Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

USI sued defendants for five million dollars, claiming misappropriation of funds held in escrow. USI also sought relief under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act of Canada (similar to a reorganization bankruptcy). Ultimately defendants agreed to pay USI $1,242,000 in installments. USI petitioned the CCAA court for clearance to proceed with settlement. Pursuant to that court’s directions, USI posted notice on its website informing creditors of the settlement. Alleging that the posting violated a confidentiality clause, the defendants refused to pay in accordance with the settlement. A magistrate ruled that there was no breach because the posting was “very, very vague,” but enjoined USI from future publication of the information. The district court reversed, holding that magistrates are not authorized to issue injunctions. Defendants then filed a separate suit, claiming that USI breached the confidentiality provision, and that under the “first-breach doctrine,” one who commits the first “substantial breach” of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other party for failure to perform; they obtained a temporary restraining order in state court that prevented USI from collecting on its judgment. After transfer back to the court in which the settlement was approved, the district court dissolved the injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Nat'l Viatical, Inc.,v. Universal Settlement Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned property that was conveyed by warranty deed to J.A. Reed. In 1968, Reed conveyed the property to Julianne Biggane, and in 2006, the Biggane Trust transferred the property to Plaintiffs. Prior to Reed's transfer of the property to Biggane, a pole line easement across the property was granted to PacifiCorp's predecessor in interest. Reed, however, signed the easement grant as president of Continental Live Stock Company, rather than in his personal capacity, at a time that the company had no interest in the underlying land. Therefore, the easement was a "wild deed." At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a "wild deed" can be the "root of title" under the Wyoming Marketable Title Act. This case arose when Plaintiffs filed an action seeking to have the easement declared invalid because it emanated from a wild deed. The district court held that the Act validated PacifiCorp's easement across Plaintiffs' property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a wild deed may constitute the root of title under the Act, and a wild deed serving as a root of title that does not bear a defect "on its face" is not an "inherent defect" in the chain of record title under the Act. View "Esterholdt v. PacifiCorp" on Justia Law

Respondent credit union sought to foreclose on the homestead that Appellant and her husband (Husband) owned. The district court granted summary judgment to Appellant after concluding that the mortgage Appellant signed with Respondent was void under Minn. Stat. 507.02 because it was not also signed by Husband. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the mortgage was valid because Husband had quitclaimed all of his interest in the homestead property to Appellant before the mortgage was executed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mortgage signed by Appellant in favor of Respondent was void because (1) the mortgage at issue here did not meet any of the statutory exceptions to the signature requirement in section 507.02; and (2) Husband's quitclaim deed did not constitute an explicit waiver of his rights under the homestead statute. View "Marine Credit Union v. Detlefson-Delano" on Justia Law

This case arose from the water loss claims Appellant Roger Daniel Rizzo made under Respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's homeowners insurance policy. All of Appellant's claims were for water damage to his home's basement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, effectively dismissing all of Appellant's causes of action because his homeowner's policy did not cover his water damage claims. Appellant also appealed the district court's denial of his motion to amend his complaint to include various new causes of action and the district court's grant of State Farm's motion for protective order against certain overbroad discovery requests. Finding no error in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions. View "Rizzo v. State Farm Insurance" on Justia Law

Western Wyoming Construction Company (WWC) submitted a bid for a highway project in Sublette County. The Board of County Commissioners of Sublette County (Commissioners) awarded the contract to another resident contractor whose bid was higher than WWC's. WWC filed a complaint in district court for an order awarding it the contract for the project. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioners. At issue on appeal was whether Wyo. Stat. 16-6-102(a) required the Commissioners to award the contract to the responsible certified Wyoming resident making the lowest bid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 16-6-102 has no application in the context of two resident contractors; and (2) because no evidence was presented showing where the funds came from to pay for the project, (i) there could be no finding as to what statutory provision, if any, was applicable, and (ii) a judicial determination as to the appropriateness of the bid award was not possible. Remanded. View "W. Wyo. Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Maria Marusa was driving her car when it was struck by a police cruiser driven by a police officer (Officer). Marusa and her daughter (collectively, Appellants) were injured in the accident. Appellants filed suit against Marusa's insurer (Insurer), seeking damages to compensate for medical expenses and pain and suffering. Insurer answered that it was not obligated to pay damages because even though the policy included uninsured-motorist coverage and the officer was an uninsured motorist, Appellants were not "legally entitled to recover" because Officer was immune under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Law (OPSTLL). The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of the policy unambiguously provides uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when the insured is injured by an owner or operator who is immune under the OPSTLL. View "Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a contract to sell a shopping center. The contract was amended on several occasions. In one provision, the buyer agreed to indemnify the seller for a real estate commission, which they both disclaimed in the contract itself, that might ultimately be owed to a particular real estate broker. Another provision provided for forfeiture of the buyer's deposit if the transaction did not close on the timetable in the contract. The transaction ultimately closed after the appointed date, and the real estate broker successfully sued the seller for a commission. The buyer went bankrupt, and the seller and the assignee investors were left to sort of the consequences of the course of events. The Court of Appeals held (1) the seller here was not entitled to indemnification from the assignee investors for its liability for the broker's commission, even though the buyer (their assignor) was obligated to indemnify the seller; (2) the seller was not entitled to forfeit the deposit funded by the investors; and (3) the seller was entitled to have the investors' claim for refund of the deposit offset by the amount of indemnification that the buyer owed the seller. View "Pines Plaza Ltd. P'ship v. Berkley Trace, LLC" on Justia Law

In an attempt to avert the foreclosure of her home, Plaintiff sought to modify the terms of her mortgage pursuant to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a federal initiative that incentivizes lenders and loan servicers to offer loan modifications to eligible homeowners. When Plaintiff's efforts did not result in a permanent loan modification, she sued Wells Fargo Bank and American Home Mortgage Servicing, alleging that their conduct during her attempts to modify her mortgage violated Massachusetts law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeal (1) affirmed the district court's judgment as to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff's other breach of contract claim, Plaintiff's unfair debt collection practices claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and her derivative claim for equitable relief. Remanded. View "Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Following remand from a prior appeal, the district court determined that defendant's breach of two contracts proximately caused injury to Carco. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court's findings were erroneous because proximate causation did not exist, and that various determinations as to damages, fees, costs, and interest were derivatively, as well as independently, in error. Carco challenged certain aspects of the district court's calculation of the attorneys' fees awarded to Carco and the denial of prejudgment interest on that award. The court vacated and remanded Carco's breach of contract claim for further determinations regarding proximate causation and quantification of Carco's damages on its contract claim, and, if appropriate, the related question of the applicability of an offset to any resulting damages award. To the extent any damages, fees, costs, and interest awards were based on the breach of contract cause of action, they were also vacated. All damages, costs, and interest awards based on Carco's faithless servant claim were affirmed. The twenty-percent reduction and denial of interest on attorneys' fees were reversed. The court instructed the district court to recalculate the award of attorneys' fees in light of those reversals and in light of its findings with respect to proximate cause on Carco's contract claim. View "Carco Group, Inc. et al. v. Maconachy" on Justia Law

Woodard & Curran, Inc. ("W&C") sued the City of Baldwin seeking damages on claims of breach of contract and quantum meruit. After a trial, a jury awarded W&C $203,000 in a general verdict that did not specify the basis for the damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that quantum meruit was an available remedy against a municipality when the claim is based on a municipal contract that is ultra vires; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the jury was properly allowed to consider the breach of contract claim based on an agreement the parties entered in May 2009. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects, and therefore reversed its judgment. View "City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc." on Justia Law