Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Travelers moved to dismiss Postel's appeal of the district court's stay of Postel's lawsuit seeking payment from Travelers on a surety bond for work that it performed as a subcontractor. Postel brought its suit pursuant to the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131 et seq. Travelers argued that Postel's appeal, which was not filed until fifty-five days after the district court's order, was untimely. Because Postel did not argue that the United States had any involvement in this case, but instead relied solely on the statutory requirement that it bring its Miller Act claim in the name of the United States, the court concluded that it was required to file its notice of appeal within thirty days under Rule 4(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, the court granted Travelers' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "United States for the use and benefit of Postel Erection Group, L.L.C., et al v. Travelers Casualty and Surety, et al" on Justia Law

John Stubbs was awarded damages for breach of contract after he sued Martin and Valerie Falkner to enforce a construction lien on their home. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment, but reversed its award of attorney's fees and prejudgment interest, finding that Stubbs's recovery was based in quantum meruit and, thus, attorney's fees and prejudgment interest were unavailable remedies. Stubbs petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the Court of Appeals failed to consider various statutory grounds for an award of attorney's fees. Although the Court of Appeals did not discuss the statutes Stubbs raised, the Supreme Court found that those statutes provided an insufficient basis for an award of either prejudgment interest or attorney's fees in this case. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and the judgment of the Circuit Court. View "Falkner v. Stubbs" on Justia Law

In Washington, a liability insurer unclear of its obligation to defend an insured may invoke a "reservation of rights" defense while it seeks a declaration regarding coverage. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the insurer may unilaterally condition its reservation on making the insured absorb defense costs if a court ultimately determines there is no coverage. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: "we recognize…that an insurer may avoid or minimize its responsibility for defense costs when an insured belatedly tenders a claim and the insurer demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice as a result." View "Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Immunex Corp." on Justia Law

In this employment case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a prospective employee could bring a promissory estoppel claim or a fraudulent misrepresentation claim based on an employer's representations regarding a job that was terminable at will. Plaintiff worked as a salesperson for defendant for nearly eight years before he had a heart attack that required him to seek a less stressful job. In reliance on his manager's promise that plaintiff would be given a new "corporate" job with defendant that would meet his health needs, plaintiff turned down a job with a different employer. Ultimately, defendant did not hire plaintiff for the corporate job, and plaintiff subsequently had to take jobs that paid less than the corporate job or less than the position that he had turned down. Plaintiff sued claiming promissory estoppel, fraudulent misrepresentation, and unlawful employment practices, including discrimination. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for defendant on the promissory estoppel and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, and plaintiff dismissed the unlawful employment practices claim without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the corporate job was terminable at will, plaintiff could not reasonably rely on the promise of employment or recover future lost wages. "[T]he at-will nature of employment does not create a conclusive presumption barring plaintiff from recovering future lost pay where the employee has been unlawfully terminated… or as in this case, where plaintiff was never hired as promised or allowed to start work." The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in determining that as a latter of law, plaintiff could not reasonably rely on defendant's representations and could not recover future lost wages. Both the appellate and trial courts' decisions were reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

K&D Enterprises, through its manager, Mid-America, contracted to purchase an apartment complex. Prior to the closing, K&D Enterprises created a new company, Euclid-Richmond Gardens, and assigned its rights under the purchase agreement to that new company. Euclid-Richmond Gardens hired K&D Group, Inc., a property-management company, to manage the apartment. K&D Group hired former employees of Mid-America and assumed the operations of the complex. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation later conducted an audit and determined K&D Group was the successor in interest to the business operations of Mid-America, a determination that authorized the Bureau to base K&D Group's experience rating, in part, on Mid-America's past experience, which included a large workers' compensation claim. After K&D Group's administrative appeal was denied, K&D Group unsuccessfully filed a mandamus action in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and issued the writ of mandamus, holding that K&D Group was not a successor in interest for purposes of workers' compensation law, and thus, the Bureau abused its discretion when it transferred part of Mid-America's experience rating to K&D Group. View "State ex rel. K&D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

Motel was insured under a policy issued by Insurer. The policy provided coverage for, as well as a duty to defend against, claims for bodily injury and personal and advertising injury liability. The policy expressly disclaimed coverage for both bodily injury and personal and advertising injury when the injury arose out of intentional conduct. Specifically, the policy excluded coverage for harm resulting from acts of sexual molestation by motel employees. After an off-duty motel employee molested a young motel guest, Insurer sought a declaratory judgment to enforce its reading of the contract disclaiming coverage for, and its duty to defend against, a civil complaint brought by the motel guest. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the abuse/molestation exclusion excluded from coverage the act of the employee, as the victim was in the "care" of the motel at the time of the molestation per the language of the exclusion. View "Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. Amco Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Alaska Rent-A-Car sued Avis claiming that Avis had breached a settlement agreement causing Alaska business to be switched to Budget Rent-A-Car, its local competitor. The district court granted a partial summary judgment, establishing that Alaska Rent-A-Car was a party to the settlement agreement, and that Avis had breached the agreement by using the same personnel to sell and market both Avis and Budget cars. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Alaska Rent-A-Car for $16 million and Avis appealed. The court held that the district court was correct in ruling that Alaska Rent-A-Car was a party to the settlement agreement by virtue of its sufficiently timely joinder. The court rejected Avis's peremptory challenge claim under Batson v. Kentucky. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to listen to Alaska Rent-A-Car's expert as well as Avis's. The evidence sufficed to establish reasonable certainty for the damages awarded. The district court did not err by applying Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 to the attorney's fee award. The parties agreed that the amount of prejudgment interest was awarded in error, double counting, and that the judgment should be reduced. View "Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

DHS sued VHS for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and trademark violations. DHS engaged VHS to market and sell the drug Provasca. After that relationship ended, VHS began to manufacture, market, and sell Arterosil, a product similar in many respects to Provasca. The court held that the district court granted DHS's request for a preliminary injunction after making sufficient findings of fact to support each element of the analysis and applying the correct legal standard to those facts. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction in full and lifted the stay of the injunction. The court remanded and directed the district court to expedite the trial on the permanent injunction and to attempt to narrow the breadth of its preliminary injunction. View "Daniels Health Sciences, L.L.C v. Vascular Health Sciences, L.L.C." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two agreements: a ground lease agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. (ASCU) and Wolf Mountain Resorts, and a specifically planned area (SPA) development agreement, which had thirty-six signatories, including ASCU, Wolf Mountain, the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (Osguthorpe). ASCU and Wolf Mountain began litigating claims involving both the ground lease and the SPA agreement. Shortly thereafter, Osguthorpe sued ASCU and Wolf Mountain, alleging that each party had breached a land-lease agreement distinct from the ground lease or the SPA agreement. The district court consolidated Osguthorpe's separate actions into ASCU's litigation. Osguthorpe later moved to compel arbitration on all the claims related to the SPA agreement, including the claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain, to which Osguthrope was not a party. The district court denied Osguthrope's motion. Osguthrope withdrew its SPA claims from the case, leaving for appeal only Osguthrope's motion to compel arbitration of the SPA claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disputes for which Osguthrope sought to compel arbitration were not subject to the SPA agreement's arbitration provision; and (2) furthermore, as a non-party to the disputes, Osguthrope had no contractual right to compel their arbitration. View "Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

This action arose from easement disputes at Big Sky Lake. Plaintiffs were homeowners who owned lakeshore lots. The access road was owned by the Homeowners Association and provided the access to each lakeshore lot. Later, the larger tracts of land outside the access road were divided between the Hollinger and Williams families. The Hollingers' land did not abut the lakeshore and did not abut the lakeshore lots. Plaintiffs claimed a right, based upon language in various documents that arose from the initial development of the lake, to an express easement allowing them the unrestricted use of four roads or trails on the Hollingers' lands for motorized access. After the Hollingers installed gates at several points to block motorized access to the disputed roads, Plaintiffs sued in district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the Hollingers, holding that none of the documents relied upon by Plaintiffs established an easement across the Hollingers' land. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly applied the facts and the law to conclude that Plaintiffs had not established any right to easements over the Hollingers' land. View "Thayer v. Hollinger" on Justia Law