Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

SM Energy Company appealed a summary judgment declaring that A.G. Golden and other plaintiffs were entitled to a four percent overriding royalty interest in leases and lands covered by a 1970 letter agreement and ordering SM to pay amounts due to Golden and the other plaintiffs for these interests, and an order denying SM's motion to amend or for relief from the judgment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that SM through its predecessors in interest, expressly assumed an "area of mutual interest" clause in the 1970 letter agreement and in expanding the judgment to include unpled and unlitigated properties within the area of mutual interest. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court correctly ruled as a matter of law that SM owed Golden and the other plaintiffs retroactive royalty payments on production from a certain well located on the subject property. View "Golden v. SM Energy Company" on Justia Law

A Massachusetts corporation and its principals sued their quondam accountant and his firm (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants negligently advised them to file amended corporate and personal tax returns that had the effect of substantially increasing the principals' liability and destabilizing the company. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants but rejected their request for attorneys' fees. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) concluding that a three-year statute of limitations applied to bar the maintenance of Plaintiffs' tort and contract claims; (2) dismissing Plaintiffs' unfair trade practices claim; and (3) denying Defendants' request for attorneys' fees. View "RTR Techs., Inc. v. Helming" on Justia Law

American Family appealed the district court's order denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial and awarding defendant attorney's fees pursuant to section 91A.8 of the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's Rule 15(b)(2) motion to amend the pleadings to add the IWPCL claim because the claim was tried with American Family's implied consent and the amendment did not result in prejudice to American Family. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to defendant under the IWPCL. Any error in giving jury Instruction 13A was harmless in light of the subsequently given Instruction No. 14. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hollander" on Justia Law

Appellant was the beneficiary of three life insurance policies insuring her husband. After the death of Appellant's husband, Appellant and one of the insurers (Insurer) disputed how the policy proceeds would be paid to Appellant. Appellant, a Nevada domiciliary, filed a complaint against Insurer on behalf of herself and a nationwide class of similarly situated persons in federal court in New Jersey, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. Sitting in diversity, the U.S. district court granted Insurer's motion to dismiss without prejudice. Appellant subsequently filed this action against Insurer in a Nevada state court, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duties arising from a confidential relationship, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed all of Appellant's claims on issue preclusion grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) here, New Jersey preclusion law applies under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.; and (2) under New Jersey law, Appellant would be precluded from relitigating her claims in Nevada. View "Garcia v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents entered into a contract for the purchase of real property owned by Petitioners, twenty-five percent of which constituted wetlands. Respondents filed an action against Petitioners for fraudulent misrepresentation, alleging that in the advertisement for the sale of the property, Petitioners knowingly and falsely misrepresented that the property had no wetlands. Petitioners moved to dismiss, asserting that the fraud claim arose out of, and was related to, the contract, and therefore, the claim fell within the arbitration provision of the contract. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the action based on fraud was not a dispute subject to arbitration under the contract. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and concluded that the fraud action had a contractual nexus with, and a significant relationship to, the contract between Petitioners and Respondents and was, as a general principle, within the scope of the contract's broad arbitration provision. Remanded. View "Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by a staffing company and had been contracted to work at Gates Rubber Company (Gates) when he suffered an injury to his arm and hand, including the severing of fingers. Plaintiff alleged that Total Compliance Consultants, Inc. (TCC) had contracted with Gates to consult on safety-compliance issues and that TCC either breached its contract or was negligent. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between TCC and Gates but that TCC was not negligent and did not breach its contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's points on appeal were either not appealable or lacked merit. View "Meador v. Total Compliance Consultants, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that, without their knowledge, the City had erected a sewer line across Plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs contended that in doing so, the City damaged a water pipe owned by Plaintiffs and that the damaged culvert was the proximate cause of three washouts on their property. Plaintiffs alleged causes of action for negligence and inverse condemnation. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court denied. The City appealed, arguing that the circuit court mischaracterized Plaintiffs' claim as based on contract, rather than tort, and in so doing denied the City the immunity to which it was entitled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in finding Plaintiffs' negligence claim sounded in contract rather than tort; and (2) the City was entitled to statutory immunity as to the tort cause of action. View "City of Malvern v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Levy Gardens appealed the district court's decision ordering Commonwealth to pay Levy Gardens pursuant to Levy Gardens' title insurance policy with Commonwealth. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Levy Gardens had coverage under the insurance policy and that Levy Gardens did not violate the conditions of the policy in a manner prejudicial to Commonwealth. The district court did not err in concluding that the insurance policy provided coverage for only the diminution in value of title to the property resulting from the zoning encumbrance. The district court's findings that Commonwealth's actions were not arbitrary and capricious and Commonwealth made its assertions in good faith were reasonable and supported by the record. Therefore, the court held that the district court did not manifestly err by declining to impose penalties to Commonwealth. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Levy Gardens Partners 2007, LP v. Lewis Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Growers filed claims against PPC seeking promissory estoppel relief, alleging that the company's oral promises of a long-term relationship induced them to invest in chicken houses. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment for PPC on the ground that the written contracts between PPC and the Growers barred the alleged oral promises because the contracts addressed the same subject matter as the Growers' claims. Because the court found that this contract bar precluded the Growers' promissory estoppel claims, the court did not address the other issues raised on appeal and therefore, affirmed the judgment. View "Clinton Growers, et al v. Pilgrims Pride Corp." on Justia Law

This action stemmed from a contract for construction of a baseball stadium and home field for the Seattle Mariners baseball team. In its first trip to the Supreme Court, "Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Construction Company," (202 P.3d 924 (2009) (PFD I)), the Court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the owner’s suit against the general contractor because the action was brought for the benefit of the State, and therefore the exemption from the statute of limitations set out in RCW 4.16.160 applied. This case raised questions about whether the construction statute of repose barred suit against the general contractor and, if not, whether the general contractor may pursue third party claims against two of its subcontractors. The trial court granted summary judgment of dismissal in favor of the general contractor and the subcontractors on statute of repose grounds. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "the statute of repose does not bar suit against the general contractor. In accord with several provisions in the subcontracts, the subcontractors are subject to liability to the same extent that the general contractor may be liable for any defective materials or work under the subcontracts. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that the statute of repose bars Hunt Kiewit’s third party claims against the subcontractors." View "Wash. State Major League Baseball Stadium v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Constr. Co." on Justia Law