Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Jared Crook was driving a Cadillac leased for him by his father, Calvin Crook, when he collided with Jessica Ahlquist's vehicle. Ahlquist sustained severe personal injuries as a result of the accident. The Cadillac was insured by Calvin through a policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate paid the policy limits, and Ahlquist sought to recover additional compensation through another Allstate policy issued to Cheryl, Calvin's former wife. The policy was issued for Cheryl's vehicle. Allstate filed a declaratory judgment action arguing that Cheryl's insurance policy did not apply to the accident. The trial justice granted summary judgment in Allstate's favor. Ahlquist appealed, contending that the trial justice erred in granting summary judgment because Calvin, who was a named driver under Cheryl's insurance policy, provided the Cadillac to Jared. Ahlquist also argued that there was an ambiguity as to whether the policy covered the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ahlquist" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joe F. Watkins, Patricia M. Smith, and RE/MAX Lake Martin Properties, LLC sued Bear Brothers, Inc., ETC Lake Development, LLC ("ETC Lake"), and E.T. "Bud" Chambers, among others, asserting claims related to the construction and development of a condominium project on Lake Martin. ETC Lake and Chambers crossclaimed against Bear Brothers seeking to recover losses suffered on the project as well as indemnification for the costs of litigating the plaintiffs' action and any damages for which they might be found liable to the plaintiffs. In January 2010, Bear Brothers moved the circuit court to compel arbitration of the cross-claim against it. The circuit court did not rule on that motion. Bear Brothers renewed its motion in July 2011, and the circuit court granted the motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim in December. Bear Brothers then moved the circuit court "to stay [the] proceedings [in the plaintiffs' action] pending the outcome of a related arbitration." After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion to stay. Bear Brothers appealed the circuit court's order denying the motion to stay to the Supreme Court; ETC Lake and Chambers moved to dismiss the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the motion at issue in this case was a motion to stay related proceedings pending the arbitration of a crossclaim between codefendants and was filed separately from the initial motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim and subsequent to the circuit court's order granting the motion. Thus, Bear Brothers did not demonstrate a right to appeal the denial of the motion to stay at this time, and accordingly the Court dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. View "Bear Brothers, Inc. v. ETC Lake Development, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties in this case entered into a real estate agreement thirteen years ago. The trial court concluded that the agreement constituted a contract for deed and that the purchasers had therefore acquired an equitable interest in the property in question. The court initiated a foreclosure on that interest, even though it had not been pled. Plaintiffs, the purchasers as found by the superior court, David and Barbara Prue, appealed the foreclosure. Defendant, the seller as found by the court, Larry Royer, appealed the court’s conclusions that the contract was an enforceable contract for deed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s conclusion that the parties entered into a contract for deed and that it was enforceable, but reversed the foreclosure decree as premature. View "Prue v. Royer, Sr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of a voting interest in Coldwell Banker Lewis-Kirkeby-Hall Real Estate, Inc. (CBLKH). Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract under which the parties agreed that Plaintiff would sell Defendant his shares of CBLKH voting stock. On the closing date of the contract, Defendant failed to attend the closing and did not pay the amount agreed upon for Plaintiff's shares. After negotiations between the parties failed, Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract against Defendant. Defendant raised the defense that his consent to enter into the contract was obtained by fraud. After a trial, the trial court entered judgment against Defendant for $250,000. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court correctly concluded that the contract was clear and unambiguous as to Defendant's receipt of financial documents; but (2) the court erred in barring Defendant's fraudulent inducement evidence under the parole evidence rule. View "Poeppel v. Lester" on Justia Law

In one agreement, Cammeby's Equity Holdings LLC (Cam Equity) received an option to acquire 99.99 percent of the ownership units of SVCare at the strike price of $100 million. In a second agreement, Cammeby's Funding III LLC (Cam III) agreed to lend $100 million to SVCare. Cam III and Cam Equity were controlled by the same person. In anticipation that Cam Equity would exercise the option, SVCare commenced an action alleging that the option was unenforceable because the consideration underlying its agreement to offer the option was contingent on Cam III loaning it $100 million, which SVCare claimed was never paid. Cam Equity brought a separate lawsuit seeking specific performance of the option agreement. Supreme Court (1) found in in favor of Cam Equity in the first action, concluding that the option and loan were entirely separate agreements and that SVCare could not offer extrinsic evidence regarding the $100 million loan obligation that was not mentioned in the option agreement; and (2) in the second action, determined that Cam III had, in fact, fully funded the $100 million loan to SVCare pursuant to the loan agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower court did not err in its judgment. View "Schron v. Troutman Saunders LLP" on Justia Law

Cammeby's Funding LLC (Cam Funding) and Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings LLC (Fundamental) entered into an option agreement entitling Cam Funding to acquire one-third of Fundamental's membership units for a strike price of $1,000. Cam Funding subsequently notified Fundamental that it was exercising the option and sent Fundamental a check for $1,000. Fundamental respondent that, pursuant to its operating agreement, no membership units in Fundamental would be issued until Cam Funding provided a required capital contribution of 33.33 percent. Fundamental then sought a declaration that Cam Funding was bound by the membership requirements in the operating agreement. Cam Funding filed a counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Supreme Court ruled that the option agreement unambiguously granted Cam Funding the right to acquire a one-third interest in Fundamental upon payment of $1,000 and that enforcement of the operating agreement would interfere with Cam Funding's rights under the terms of the option agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mere reference in the option agreement to the operating agreement was not enough to evidence clear intent for the two separate contracts to be read as one. View "Fund. Long Term Care Holdings, LLC v. Cammeby's Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

A nursing home patient (Decedent) signed an agreement providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of treatment and care at the nursing home. Decedent subsequently died, allegedly through the nursing home's negligence. Through Decedent's personal representative, Decedent's survivors (Plaintiffs) subsequently brought a cause of action for deprivation of rights under the applicable nursing home statute and, alternatively, a wrongful death action. At issue on appeal was whether an arbitration agreement signed by the decedent requires his estate and heirs to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. The court of appeal concluded that the estate and heirs were bound by the arbitration agreement but certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Court approved of the court of appeal's decision and answered that the execution of a nursing home arbitration agreement by a patient with capacity to contract binds the patient's estate and statutory heirs in a subsequent wrongful death action arising from an alleged tort within the scope of the valid arbitration agreement. View "Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued for a declaratory judgment that the lien on their homestead was void and that the mortgage holder was required to forfeit all principal and interest. Plaintiffs also sought damages for defamation. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under Tex. Const. Art. XVI 50(a)(6); because there was no evidence or allegation of defendants' attempting to conceal information, and because the facts that gave rise to any claims were obvious and not hidden, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply in this instance to estop the lenders' assertion of the limitations defense; because the loan was valid, and plaintiffs were delinquent, the statements at issue were true and no defamation occurred; the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the statute of limitations barred only remedies; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the amended complaints. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Priester, Jr., et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a contract dispute between Verint and Tekelec where Tekelec sought a right to payment stemming from a patent dispute between two corporate entities not directly involved in this appeal. The district court awarded summary judgment to Tekelec and denied Verint's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court rejected Verint's claims that Tekelc lacked constitutional standing to enforce its right to the payments at issue. Because the court concluded that Verint's fixed, contractual payment obligations under the Blue Pumpkin/IEX Agreement unambiguously fell outside of the scope of the subsequent Verint/NICE Settlement's boilerplate Non-Accrual Clause, the court need not consider Tekelec's alternative argument that the disputed payments accrued prior to the effective date of the Verint/NICE Settlement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Tekelec, Inc. v. Verint Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

BancorpSouth (the bank) sued HLC and McKee (collectively, Hazelwood), alleging breach of contract against HLC, breach of guaranty against McKee, and asserting a security interest in some of HLC's property. Hazelwood raised lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue and choice of forum, and a state law contract defense. MPT intervened, claiming priority over real property tax refunds owed to HLC and attached by the bank. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1); the forum selection clauses at issue were permissive and did not prohibit the bank from bringing the suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the bank on its breach of contract claim against HLC, or the breach of guaranty claim against McKee; Hazelwood failed factually to contest the bank's damages assessment before the district court, and was not entitled to relief on appeal; and the court declined MPT's invitation to disregard state law and craft an "equitable" solution designed to protect a party who failed to take reasonable steps to protect itself and assumed a known risk. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "BancorpSouth Bank v. Hazelwood Logistics Center, et al" on Justia Law