Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Shirley Spencer and Christy Gee petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Greene Circuit Court to vacate its judgment granting the motion of K & K Excavating, LLC ("K & K"), to enforce a forum-selection clause and transferring the petitioners' action against K & K to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. In 2007, Spencer contracted with K & K for the installation of a septic system at the petitioners' house in Eutaw. The petitioners separately contracted with S. Boyd, Inc. ("Boyd"), to conduct the excavation work necessary to install the septic system. The contract between the parties included a forum-selection clause. When mediation of the case proved unsuccessful, the Greene Circuit Court ordered another pretrial conference to be held. K & K filed a reply brief in support of the transfer motion. The Greene Circuit Court ultimately entered an order granting the transfer motion as to K & K and severing the petitioners' claims against K & K from those asserted against the Boyd defendants; the Greene Circuit Court denied the transfer motion as to the Boyd defendants. The petitioners did not challenge the validity of the forum selection clause. Instead, the petitioners argued only that K & K waived its right to enforce the forum-selection clause "by defending the lawsuit in Greene County for two years, through multiple pretrial conferences and completion of party discovery." The Supreme Court agreed. Under the facts of this case, K & K's substantial invocation of the litigation process in Greene County clearly evinced its intention to abandon its right to enforce the forum-selection clause in favor of the judicial process. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting the transfer motion. View "Spencer v. S. Boyd, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a contractor's bid was responsive to the Delaware Department of Transportation's (DelDOT) Request for Proposals (RFP). The contractor's bid did not include required paint certifications. In addition, the bid reflected the contractor's plan to use new steel beams, rather than refurbish the existing ones, as required by the RFP. The contractor chose to submit a bid that did not conform to the project specifications. The Supreme Court concluded that the contractor therefore did so at its own risk. DelDOT's decision that the bid was non-responsive was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in DelDOT's favor. View "Julian v. Delaware Dep't. of Transportation" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, Motorola appealed from the district court's preliminary injunction to enjoin Motorola temporarily from enforcing a patent injunction that it obtained against Microsoft in Germany. The underlying case before the district court concerned how to interpret and enforce patent-holders' commitments to industry standard-setting organizations (SSOs), which established technical specifications to ensure that products from different manufacturers were compatible with each other. Specifically, the case involved the H.264 video coding standard set by International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the 802.11 wireless local area network standard set by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). The court held that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the district court's narrowly tailored preliminary injunction was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the court of appeals erred in holding that an action seeking reformation of an executory contract does not accrue until a party discovers a mutual mistake in the contract language. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff's reformation claim was barred by Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-511(1) because the mutual mistake occurred when the contract was executed, which was more than five years before this case was filed. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) a cause of action for reformation of a contract based on an alleged mutual mistake accrues when the mistake is made, not when the mutual mistake is discovered; and (2) the application of these rules does not depend on whether a contract is executed or executory, and the rules do not vary just because the contract relates to the title of real property. View "Law v. Law Co. Bldg. Assocs." on Justia Law

In this contract dispute, Respondent filed an action against Petitioner, claiming negligent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, unjust enrichment, and reformation of the contract. During discovery, Petitioner propounded to Respondent a request for the production of documents, seeking, inter alia, corporate financial documents, tax returns, budgets, and auditor's reports. Respondent objected to the request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and irrelevant. Petitioner, in turn, moved to compel Respondent to provide the requested documents. The trial court granted Petitioner's motion and ordered Respondent to produce the requested items. Respondent petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of certiorari. The court of appeal quashed the order compelling production, holding that the order of the trial court compelling production was overbroad. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the basis stated for certiorari relief was incorrect and in express conflict with numerous Florida decisions; and (2) because the requested information was relevant to the disputed issues and Respondent had not demonstrated irreparable harm through its disclosure, the information was discoverable. View "Bd. Of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Am. Educ. Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Cambridge appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Concentra. Cambridge and Concentra owed each other contractual duties of defense and indemnification. Cambridge and a subsidiary of Concentra were later named as defendants in a state court lawsuit. Concentra settled and obtained a release that benefited Cambridge to the extent of Concentra's indemnification obligation. However, Concentra rejected Cambridge's tender of defense. Cambridge filed suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that Concentra owed it contractual defense and indemnification for the costs that Cambridge incurred in settling the state-court litigation. The court affirmed summary judgment of the district court dismissing Cambridge's claims against Concentra for indemnification, but reversed summary judgment with respect to Concentra's duty to defend. View "Cambridge Integrated Services v. Concentra Integrated Services" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Appellants, who were employees of a contractor that performed work pursuant to a municipal contract with the City of Minneapolis, may recover for the contractor's alleged breach of a prevailing wage provision in the contract. Appellants brought this action against the contractor, alleging that the contractor failed to pay them the prevailing wage in breach of the contract with the City, that the breach of the contract by the contractor violated state wage statutes, and that the contractor was unjustly enriched as a result. The district court granted the contractor's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Appellants were not intended third-party beneficiaries and that without a viable claim for breach of contract, Appellants' other claims failed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Appellants were not intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract and that Appellants' other claims lacked merit. View "Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc." on Justia Law

A pipeline owner and a natural gas supplier entered into a contract for the transportation of the supplier's natural gas. The parties later became embroiled in a dispute and submitted their dispute to binding arbitration. After the arbitrators issued a decision largely favorable to the supplier, the pipeline owner sought to vacate the decision in the district court. The district court entered judgment in favor of the supplier. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration panel's decision to make the pipeline owner by for the lateral costs was not in manifest disregard of the law; and (2) the panel did not compromise on the matter of the destination-end heating costs, which it imposed on the supplier for the future but declined to make the ruling retroactive; and (3) even assuming that the arbitrators committed misconduct by considering in their decision two documents among the three that the panel attached to its written decision, the misconduct could not have been prejudicial. View "Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Servs. (U.S.) Inc." on Justia Law

Haight purchased an insurance policy that included underinsured motorist coverage for the named insured (him) and any family members. After his teenage daughter Nicole was injured while riding in a car driven by an acquaintance whose insurance did not fully compensate her, she made an underinsured motorist claim on her father’s policy. The insurance company maintained that Nicole is not entitled to coverage because she was not riding in a vehicle listed on her father’s policy when she was hurt. The district court ruled in favor of Haight. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The policy provides underinsured motorist coverage to the named insured and his family members that does not require that they be occupying a vehicle listed on the policy during the accident. View "Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Haight" on Justia Law

James Turner and Julie Viers opened a line of credit with Wells Fargo Bank and granted Wells Fargo a deed of trust on property they owned as security for the line of credit. Later, John Turner, Christina Turner, and Sandy Couch (the John Turners) purchased the property. Julie and James paid off the entire outstanding balance under the credit line agreement using the proceeds from the sale of the property to the John Turners, but Julie subsequently borrowed $169,090 under the credit line agreement secured by the property. Thereafter, Wells Fargo refused to release the deed of trust. The John Turners then filed a complaint to quiet title to the property. The district court granted Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the John Turners could not enforce the terms of the credit line agreement because they were not intended beneficiaries of the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the John Turners were not entitled to judgment requiring Wells Fargo to release the deed of trust the bank held on the property; and (2) the John Turners failed to establish prima facie claims of promissory or equitable estoppel. View "Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law