Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

MCR, LLC filed an action for condemnation of a compressor station site on property owned by Appellees. Appellees counterclaimed against MCR for damage to their property and claimed punitive damages. Appellees sought restoration costs as the measure of damages for their contract, trespass, and nuisance claims. The parties stipulated to the substitution of MCR Transmission, LLC (MCR-T) for MCR on the condemnation claim. The district court dismissed MCR-T's condemnation claim and granted Appellees' summary judgment motion allowing Appellees to seek restoration costs. The jury awarded restoration costs and punitive damages to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in dismissing MCR-T's motion to condemn Appellees' property for a compressor station, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Appellees' property was necessary for the compressor station; (2) properly determined that Appellees were entitled to seek restoration costs as the measure of their damages; and (3) properly admitted evidence at trial that MCR had jumped Appellees' bid on state trust land leases. View "McEwen v. MCR, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit against several power companies alleging that the Colstrip power facility, which bordered land owned by Plaintiffs, contaminated groundwater under their property. The parties proceeded with mediation after three years of litigation. The mediation ended with the transmission of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to the parties' counsel. After some of Plaintiffs expressed reservations about accepting the settlement, the power companies filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that the MOU was a written and signed settlement agreement. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding that the MOU was a binding, enforceable settlement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by finding the MOU was an enforceable settlement agreement; (2) did not err by allowing parol evidence to change an option to purchase into a right of first refusal; and (3) erred in admitting evidence protected by the mediation confidentiality statute, but the error was harmless. View "Kluver v. PPL Mont., LLC" on Justia Law

Boyne USA, Inc. filed an action for breach of contract against Blixseth Group, Inc. that covered a land sale for fifteen acres of property, seeking specific performance. Boyne joined Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC (Yellowstone) as a party due to Yellowstone's acquisition of the contested property. Meanwhile, Yellowstone conveyed the property to Spanish Peaks Development, LLC (SPD). SPD, in turn, conveyed the property to Lone Mountain Holdings, LLC (LMH). Boyne joined SPD and LMH as parties. Boyne further alleged abuse of the legal process and deceit. The district court dismissed Blixeth Group and Yellowstone due to Yellowstone's bankruptcy. After a jury trial, (1) the jury awarded Boyne $300,000 from each SPD and LMH based on its determination that Defendants had deceived Boyne and had abused the legal process, (2) the district court awarded Boyne specific performance on the agreement; and (3) the court awarded attorney fees to Boyne. The Supreme Court affirmed subject to one minor modification, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment, and that Boyne was entitled to legal fees on appeal. View "Boyne USA, Inc. v. Spanish Peaks Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Superior Court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen a summary judgment entered against appellants after they missed the deadline for filing a response to appellees’ motion. Appellants mistakenly believed that they had 20 additional days to respond because appellees filed supplemental materials two weeks after filing their motion. The trial court apparently accepted the fact that appellants had made a mistake, but refused to reopen the case because appellants were unable to justify their mistake. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court failed to give adequate weight to the policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits, and reversed. View "Keener v. Isken" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the interpretation of a commercial general liability (CGL) policy that Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange sold to Plaintiff Bresee Homes, Inc. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Farmers and denied Bresee's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The dispute stemmed from a homeowner suit in which Bresee claimed Farmers had a duty under the CGL to defend, and to reimburse for any damages arising out of the homeowners' suit. Upon review of the subject policy, the Supreme Court concluded that the Farmers owed a duty to defend to Bresee. Accordingly, the Court concluded the trial court erred in granting Farmers' motion for summary judgment, and for denying Bresee's cross-motion on the issue of the duty to defend. The Court could not determine whether the policy afforded a basis for indemnification, and as such, neither party was entitled to summary judgment on that issue. The case was reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Bresee Homes, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS) signed an employment agreement with Plaintiff containing a clause to compel arbitration for any disputes regarding the employment agreement. After Plaintiff's employment was terminated, Plaintiff brought an action against BCBS claiming that BCBS violated the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA). Plaintiff, however, could bring a WDEA claim only if she did not have a written contract of employment for a specific term. The district court compelled arbitration to allow the arbitrator to determine in the first instance whether Plaintiff had a term employment contract. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order to compel arbitration, holding that because the instant dispute implicated the terms or provisions of the employment agreement, the district court correctly determined that an arbitrator should decide, in the first instance, whether Plaintiff was an at-will employee or whether she had a term contract. View "Marsden v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc." on Justia Law

Respondents brought an action against Appellants, alleging breach of contract and fraud- and tort-based claims based on their purchase of two furniture stores from Appellants. The district court entered judgment for Respondents. The court allowed Respondents to rescind the agreement and awarded them damages. Although they appealed the judgment, Appellants did not obtain a stay of execution. Thus, despite the pending appeal, Respondents obtained a writ of execution on the judgment, allowing them to execute against one appellant's personal property. Respondents subsequently purchased Appellants' rights and interests in the district court action. Respondents moved to substitute as real parties in interest and dismiss the appeal on the basis that they acquired Appellants' claims and defenses at the sheriff's sale. The Supreme Court denied Respondents' motion, holding that Nevada's judgment execution statutes do not include the right to execute on a party's defenses to an action, as permitting a judgment creditor to execute on a judgment in such a way would cut of a debtor's defenses in a manner inconsistent with due process principles. View "Butwinick v. Hepner" on Justia Law

This appeal involved litigation between Coverall North America, Inc. and its franchisees. Proceeding under federal diversity jurisdiction, the franchisees asserted a variety of state-law claims against Coverall. Which of the various plaintiffs were subject to the arbitration provisions of the Franchise Agreement was at issue in this appeal. Appellees were a subgroup of Plaintiffs who became Coverall franchisees by signing consent to transfer agreements, which by reference incorporated under franchise agreements that contained arbitration clauses. The district court determined that Appellees did not have to arbitrate their claims against Coverall because they did not have adequate notice of the arbitration clauses contained in the franchise agreements. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court erred because (1) Massachusetts law, which governed this dispute, did not impose any such special notice requirement upon these commercial contractual provisions; and (2) in any event, any special notice requirement would be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Awuah v. Coverall N.A., Inc. " on Justia Law

Defendant's father was a resident at Plaintiff's nursing care facility until his death. After Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff the outstanding bill from her father's assets, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant, claiming breach of contract and fraud. The trial court held in favor of Defendant, concluding that Defendant did not have a power of attorney for her father and did not have access to his checking account or to any of his other financial resources. The court also awarded attorney's fees to Defendant under Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-150bb for successfully defending against a commercial party's action based on a contract. The appellate court reversed in part, concluding that Defendant was not entitled to attorney's fees under section 42-150bb because she was not the personal representative of her father. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that, in order to be a "personal representative" entitled to fees under section 42-150bb, Defendant would have to be a legal representative of the party to the contract. Remanded. View "Aaron Manor, Inc. v. Irving" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Willie Barlow, Jr., appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, C.R. England, Inc., on his claims for race discrimination, wrongful discharge in violation of Colorado public policy, and failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). England employed Plaintiff as a security guard and also paid him to perform janitorial work through a company Plaintiff formed. Plaintiff began receiving workers’ compensation benefits after he sustained an injury at work in June 2007. In November, England terminated its janitorial services contract with Plaintiff's company. A few months later, England fired Plaintiff from his security guard position after he failed to notice and report a theft of several trailer doors from England’s premises. The district court concluded that: (1) there was no evidence England fired Plaintiff for race-based reasons, or in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim; (2) Plaintiff performed his janitorial work as an independent contractor, not an employee, and thus could not assert a claim for wrongful discharge from that position; and (3) Plaintiff's status as an independent contractor precluded an FLSA claim for overtime. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed with regard to Plaintiff's claims for discrimination and violation of the FLSA. The Court reversed, however, Plaintiff's state-law claim for wrongful discharge. View "Barlow, Jr. v. C.R. England Inc." on Justia Law