Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a suit by ExxonMobil Corporation against DSTJ, LLP and Milestone Operating, Inc. (collectively Milestone). After Milestone failed to answer, ExxonMobil obtained a default judgment. Milestone appealed, arguing that service on Donald Harlan - DSTJ's partner and Milestone Operating, Inc.'s director and registered agent - was defective, and that Milestone established the necessary elements set forth in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc. to set aside the default judgment. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Milestone failed to meet its burden to satisfy Craddock's first element. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that because the evidence in this case established that Defendants' failure to answer was no intentional or the result of conscious indifference, Defendants' motion for new trial could not be denied on the ground that Defendants failed to satisfy the first Craddock element. Remanded. View "Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit in superior court claiming that she and her son entered into an oral that granted her a life estate in certain property. Petitioner sought to enforce the oral agreement or, in the alternative, recover of a theory of quantum meruit. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The appeals court remanded for proceedings as to whether Petitioner should recover under a theory of quantum meruit. While the case was pending on remand, Petitioner filed a petition in the county court against the judge assigned to the matter, in both his individual and official capacities, and against the Commonwealth. Petitioner raised a number of claims concerning the judge's rulings and conduct, including an assertion that he had acted in an unlawful and biased manner. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner's claims of judicial bias and declaratory judgment claims should have been addressed through the ordinary trial and appellate process; (2) the judge was absolutely immune from Petitioner's request for monetary damages; and (3) Petitioner's allegations of conspiracy were insufficient to overcome the judge's absolute immunity. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a motor vehicle collision involving Roger Linton and James Carey that resulted in Carey's death. At the time of the collision, Linton was driving a truck owned by Jonathan Jennings, for whom Linton worked as an independent contractor. Jennings's insurer, State Farm, filed a declaratory judgment action against Carey's Estate and Linton to determine whether it was responsible for liability coverage and obligated to defend and indemnify Linton for claims arising from the collision. The superior court entered a judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that Linton was not an insured covered by Jennings's policy because his use of the truck was not within the scope of Jennings's consent. At issue on appeal was whether the superior court erred in its application of the minor deviation rule in determining that Linton's use of the truck exceeded the scope of Jennings's consent. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, clarified the applicable burdens associated with the minor deviation rule, and remanded for the superior court to apply the minor deviation rule as clarified. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Carey" on Justia Law

Norman Budge and twenty-eight additional parties (collectively, Employees) filed a complaint for review of government action for the Town of Millinocket's (Town) amendments to its personnel policy originally adopted as a town ordinance. In the most recent amendment, the Town reduced its obligation for paying for the health insurance plan for its employees and established a new policy for the health insurance offered to retirees that resulted in the Town reducing its payment of the retirees' premiums. Employees alleged that, regardless of the policy language, this reduction was inconsistent with promises made to them either when they were hired or during their tenure with the Town. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the personnel policy did not create an enforceable contract between the Town and its employees; (2) the Town was not bound to pay Employees' retirement group hospitalization and life insurance premiums by virtue of promissory estoppel; and (3) the Town's reduction in benefits did not result in an unconstitutional taking. View "Budge v. Town of Millinocket" on Justia Law

Hospital purchased from Insurer a "builders risk" insurance policy which included a provision requiring Hospital to obtain Insurer's written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss. Hospital contracted with Constructors for floors and subsurface work, which was later damaged. Hospital claimed a loss and sought recompense under the builders risk policy, but Insurer denied the claim. Hospital later assigned Constructors any claim or rights Hospital had against Insurer arising out of the insurance policy. Constructors, as Hospital's assignee, brought suit in federal court against Insurer seeking to recover payment due under the builder's risk policy. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the federal court to answer a question of state law and concluded that, under Kentucky law, a clause in an insurance policy that requires the insured to obtain the insurer's prior written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss under the policy is not enforceable or applicable to the assignment of a claim under the policy where the covered loss occurs before the assignment, and that such a clause would, under those circumstances, be void as against public policy. View "Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs acquired a homeowners' insurance policy from Defendant effective as of the closing date of the home they had entered into a contract to purchase. The closing date was scheduled to take place on March 31 but was delayed until May 20. On May 15, a fire completely destroyed the house. Defendant disclaimed coverage on the pertinent grounds that the dwelling was unoccupied at the time of the loss, and therefore, it did not qualify as a "residence premises" under the policy. Supreme court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The appellate division modified the order, concluding that the "residence premises" requirement in the policy failed to define what qualifies as "resides" for the purpose of attaching coverage and that the policy was ambiguous in the circumstances of this case, and otherwise denied summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there were issues of fact as to whether Plaintiffs' daily presence in the house, coupled with their intent to eventually move in, was sufficient to satisfy the policy's requirements; and (2) the term "residence premises" in the contract was ambiguous. View "Dean v. Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y." on Justia Law

Petitioner Victoria Drumheller and three corporate entities sought relief from the default judgment entered against them by the circuit court in connection with a breach of contract action filed by Respondents James and Diane Fillinger. Petitioners asserted (1) they were wrongfully denied the right to have a jury determine the amount of damages they owed to Respondents in connection with the default judgment, and (2) the damage award was not supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit error in entering the subject default judgment and in holding a bench trial on the issue of damages. View "Drumheller v. Fillinger" on Justia Law

Travelers Indemnity Company issued to Plaintiff an insurance policy covering direct physical loss of or damage to a building. The policy contained an exclusion for loss or damage caused by earth movement, which included earth sinking whether "naturally occurring or due to made made or other artificial causes." The building suffered cracks as a result of an excavation being conducted on the lot next door to it. Travelers rejected Plaintiff's claim, relying on the earth movement exclusion. Plaintiff sued for breach of the policy. Supreme court denied Travelers' motion for summary judgment, and the appellate division affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Pioneer Tower Owners Ass'n v. State Farm, in which the Court held that an "earth movement" exclusion in an insurance policy did not unambiguously apply to excavation, applied in this case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the policy in the instant case had added language expressly making the earth movement exclusion applicable to "man made" movement of earth, the exclusion was unambiguous and the loss caused by excavation was excluded from the policy. View "Bentoria Holdings, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co." on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal stemmed from litigation concerning a contract dispute among Williams Transport, LLC (Williams Transport), Driver Pipeline Company, Inc. (Driver Pipeline), Buckley Equipment Services, Inc. (Buckley Equipment), and other unnamed defendants. Based on an arbitration clause in the contract, Driver Pipeline filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Driver Pipeline filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which the Supreme Court accepted as a notice of appeal. Finding no error by the trial court in denying Driver Pipeline's motion to compel arbitration, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Driver Pipeline Company, Inc., Buckley Equipment Services, Inc. v. Williams Transport, LLC" on Justia Law

The primary question in this commercial dispute involving, among other things, the right to a leasehold to certain commercial property, was whether, pursuant to the "necessary affects" requirement under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(a)(1), Defendants' appeal to the appellate division from a judgment declaring Plaintiff the lawful tenant of the subject property brought up for review two non-final supreme court orders: one dismissing Defendants' counterclaims and third-party complaint and the other denying Defendants' motion for leave to amend their answer. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the appellate division, concluding that the appellate division improperly held that Defendants' appeal from the judgment did not bring up for review the order dismissing Defendants' counterclaims and third-party complaint. In other words, the appellate division erred in ruling that this order did not necessarily affect the final judgment. View "Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v. E. 149th Realty Corp." on Justia Law