Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

At issue on review in this case was whether the State Board of Land Commissioners properly issued leases to Ark Land Co., a subsidiary of Arch Coal, Inc., without first conducting environmental review under the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The State Land Board did not conduct environmental review prior to entering the leases, relying on Mont. Code Ann. 77-1-121(2). The district court granted summary judgment to the State Land Board, Ark Land Co., and Arch Coal (Defendants), determining that the State retained sufficient ability to require adequate environmental protections sufficient to meet its constitutional and trust responsibilities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the leases did not allow for any degradation of the environment and specifically required full environmental review and full compliance with applicable State environmental laws, the act of issuing the leases did not impact or implicate the right to a clean and healthful environment in Mont. Const. art II, 3; and (2) therefore, section 77-1-121(2) was not subject to strict or "middle-tier" scrutiny. View "N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs" on Justia Law

In this construction defect case, defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff then filed a "motion for reconsideration" of the summary judgment ruling. The court meanwhile entered judgment, and plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. When the trial court later denied the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff did not file a new notice of appeal. The question in this case was whether plaintiff needed to do so. Defendant argued that, because a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for new trial, its filing rendered plaintiff's earlier notice of appeal premature and, as a consequence, a nullity. Plaintiff argued that the motion for reconsideration did not constitute a motion for a new trial and thus had no effect on the filing of the notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that, under "Carter v. U.S. National Bank," (747 P2d 980 (1987)), a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for a new trial. Nevertheless, the court held that the filing of the motion did not have the effect of rendering the appeal a nullity. Consequently, the court concluded that plaintiff was not required to file a new notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Carter" and earlier decisions declaring that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment constitutes a motion for a new trial were incorrectly decided. In this case, plaintiff's filing of the motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment did not render the filing of the notice of appeal premature. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Assoc. Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condo v. Warren" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, The Hannon Law Firm ("Hannon"), Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P.("Melat"), and Howarth & Smith ("Howarth") entered into a contingent fee agreement to represent multiple plaintiffs in an action against the Cotter Corporation regarding contamination from a uranium mill. The three firms entered into a fee sharing agreement to apportion the fees and costs of the litigation among themselves. Hannon withdrew mid-representation, citing a strained relationship with Howarth. Six years later, after the underlying litigation settled, Hannon filed a quantum meruit action against Melat and Howarth, seeking the reasonable value of the services it provided up to the time of withdrawal. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's judgment with regard to its interpretation of C.R.C.P. Chapter23.3 allowing a quantum meruit claim among co-counsel, but reversed the trial court's determination that the claim accrued when Hannon withdrew from the litigation, instead of when the recovery occurred that made funds available to the attorneys. The Supreme Court held that, where multiple attorneys are co-counsel in a contingent fee agreement, C.R.C.P. Chapter 23.3 does not bar a withdrawing attorney from pursuing a quantum meruit action against former co-counsel for a share of attorney fees obtained in the case, even though that attorney was barred from pursuing such an action against the former client. The claim accrues at the time the withdrawing attorney knows or should know of the occurrence of the settlement or judgment that will result in the payment of attorney fees. View "Melat, Pressman & Higbie, LLP v. Hannon Law Firm, LLC" on Justia Law

This was a quiet title action challenging a claimed interest to oil and gas rights reserved in 1924 when the landowners sold the surface and mineral estate but kept for themselves and their heirs what was described as a portion of the landowners' one-eighth interest in the oil, gas, or other minerals that might later be developed. The district court and court of appeals held that this reservation was a royalty interest and invalidated it under the rule against perpetuities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the royalty interest was not void under the rule against perpetuities because it was reserved in the grantors. View "Rucker v. DeLay" on Justia Law

The Phenix City Board of Education ("the Board") sought mandamus relief from the Russell Circuit Court's denial of the Board's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment on claims brought against it by The Lisle Company, Inc. ("Lisle"). Because the Board is immune from suit pursuant to § 14, Ala. Const. 1901, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition and issued the writ. View "Lisle Company, Inc. v. Phenix City Board of Education" on Justia Law

BancorpSouth Bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the bank's motion to strike a jury demand in the complaint filed against it by Plaintiff Thomas L. Busby and to enter an order granting the Bank's motion, thereby enforcing Busby's waiver of a jury trial. The dispute arose from a construction loan to which Plaintiff Busby guaranteed. The loan agreement contained the jury trial waiver in the event of a dispute between the parties. The borrower defaulted on the loan, and the bank sought payment from Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the bank, alleging multiple counts of fraud, misrepresentation and breach of contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank demonstrated that it had a clear legal right to have the jury demand stricken. Accordingly the Court granted the petition, issued the writ, and directed the trial court to enter an order granting the bank's motion. View "Busby v. BancorpSouth Bank" on Justia Law

Terry Leonhardt and his wife, Cindy, alleged that they entered into an oral lease with Terry's father, Delbert Leonhardt, which was to extend for the lives of Delbert and his wife, Ellen. They claimed the oral lease contained a right of first refusal that Terry could exercise after the death of both Delbert and Ellen. Delbert later entered into a written lease with his grandson, Matthew Oswald. The written lease encompassed some of the farmland Terry and Cindy alleged was part of their oral lease with Delbert. Terry and Cindy initiated a declaratory judgment action against Delbert, seeking a declaration that the oral lease and right of first refusal were valid. Matthew intervened in the lawsuit. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Delbert and Matthew on the ground that the lease was invalid under the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to provide them with notice that it would consider granting summary judgment on a legal theory different from the legal theory advances by Delbert and Matthew in their summary judgment pleadings and brief, and Terry and Cindy were prejudiced by the error. View "Leonhardt v. Leonhardt" on Justia Law

Insurer denied coverage for two unassembled wind turbines that were destroyed in a fire on Ranch's property. Insurer claimed that a policy exclusion for "fences, windmills, windchargers, or their towers" permitted it to deny coverage for the loss. Ranch sued Insurer, asserting Insurer committed a breach of contract and acted in bad faith in denying coverage for the unassembled wind turbines. The circuit court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding the policy exclusion applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly applied the law in determining Ranch's unassembled wind turbines were precluded from coverage under Insurer's policy exclusion, as the language of the exclusion was unambiguous and the plain and ordinary meanings of "windmill" and "windcharger" encompassed the unassembled wind turbines. View "Ass Kickin Ranch, LLC v. N. Star Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants owned land on the shore of a pond. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants claimed to be the owners of the land under the pond that was adjacent to Defendants' waterfront land. The parties' claims depended on the interpretation of two 1973 deeds from Anthony and Marilyn Furlano to Defendants' predecessors in title. According to Defendants, the deeds conveyed both waterfront land and land under the water. Plaintiffs claimed that only the waterfront land was conveyed. Plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin Defendants from interfering with or using the underwater property "and the water thereon." The supreme court granted summary judgment for defendants, but the appellate division modified and ruled in Plaintiffs' favor. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that since the deeds did not expressly exclude underwater lands, they must be read as conveying such land, to the center of the pond, to Defendants' predecessors. View "Knapp v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Riverbend Community, LLC and Parkway Gravel, Inc. jointly owned a parcel of land (the Property), which they intended to develop into residential real estate. Before purchasing the Property, Riverbend and Green Stone Engineering, LLC signed a August 2005 Contract, which required Green Stone to perform four tasks: (1) Site Evaluation and Regulatory Review, (2) Wetlands Restoration Conceptual Design, (3) Wetland Enhancement Conceptual Layout, and (4) Regulatory Meetings and Presentation. In March 2006, the parties signed a second contract which required Green Stone to provide design services for the site and roadways, the stormwater collection and conveyance systems, the sanitary sewer system, the water supply piping system, the stormwater management plans, the sediment and erosion control plans, and the landscape plans. Green Stone left the project in late 2007. Riverbend hired a new engineering firm to complete the work, but the new firm needed Green Stone's work product. Green Stone would not release its work product unless Riverbend executed a release. In 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued two Cease and Desist Letters against Riverbend because of the work in the wetlands. Meanwhile, the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control filed a complaint against Riverbend too. As a result of the federal and state issues, Riverbend could not sell houses, and its lender foreclosed on and purchased the Property at a sheriff's sale in April 2012. Riverbend sued Green Stone for breach of contract, professional negligence, and simple negligence. Green Stone moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the economic loss doctrine barred the tort claims and the general release barred all claims. The trial judge granted the motion, and Riverbend appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court interpreted the release as a general release, and did not address the application of the economic loss doctrine. Because the Court found the release was a general release that unambiguously waived all claims, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment below on both the tort and contract claims. View "Riverbend Community, LLC, et al. v. Green Stone Engineering, LLC, et al." on Justia Law