Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Respondents graduated from College's legal assisting program with associate degrees. Respondents filed a complaint against College, alleging that College induced Respondents to enroll in College's legal assisting program by verbally guaranteeing legal assistant jobs to Respondents after graduation. The jury found College engaged in both unconscionable and fraudulent inducement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting relief to Respondents and denying College's motion for judgment as a matter of law, where (1) the circuit court erred in finding College violated the state Consumer Credit and Protection Act, and accordingly, Respondents did not have cognizable causes of action for unconscionability and inducement by unconscionable conduct pursuant to W. Va. Code 46A-2-121; (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that the agreement between the parties was unconscionable under the common law of contracts based on a lack of consideration; and (3) because the circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law on Respondents' fraudulent inducement claim on the basis that it was time-barred, Respondents did not have an equitable claim for fraudulent inducement, and therefore, the circuit court erred to the extent that it granted equitable relief to Respondents on the basis of fraudulent inducement. View "Mountain State Coll. v. Holsinger" on Justia Law

EB Acquisitions I (EB) entered into a written contract to purchase real property from DK Arena. The parties orally agreed to modify their contract for the sale of the property by extending the due diligence deadline. After the original due diligence period expired, EB attempted to terminate the contract of sale and sought a return of its deposit. DK Arena filed suit alleging breach of contract. EB asserted several counterclaims, including breach of contract. The trial court held in favor of EB on all claims, concluding that the oral agreement was valid and enforceable, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The court ruled that EB retained an unqualified right to terminate the contract and obtain the return of its deposit. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court to the extent it was inconsistent with this opinion, holding that the district court applied an improper estoppel exception to the Statute of Frauds in express and direct conflict with the Court's decision in Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, Inc. Remanded. View "DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC" on Justia Law

Holline and William Parsons (Plaintiffs) were enrolled in Today's Option, a Medicare Advantage Plan sponsored by the Pyramid Life Insurance Company (Pyramid). After Plaintiffs were each disenrolled from their respective plans, they brought suit against Pyramid, asserting numerous state law claims. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part declaring that the Medicare Act did not provide the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' claims in this case. Pyramid then moved for Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification and a stay pending appeal, requesting permission to file an interlocutory appeal on the issues of whether Plaintiffs' state-law claims arose under the Medicare Act and whether their claims, to the extent they did not arise under the Act, were expressly preempted by the Act. The circuit court certified this appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the finding supporting Rule 54(b) certification was in error. View "Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Parsons" on Justia Law

Four independent shippers, all located outside Arkansas, engaged Western Brokerage, a transportation broker in Arizona, to arrange for the transportation of produce from Arizona to Pennsylvania and New York. Western Brokerage requested carriers. Hotfoot, an Arkansas trucking company, agreed to transport multiple loads. Hotfoot engaged Freight Ambulance, an Arkansas company, to deliver the produce. After the delivery was made, Hotfoot unsuccessfully made a demand on Western Brokerage for the payment of the unpaid balance. Hotfoot subsequently filed an amended complaint against the four independent shippers and Western Brokerage for breach of contract. The Pulaski County circuit court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, Appellants limited their arguments to Shipping Point Marketing (SPM), one of the independent shippers, and SPM's president and the president of Western Brokerage (collectively, Appellees). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that questions of fact existed surrounding the personal jurisdiction of Appellees. View "Hotfoot Logistics LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., Inc." on Justia Law

Circle D Contractors filed suit in district court to collect from the Bartletts money owed for the installation of a swimming pool. The district court ruled in favor of Circle D. The Barletts appealed. Circle D did not refile an additional complaint within thirty days, and the Barletts moved to dismiss Circle D's complaint as untimely. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, ruling that Circle D had failed to strictly comply with the requirements of District Court Rule 9 by failing to timely refile its complaint in circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) only substantial compliance with the rule that a plaintiff refile its complaint in circuit court is required; and (2) Circle D substantially complied with rule 9 because all of its pleadings that were previously filed in district court were filed in circuit court, albeit by the Bartletts, and moreover, Circle D also refiled its complaint in circuit court. Remanded. View "Circle D Contractors, Inc. v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

The trial court denied defendant Virginia College's motion to compel arbitration. Because the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim that they were fraudulently induced to agree to the arbitration provision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Virginia College, LLC v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

Appellants Thomas and Vera Gladden appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Respondent Palmetto Home Inspection Services, alleging the limit of liability provision in a home inspection contract was unenforceable as violative of public policy and as unconscionable under the facts of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that contractual limitation of a home inspector's liability did not violate South Carolina public policy as expressed by the General Assembly and, as a matter of law, was not so oppressive that no reasonable person would make it and no fair and honest person would accept it. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the inspector. View "Gladden v. Palmetto Home Inspections" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (ILM) appealed the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial following a $2.2 million jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Ryan Development Company, L.C., d/b/a Agriboard Industries (Agriboard). This case arose from a fire that destroyed a Texas manufacturing facility in April 2009. Agriboard, manufactured building panels made of compressed straw. At the time of the fire, Agriboard was insured under a fire and related losses insurance policy issued by ILM with various coverages including lost income. By May 2009, ILM had paid $450,000; Agriboard filed suit and thereafter ILM paid $1.8 million. Agriboard continued to seek recovery under the policy, but ILM refused to pay the amount requested and Agriboard re-filed suit, seeking $2.4 million in unpaid coverages. The trial court denied ILM's motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial. ILM timely appealed that denial to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying ILM's motion and affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "Ryan Development Co. v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Klein-Becker USA and Klein-Becker IP Holdings sued Patrick Englert and Mr. Finest, Inc., for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act; false advertising under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act; unfair competition under the Utah Unfair Practices Act; fraud; civil conspiracy; and intentional interference with existing and prospective business relations. The action arose from Englert's unauthorized selling of "StriVectin" skin care products: he posed as a General Nutrition Center (GNC) store to purchase the products at below wholesale rates. Englert then sold the products through eBay and other commercial web platforms, including his own, "mrfinest.com." Englert was sanctioned several times for failing to comply with court orders and discovery schedules. The third and final sanction resulted in the entry of default judgment for Klein-Becker on all remaining claims. Englert appealed the district court's entry of default judgment against him, determination of his personal liability and the amount of damages owed, grant of a permanent injunction, denial of a jury trial, and refusal to allow him to call a certain witness. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no fault in the district court's analysis or judgment and affirmed. View "Klein-Becker USA v. Englert" on Justia Law

Brothers Thomas and Michael Tessier allegedly swindled brothers Frederick and Thaddeus Jakobiec and the estate of their mother out of millions of dollars. This lawsuit covered the Tessiers' theft of almost $100,000 in life insurance proceeds due to a trust benefitting Thaddeus. Thaddeus and various persons affiliated with the trust and estate (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against Merrill Lynch, the company that issued the life insurance policy, claiming that Merrill Lynch made out the insurance proceeds check to the wrong trust entity in breach of the insurance contract, thus allowing the Tessiers to steal the money. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch, concluding that even if Merrill Lynch did breach the contract, its breach was not the cause of Plaintiffs' losses because the Tessiers would have stolen the money even if the check had been made out correctly. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the extensive groundwork laid by the Tessiers for their criminal scheme, they could have and would have stolen the insurance money regardless of how Merrill Lynch made out the check; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch. View "Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law