Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellee McKinley Hyten obtained a provisional driver's license in April 2004. In January 2007, Defendant's driver's license was suspended because of multiple moving violations and two minor traffic accidents. In light of what she perceived as assurances from her probation officer, Defendant anticipated that her license would be restored at a district court hearing scheduled for later that year. Defendant's mother Anne Johnson gave Defendant a vehicle, and given the anticipated restoration of the driver's license, sought to obtain automobile insurance for Defendant. Johnson telephoned an independent insurance agent who, after being told that the license had been suspended, informed Johnson that Defendant could not be insured until her license had been restored. Nonetheless, an application for insurance from Titan Insurance Company was filled out on Defendant's behalf, postdated to August 24, 2007. August 22, 2007, Defendant signed the application for insurance. At an August 24, 2007, hearing, Defendant's driver's license was not restored. Plaintiff-Appellee Titan Insurance Company was not informed of this fact. Subsequently, in February 2008, Defendant was driving the insured vehicle and collided with the vehicle of Howard and Martha Holmes, causing injuries to both. Titan then learned Defendant did not have a valid driver's license when the policy was issued. In anticipation that the Holmeses would be filing claims against Defendant for their injuries, Titan filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, asserting that once an insurable event occurred and a third party (the Holmeses) possessed a claim against the insured arising out of that event, the insurer was not entitled to reform the policy to avoid paying the third party. Titan appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: in accordance with the Supreme Court's precedent in "Keys v Pace,"(99 NW2d 547 (1959)), the Court found "nothing in the law to warrant the establishment of an 'easily ascertainable' rule." The Court overruled "State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Kurylowicz," (242 NW2d 530 (1976)) and its progeny, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

These cases arose from a declaratory judgment action filed by a trustee seeking to determine the effect of an in terrorem clause in an express trust. At issue was whether appeals that involved the proper interpretation of a trust provision came within the court's general appellate jurisdiction over "equity cases," Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(2), because the resolution of that legal issue would affect the administration of the trust. Consistent with the court's precedent on this question, the court concluded that such cases did not come within its equity jurisdiction.

Plaintiff, insured under two-long term disability plans, sued the Plans when Unum decided to deduct his Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefit as deductible income under each plan, resulting in what he termed a "double offset." Because the court held that Unum's decision was not an abuse of discretion, that the plain language of the Plans permitted the deduction of the SSDI benefit from each plan, and that plaintiff was not entitled to equitable estoppel, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plans.

This case arose from a contract entered into by the parties where Ewing agreed to construct tennis courts for the school district. At issue was the interpretation of a Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurance policy under Texas law. The district court held that a CGL policy's contractual liability exclusion applied in this case and that no exception restored coverage. The insured construction company faced liability, if at all, because it contracted to construct usable tennis courts for the school district and it had allegedly failed to perform. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted the contractual liability exclusion and correctly applied that exclusion with respect to the insurer's duty to defend the construction company. The court held, however, that the district court was premature in applying the exclusion to the insurer's duty to indemnify.

David Bennett and Bennett & Bennett Construction, Inc. ("Bennett") appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of the claims alleging fraud in the inducement and the tort of outrage brought against them by Barbara and Leotes Skinner. The Skinners entered into a construction-services contract with Bennett, pursuant to which Bennett was to renovate and remodel their residence located in Oxford. After disagreements developed between the parties, the Skinners sued Bennett, alleging claims of breach of contract; breach of warranty; fraud in the inducement; assault and battery; the tort of outrage; and negligence, wantonness and recklessness. Bennett moved to compel arbitration of all claims, arguing that, because each of the claims alleged by the Skinners arose from the construction-services contract or were related to the construction-services contract, the claims were subject to arbitration. Furthermore, Bennett argued that the tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and that the Skinners should not be allowed to avoid arbitration because they cast their claim as a tort. The Skinners responded, arguing that their agreement to the arbitration clause in the contract was obtained fraudulently. The trial court denied Bennett's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Skinners' tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and thus was a proper claim for arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In this real estate dispute, some of the defendants filed a motion for sanctions, alleging Defendant brought the action to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation. The district court ordered sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel for $1,000. The court of appeals affirmed the sanctions, ordering them payable to the jury and witness fund. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of the sanction at $1,000; (2) the court abused its discretion by ordering the sanction be paid to the jury and witness fund; and (3) given Rule 1.413(1)'s preference of compensating victims, the district court should enter an order requiring Plaintiff's counsel to pay the sanction in equal sums to the defendants who sought the sanction as partial reimbursement of the legal fees they incurred in defending against the unfounded claims brought against them. Remanded.

Plaintiff, an African-American male of Nigerian origin, was hired by Atlantek, Inc. Zebra Technologies later acquired Atlantek. Three years later, Plaintiff was laid off. Plaintiff signed a release document and submitted it to Zebra Atlantek without consulting with his attorney. According to another document received by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's receipt of separation benefits was contingent on the receipt by Zebra Atlantek of a signed copy of the release document wherein Plaintiff released any claims under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) or any state law prohibiting employment discrimination or harassment. Plaintiff later commenced an action against Defendants, Zebra Atlantek and several individuals, alleging that he had been discriminated against in violation of the FEPA and State Civil Rights Act. Defendants counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit constituted a material breach of the release document. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that FEPA did not render the release document void as it applied to Plaintiff's pending FEPA claims.

In this case the Supreme Court addressed several issues arising from a dispute over a series of property transactions. Plaintiffs sued Defendants under various theories of liability, including breach of contract and fraud. Defendants countersued for, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation and fraud by concealment. Defendants also brought a claim against Plaintiffs under Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.257, which provides a statutory cause of action for the victim of a real estate licensee's breach of the various duties imposed by Nev. Rev. Stat 645.252-.254. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court, holding (1) compromise offers are not admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a failure to mitigate damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.105; (2) although Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.251 does not, in all instances, shield real estate licensees from common law forms of liability, it precludes such liability when the type of conduct complained of is covered by sections 645.252-.254; and (3) punitive damages may not be recovered under section 645.257, but compensatory damages are recoverable under the statute in accordance with the measure of damages that appropriately compensates the injured party for the losses sustained as a result of the real estate licensee's violations. Remanded.

The parcel of land that was the subject of this appeal was once owned by a school. An adjacent property, now owned by Defendants, Eric and Wendy Federer, was previously owned by Wendy's father. In 1990, the school sold its property to a limited liability corporation subject to a set of restrictive covenants that did not expressly reference any third parties. The present action arose when Plaintiff, the current owner of the property, sought permits to develop the school property in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the restrictive covenants. Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish the unenforceability of the restrictive covenants as to Defendants. Defendants counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to Plaintiff's property and to enforce the restrictive covenants. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the covenants at issue in this case were not void as a matter of law; and (2) questions of material fact existed as to whether Defendants were entitled to enforce them. Remanded.

Appellants, a clinic study center and three medical doctors, filed an action against Appellees, Dr. Samuel and Marilyn Boellner, alleging breaches of contract for a covenant not to compete, tortious inteference with a business expectancy, defamation, and injunctive relief. Appellees counterclaimed for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and declaratory judgment on the noncompete agreement. The trial court returned verdicts in favor of both Appellants and Appellees. Appellants later caused a writ of garnishment to be issued to reach assets of Marilyn Boellner held in an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). Appellants moved to declare the IRA statute unconstitutional. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion and quashed the writ of garnishment. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute was constitutional, as the IRA exemption provided in Ark. Code Ann. 16-66-220(a)(1) is not an absolute exemption of all personal property, and, as such, does not offend Ark. Const. art. IV, section 2.