Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from the fallout from the failure of the Fountainebleau development in Las Vegas, Nevada and involved the contract dispute between the Term Lenders, the Revolving Lenders, and the Borrowers. The district court dismissed the Term Lenders' claims against the Revolving Lenders, finding that the Term Lenders lacked standing to sue. The district court also denied the Borrowers' motion for summary judgment against the Revolving Lenders, rejecting the Borrowers' argument that the Revolving Lenders had breached the contract as a matter of law and alternatively finding there were material issues of fact about whether the Revolving Lenders breached the contract. The court held that the Term Lenders lacked standing to enforce section 2.1(c) of the Credit Agreement promise and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract claims. The court could not conclude as a matter of law that the Revolving Lenders broke their promise to fund the Borrowers under section 2 of the Credit Agreement and affirmed the district court's denial of the Borrowers' request for turnover of the loan proceeds and specific performance. View "Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd., et al v. Bank of America, NA, et al" on Justia Law

Burton founded and ran companies that manufactured and distributed medical device parts. By 2006, the companies employed approximately 140 people and generated annual revenue of $14 million. In 2007, Burton sold to Teleflex and entered into a two-year employment agreement with Teleflex, providing that she could terminate her employment by providing 30 days’ written notice. Teleflex could fire Burton without cause by providing 30 days’ written notice or could fire Burton for cause, upon written notice and an opportunity to cure. Burton, then age 67, became Vice President of New Business Development, supervised by Boarini. The two had a strained relationship. During an argument, Burton asked Boarini whether he wanted her to resign. There is evidence that she stated that she was resigning, stayed out of the office for two days, then left on a previously-scheduled vacation, after which SMD “accepted” her resignation in writing. The district court granted Telefex summary judgment on claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and state law. The Third Circuit reversed, finding genuine issues of fact on whether Burton resigned. View "Burton v. Teleflex Inc." on Justia Law

These three cases stemmed from a residency policy that called for employees of the City of Niagara Falls School District hired or promoted after the policy's effective date to reside in the City and maintain residency there during their employment. Here the District's Administrator for Human Resources notified three employees that they were suspected of violating the residency policy. The Board then terminated the employees' employment for failure to comply with the policy. On appeal, the Appellate Court (1) found that the District did not meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the employee had changed her domicile in the first case; (2) found the Board's determination was not arbitrary and capricious in the second case; and (3) determined that the third employee's termination was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals reversed in the first case, affirmed in the second case, and reversed and remanded in the third case, holding (1) the residency policy and its implementing regulations were clear and unambiguous; (2) the District's notice-and-hearing procedures easily complied with due process; and (3) in the majority of these cases, the Board's determinations were not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. View "Beck-Nichols v. Bianco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his suit alleging claims of equitable estoppel and breach of fiduciary duties pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff stated a claim for relief that was cognizable under ERISA, in light of CIGNA Corp. v. Amara. Because relief was available under the surcharge doctrine under Amara, the court did not address the equitable estoppel claim and the district court was free to consider that claim on remand. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing Defendant Entergy Mississippi where plaintiff failed to allege that Entergy Mississippi sponsored or administered the plan or made any decisions with respect to his benefits. View "Gearlds, Jr. v. Entergy Services, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Lehigh appealed the district court's award of damages to plaintiffs under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. 2801-2841. At issue was whether a franchisor could be held under the PMPA for failing to provide notice to a "trial franchisee" prior to termination of its franchise. The court held that the PMPA provided a right of action, both to "full" and "trial" franchisees, when a franchisor failed properly to notify it prior to terminating the franchise. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiffs compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs, and interest. View "Jimico Enterprises, Inc. v. Lehigh Gas Corp." on Justia Law

In 2001, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement awarded Northrop a contract for lease and support of Oakley network monitoring software for one base year and three option years at about $900,000 per year. To obtain Oakley’s software, Northrop was required to pay $2,899,710, so Northrup assigned its payment rights to ESCgov for $3,296,093. ESCgov assigned its rights to Citizens, but the government was not notified. In 2005, ICE decided not to exercise the first option. Northrop sent the contracting officer a “Contract Disputes Act Claim for not Exercising Option,” citing the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 601. The letter did not mention the two assignments. The CO denied Northrop’s claim. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, holding that Northrop had not supplied the CO “adequate notice” because it failed to reference potential application of the Anti-Assignment Act and Severin doctrine. While the matter was pending, Northrop filed a second claim, including documents on the financing arrangements. The CO determined that Northrop’s second claim was the same claim and declined to issue a final decision. The Claims Court again held that it lacked jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, finding that the first letter constituted a valid claim. View "Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Pearl Archambault died while in the care of Haven Health Center of Greenville (Haven Health) after a nurse mistakenly administered a lethal overdose of morphine. The administratrix of her estate, Plaintiff, filed a medical malpractice action against Haven Health. Health Haven subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Thereafter, Plaintiff amended her complaint to add Columbia Casualty Company, the professional liability insurer of Health Haven, as a defendant and asserted two counts against Columbia directly based on R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.4, which permits an injured party to proceed against an insurer when the insured has filed for bankruptcy. The superior court entered default judgment against Haven Health. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment against Columbia, holding that the superior court erred in interpreting Rhode Island law and that the insurance contract between Columbia and Health Haven should be construed in Plaintiff's favor. View "Peloquin v. Haven Health Ctr. of Greenville, LLC" on Justia Law

Dean Pepper, the owner and sole shareholder of D.F. Pepper Construction (DFP) was driving one of his trucks home in the early winter morning. An icy road caused the truck to slide into Pepper's house and crash through the foundation and west wall. The house was later condemned and demolished as a result of the damage. The house was insured by Nationwide Casualty Insurance Company. Nationwide paid the loss. As subrogee of Pepper, Nationwide then sued DFP, the registered owner of the truck, alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Pepper. The superior court issued judgment in favor of Nationwide, finding that Pepper had been negligent and that the antisubrogation rule did not apply in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Pepper Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

DWS Properties (DWS) owned rental property. The sole member of DWS was Dustin Shore. After a pipe burst at the property causing substantial damage, Shore executed contracts with Performance Adjusting Public Insurance Adjusters (Performance) and Multi-State Restoration (Multi-State), in which Performance agreed to provide public adjusting service relative to the loss, and Multi-State agreed to perform emergency clean-up work at the property. Performance and Multi-State (Plaintiffs) were never paid for the services they provided, and after Shore filed for personal bankruptcy, Shore's debts to Plaintiffs were discharged. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against DWS, seeking damages for book account, breach of contract, quasi-contract, and unjust enrichment. DWS filed a motion to dismiss, which the hearing justice converted into a motion for summary judgment and granted, reasoning that Shore had signed the contracts in an individual capacity without making any reference to DWS. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded, holding (1) summary judgment was inappropriate on Plaintiffs' contract claims; and (2) the fact that DWS was not explicitly named on the contracts did not entitle it to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' equitable claims. View "Multi-State Restoration, Inc. v. DWS Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Massachusetts corporation when it entered into a contract with Defendants. The contract was to be performed entirely in Rhode Island. Defendants subsequently commenced a civil action against Plaintiff. At the time, Plaintiff had a certificate of authority from the secretary of state, but after Plaintiff filed this action, the corporation's certificate of authority was revoked. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, determining that Plaintiff did not have a certificate of authority to transact business in Rhode Island, and therefore, it lacked the capacity to sue in the state. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a certificate was not required in this instance, but Plaintiff must obtain a certificate before proceeding to final judgment. View "Custom Metals Sys., Ltd. v. Tocci Building Corp." on Justia Law