Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Klein-Becker USA and Klein-Becker IP Holdings sued Patrick Englert and Mr. Finest, Inc., for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act; false advertising under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act; unfair competition under the Utah Unfair Practices Act; fraud; civil conspiracy; and intentional interference with existing and prospective business relations. The action arose from Englert's unauthorized selling of "StriVectin" skin care products: he posed as a General Nutrition Center (GNC) store to purchase the products at below wholesale rates. Englert then sold the products through eBay and other commercial web platforms, including his own, "mrfinest.com." Englert was sanctioned several times for failing to comply with court orders and discovery schedules. The third and final sanction resulted in the entry of default judgment for Klein-Becker on all remaining claims. Englert appealed the district court's entry of default judgment against him, determination of his personal liability and the amount of damages owed, grant of a permanent injunction, denial of a jury trial, and refusal to allow him to call a certain witness. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no fault in the district court's analysis or judgment and affirmed. View "Klein-Becker USA v. Englert" on Justia Law

Brothers Thomas and Michael Tessier allegedly swindled brothers Frederick and Thaddeus Jakobiec and the estate of their mother out of millions of dollars. This lawsuit covered the Tessiers' theft of almost $100,000 in life insurance proceeds due to a trust benefitting Thaddeus. Thaddeus and various persons affiliated with the trust and estate (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against Merrill Lynch, the company that issued the life insurance policy, claiming that Merrill Lynch made out the insurance proceeds check to the wrong trust entity in breach of the insurance contract, thus allowing the Tessiers to steal the money. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch, concluding that even if Merrill Lynch did breach the contract, its breach was not the cause of Plaintiffs' losses because the Tessiers would have stolen the money even if the check had been made out correctly. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the extensive groundwork laid by the Tessiers for their criminal scheme, they could have and would have stolen the insurance money regardless of how Merrill Lynch made out the check; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch. View "Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action against Priceline, seeking compensatory, punitive, and equitable relief for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and contract, as well as a violation of Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110b. Plaintiffs' claims arose from Priceline's alleged failure to disclose to users of its "Name Your Own Price" booking service that a successful bid for a hotel room would generally exceed the amount Priceline itself compensated the hotel vendor, with Priceline retaining the difference as profit. Because plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to allege an agency relationship between Priceline and consumers who use its "Name Your Own Price" service to reserve hotel accommodations, they could not plausibly claim that Priceline breached an agent's fiduciary duty in failing to apprise consumers that it might have procured the accommodations at costs lower than their bids, retaining the difference as profits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant formed a partnership by oral agreement. Defendant later withdrew from the venture after Plaintiff refused his demand for majority ownership of the partnership. Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, claiming that Defendant could not unilaterally terminate his obligations under the agreement. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the complaint failed to allege that the partnership agreement provided for a definite term or a defined objective, and therefore, dissolution was permissible under N.Y. P'ship Law 62(1)(b). The Appellate Division modified by reinstating the breach of contract cause of action, reasoning that the complaint adequately described a definite term and alleged a particular undertaking. The Court of Appeals reversed with directions that the breach of contract cause of action of the complaint be dismissed, holding (1) the complaint did not satisfy the "definite term" element of section 62(1)(b) because it did not set forth a specific or a reasonably certain termination date; and (2) the alleged scheme of anticipated partnership events detailed in the complaint were too amorphous to meet the statutory "particular undertaking" standard for precluding unilateral dissolution of a partnership. View "Gelman v. Buehler" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against Home Loan and Deutsche Bank, alleging state law claims based on a mortgage contract. The district court determined that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Home Owner's Loan Act (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. 1461 et seq., and its implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. 560.2. The court concluded that plaintiff's allegations supporting her first count - that the mortgage contract was unconscionable - fell under section 560.2(b) and therefore, the court concluded that her claim was preempted and affirmed the dismissal of that claim. However, because plaintiff's state tort claim for fraud only incidentally affected lending, it was not preempted by HOLA or its implementing regulation. Therefore, dismissal of that claim on preemption grounds was unwarranted. Further, the court found no basis for dismissal of plaintiff's fraud count on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds and plaintiff's complaint met the requirements of Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "McCauley v. Home Loan Investment Bank, F.S" on Justia Law

A jury found Ronald Brooks liable to his former brother-in-law, Timothy Hollaar, for the full amount of loans that had been memorialized by four promissory notes. On appeal, Ronald argued: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing Timothy to recover more than nominal damages, since Timothy was not the real source of the money and intended to pay any recovery to the family members who supplied it; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to make special findings of fact on Timothy’s promissory estoppel claim; and (3) that the trial court erred in naming Timothy the prevailing party. Because Timothy could lawfully sue to recover the loans, the promissory estoppel claim was properly submitted to the jury, and Timothy was the prevailing party, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Brooks v. Hollaar" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife signed a contract to make mutual wills and then executed those wills. Soon after Husband's death, Wife executed a new will that was inconsistent with her previous will. Following Wife's death, the children of Husband's earlier marriage filed an action asserting, among other things, that their stepmother's last will was invalid because it breached the contract to prepare mutual wills and that the will prepared by their stepmother pursuant to the contract to make mutual wills should be admitted into probate rather than her last will. The trial court granted summary judgment to Husband's children, determining that the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration and that, therefore, Wife's last will was null and void. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Husband's children were entitled to judgment as a matter of law sustaining their challenge to the validity of Wife's will because, as a matter of law, the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration. View "In re Estate of Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant Ritchie Corporation conveyed title to a tract of land a waste systems corporation (BFI). Ritchie and BFI entered into an escrow agreement that entitled BFI to operate the property as a nonhazardous waste transfer station for thirty-five years. Ritchie granted BFI a right of first refusal to buy the transfer station from Ritchie. BFI later assigned its title and interest in the escrow agreement to Plaintiff Waste Connections, which began operating the transfer station. Later, a third party agreed to buy the transfer station and an adjoining landfill. Waste Connections asserted its right of first refusal to purchase the transfer station. Waste Connections and Ritchie subsequently disputed the proper price owed under the escrow agreement - $1.45 million or $2 million. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Ritchie. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because genuine issues of material fact remained on Waste Connections' breach of contract action against Ritchie, summary judgment for either party was inappropriate. View "Waste Connections of Kan., Inc. v. Ritchie Corp." on Justia Law

Sheridan Fire Fighters Local No. 276 filed suit against the City of Sheridan alleging that the City breached the parties' collective bargaining agreement when it failed to provide pay raises to five firefighters who had qualified for a "step increase" in salary. The City responded that the raises were not required and that, under the terms of the agreement, the City retained discretion in the award of pay raises. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Local 276, holding (1) the agreement was ambiguous about whether step increases in salary were mandatory or left to the City's discretion; and (2) because Local 276 presented evidence in support of its summary judgment motion consistent with the union's interpretation that the agreement required the City to give step increases to all eligible firefighters, and the City offered no evidence to the contrary, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and Local 276 showed it was entitled to judgment in its favor. View "Sheridan Fire Fighters Local No. 276 v. City of Sheridan" on Justia Law

Second Chance Investments, LLC (SCI) purchased a fire insurance policy from Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners) that covered a building with the limit of insurance set at $2,095,500. The building subsequently suffered extensive fire damage. SCI filed a proof of loss claiming the building was a total loss. Auto-Owners rejected the proof of loss, contending that it did not state the actual cash value of the loss as required by the policy or provide a written estimate of repair to support the claim. After a continued dispute over whether the property was a total loss, Auto-Owners ultimately filed a complaint in district court seeking an order compelling SCI to submit the issue of whether the building was a total loss to a binding determination by an appraisal panel. The district court denied Auto-Owners' motion to compel appraisal and dismissed its complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a court, rather than an appraisal panel, is the appropriate forum to determine whether the property suffered a total loss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a party to a fire insurance policy does not have the statutory right to have an appraisal panel decide whether a claim involves a total loss. View "Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Second Chance Invs., LLC" on Justia Law