Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Employee sustained injuries in the course of his employment with Four Star Transportation. Despite being hired by Four Star, Employee was initially considered an employee of Better Integrated Services. Better Integrated leased Employee to Beacon Enterprises, which then leased Employee to Four Star. Beacon had an insurance policy with Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance (KEMI). An ALJ determined (1) Employee's injury entitled him to benefits and a permanent partial disability award, and (2) KEMI's policy covered Employee's injury. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed, finding Employee was not covered under the KEMI policy due to the fact he was unaware that Four Star was leasing him from different entities, including Beacon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Uninsured Employers' Fund appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee could not be considered Beacon's employee because he did not enter into a contract for hire with Beacon; (2) the Board did not act arbitrarily in finding that the ALJ's opinion was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the Board and lower court's decision was not based on Better Integrated and Beacon's failure to comply with Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.615. View "Ky. Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

A construction company and its principals (collectively, Appellants) hired a plumbing company (Peters), excavation company (Bostic), and marble company (Esquire) as subcontractors for the construction of Appellants' home. After Buyers purchased the home, Buyers filed a complaint against Appellants, alleging negligence and breach of the implied warranties of habitability, sound workmanship, and proper construction. Appellants filed a third-party complaint against Peters, Bostic, and Esquire, alleging several causes of action. Bostic subsequently filed cross-claims against Peters, and Peters filed cross-claims against both Bostic and Esquire. Thereafter, the circuit court (1) granted Peters' motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint, (2) granted summary judgment for Bostic on Peters' cross-claim, and (3) granted Esquire's motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction because a final order had not been entered disposing of all the claims. View "J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his breach of contract and retaliation claim against Boston Scientific. Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and then Boston Scientific terminated his employment shortly after his filing. The court concluded that, because the guaranteed payments at issue, if due at all, were property of the bankruptcy estate, plaintiff lacked standing to assert his breach of contract claim. Plaintiff's argument that had Boston Scientific not terminated him, the payments he received under the Employment Agreement would have been future earnings also failed. Because plaintiff never requested leave to amend his complaint to include a retaliation claim, the district court could not be faulted for failing to allow him to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Longaker v. Boston Scientific Corp., et al" on Justia Law

This was an action brought by the grantor of a deed of trust to stop nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings based upon the contention that MERS, the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, which was the named beneficiary as nominee for the lender, could not legally act as the beneficiary. The defendants moved to dismiss this action on the ground that the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court agreed and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Edwards v. MERS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former spouse, seeking rescission and damages arising out of an allegedly fraudulent real estate sales agreement. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's lawsuit for failing to issue summons or file a waiver within ninety days of bringing the action as required by Rule 9(a), Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a discord between Rule 9(a) and 12 O.S.Supp. 2002 section 2004(I), and found the two provisions were in direct conflict to the extent Rule 9(a) shortened plaintiff's allotted time for service of summons. View "Cornett v. Carr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, purchaser of real property, sought damages resulting from alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Plaintiff purchased property advertised as development-ready with an active waste-water permit. Plaintiff then learned that the permit had expired, but nevertheless maintained possession of the property and continued making its required financing payments. Plaintiff did not allege fraud until it defaulted on the modified promissory note - the original note having been modified after plaintiff defaulted - and faced foreclosure. The court held that plaintiff, with full knowledge of the alleged fraud, ratified the purchase and sale price of the property. Such ratification foreclosed plaintiff's right to damages, because plaintiff received the benefit of its bargain. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "R&L Investment Property, L.L.C v. Hamm, et al" on Justia Law

Somascan filed suit against Philips Medical Systems, alleging that Philips had misrepresented the capabilities of the medical equipment it sold to Somascan and that the medical equipment did not meet the appropriate standards of quality. The federal district court set a deadline to amend the pleadings. More than a year and a half after the deadline, Somascan filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. The court denied the motion and later granted Philips' motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion for leave to amend, holding that the district court acted correctly in denying leave to amend, as Somascan offered no excuse for not requesting leave to amend earlier, and no new evidence was alleged to have been uncovered. View "Somascan, Inc. v. Philips Med. Sys. Nederland, B.V." on Justia Law

Clarinet sued Essex alleging that Essex wrongfully refused to pay Clarinet under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Clarinet sought payment for expenses for stabilizing and demolishing a building that it owned, in accordance with Clarinet's interpretation of the policy. Essex denied coverage and refused payment. The insurance policy contained several conditions and exclusions, including the owned property exclusion. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Essex and denied relief to Clarinet because the owned property exclusion barred coverage. View "Clarinet v. Essex Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC) brought a declaratory judgment action against the Donnellys and Rimar Construction, Inc. (RMI) to establish that under its policy of insurance with RCI, EMC had no duty or responsibility to pay damages claimed by the Donnellys in litigation between the Donnellys and RCI. The declaratory judgment action was stayed until a verdict was reached in the underlying action. In the underlying action, the Donnellys were awarded damages, costs and attorney fees against RCI. Subsequently the district court entered summary judgment in the declaratory action, finding that there was no insurance coverage for the damages the Donnellys incurred, but that there was coverage for costs and attorney fees. On appeal, EMC argued that the district court erred in its determination that it had a duty to pay attorney fees and costs when there were no damages awarded to the plaintiff subject to the policy coverage. The Donnellys cross appealed, arguing the district court erred in its conclusion that EMC did not have a duty to cover the damages in this case, and that the Donnellys were entitled to attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Employers Mutual Casualty Co v. Donnelly" on Justia Law

Several hospitals (Hospitals) sued Aetna, Inc. and Aetna Health, Inc. (collectively Aetna) for allegedly violating the Prompt Pay Statute. Aetna provided a Medicare plan (Plan) through an HMO called NYLCare. It delegated the administration of its Plan to North American Medical Management of Texas (NAMM), a third-party administrator. IPA Management Services (Management Services) provided medical services to Plan enrollees. Management Services entered into contracts with the Hospitals to secure hospital services for the Plan employees. Aetna was not a party to these contracts. The Hospitals submitted hospital bills to NAMM for payment. After NAMM and Management Services became insolvent, Aetna de-delegated NAMM and assumed responsibility for processing and paying claims. However, Aetna instructed the Hospitals to continue submitting their bills to NAMM. The Hospitals argued that Aetna was liable for NAMM's failure to timely pay claims and was responsible for $13 million in outstanding bills. The trial court granted summary judgment for Aetna. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because the Hospitals entered into contracts with Management Services and not with Aetna directly, the Hospitals had no viable prompt-pay claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lack of privity between the Hospitals and Aetna precluded the Hospitals' suit. View "Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc." on Justia Law