with the Home Improvement Act by failing to indicate a starting and completion date in the contract. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that the contract did not comply with the Act but that Defendant invoked the Act in bad faith. The appellate court reversed the award of attorney's fees, costs, and interest, but otherwise directed judgment in favor of Plaintiff for the balance due under the bad faith doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff the balance due. View "Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the servicer of their home loan, violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, because it did not respond adequately to three letters in which they challenged the monthly payment due on their loan. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim because a servicer must receive a valid "qualified written request" to incur the duty to respond under section 2605, and it determined that the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered the statutory duty. Because plaintiffs' letters to defendant challenged the terms of their loans and requested modification of various loan and mortgage documents, they were not qualified written requests relating to the servicing of plaintiffs' loan. Because section 2605 did not require a servicer to respond to such requests, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Medrano, et al v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff corporation and two of its officers brought suit against Defendant, a brokerage firm, to recover damages that allegedly resulted when the president of the corporation independently engaged the brokerage firm's services to locate and lease new office space while the corporation was still liable under a previous lease, which it later breached. Plaintiff sued under theories of inducement, tortious interference, and negligence. The district court concluded that the brokerage company was not liable to Plaintiff for assisting the president to enter into a new lease while knowing that the corporation remained liable under a previous lease. The Supreme Court affirmed, either not reaching Appellants' assignments of error or finding them to be without merit. View "Pro. Mgmt. Midwest, Inc. v. Lund Co." on Justia Law