Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Wehrles were struck by drunk-driver Barth. Robert Wehrle’s injury claim exceeded $750,000 and his wife's claim exceeded $1.5 million. Barth’s auto insurance policy included a $100,000 per-person liability limit. Each recovered that amount from Barth’s insurer. The Wehrle’s own policy, issued by Cincinnati, included underinsured-motorist coverage, for up to $1 million. Cincinnati paid $800,000, reasoning that the Wehrles’ policy reduces its $1 million maximum payout “by all sums paid by anyone who is legally responsible,” and that the Wehrles had recovered $200,000 from Barth’s insurer. The Wehrles claimed that the $100,000 that they each received from the drunk-driver’s insurer should reduce their individual claims. The district court ruled in favor of the insurer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the policy language unambiguously supported the insurer’s interpretation and was consistent with the gap-filling purpose of underinsured-motorist insurance. View "Wehrle v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, Kevin and his wife Marjorie moved to Indiana, to manage car dealerships owned by Savoree. In 2007 Savoree proposed selling the dealerships to the couple through a series of stock purchases to be financed by a $3.5 million loan from CSB. After negotiating the loan with CSB, Kevin took out a life insurance policy with Cincinnati Life that named Marjorie as the beneficiary. Two months later, Kevin assigned that policy to CSB. The couple eventually declared bankruptcy and litigation between all of the parties ensued. Kevin died of cancer in 2010. Cincinnati Life deposited the proceeds, $3 million, with the clerk of court and sought judicial determination of ownership. The district court dismissed Marjorie’s claims with prejudice for failing to meet pleading standards and entered summary judgment for CSB. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Marjorie did not present any evidence to create a genuine disputed issue of material fact. She identified lack of consideration for the assignment as a potential disputed fact, but the assertion was made and repeated without any support or citation to evidence. View "Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Conoco for breach of the Offer Letter and breach of its obligations under a severance plan (the Plan). The court concluded that plaintiff waived any challenge to the Trustee's application of the common law presumption of integration or Texas's parol evidence rule; plaintiff's arguments regarding his change in title were unpersuasive; plaintiff's "at will" employment argument relied on outdated and out-of-context Texas authority and was unpersuasive; the waiver was not invalid and unenforceable on account of fraud in the inducement; plaintiff ratified an alleged fraud, thereby preserving the validity and enforceability of the waiver regardless by submitting a claim to Conoco Human Resources but then continuing to work at Conoco; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), civil enforcement provision "completely preempts" plaintiff's state law claims against Conoco and the district court did not err by denying plaintiff's first motion for remand; the district court correctly denied plaintiff's renewed motion for remand; plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees; and plaintiff waived his claim for breach of the Offer Letter, pertaining to a substantial reduction in his post-merger job position and responsibilities, for failure to plead with specificity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff. View "Clayton v. ConocoPhillips Co., et al" on Justia Law

Appellant sued the trustee of his deceased wife's estate, claiming that the trustee improperly transferred Appellant's assets into the trust. Appellant also sought to disqualify the attorney who prepared the trust documents (Attorney) from representing the trustee based on the district court's conclusion that a prior attorney-client relationship existed between Appellant and Attorney, creating a conflict of interest. After the trust litigation settled, Appellant sued Attorney for legal malpractice due to Attorney's failure to verify Appellant's intentions before preparing he documents for his signature. Before trial, Appellant sought to preclude Attorney from arguing that an attorney-client relationship did not exist because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, Attorney could not deny the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The district court denied Appellant's motion. During trial, the district court ruled that evidence of Appellant's intent in executing the documents was precluded by the parol evidence rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly refused to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion because the issue of an attorney-client relationship between Appellant and Attorney was not necessarily litigated in the trust action; and (2) the district court did not err in applying the parol evidence rule. View " Frei v. Goodsell" on Justia Law

Several insureds filed a class action against the predecessor of Washington National Insurance Corporation concerning insurance policies that provide for reimbursement of certain home health care expenses. The district court granted summary judgment for the insureds, concluding that various provisions in the policy, including a certificate schedule, demonstrated an ambiguity concerning whether an automatic increase applied only to the daily benefit or also applied to the lifetime maximum benefit amount and the per occurrence maximum benefit amount. Because there was ambiguity in the policy, the court of appeal certified questions of law to the Florida Supreme Court, which held (1) because the policy was ambiguous, it must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage without consideration of extrinsic evidence; and (2) when so construed, the policy's automatic benefit increase applies to the daily benefit, the lifetime maximum benefit, and the per occurrence maximum benefit. View "Washington Nat'l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim with Defendant, his homeowner's insurance company, for fire damage on his home. Plaintiff's insurance policy with Defendant was a replacement cost policy. Defendant made a payment to Plaintiff that included costs of repair even though Defendant had not completed any repairs to the home. Defendant, however, refused to pay for a general contractor's overhead and profit because Plaintiff had not yet incurred those expenses. Plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim against Defendant, contending that, like the other costs of repair Defendant paid, Defendant was required to pay costs for overhead and profit. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding (1) replacement cost insurance includes overhead and profit where the insured is reasonably likely to need a general contractor for repairs; and (2) the court of appeal erred in determining the Florida law and the insurance policy permitted Defendant to withhold payment of overhead and profit because Plaintiff had not actually incurred those costs. Remanded. View "Trinidad v. Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case presented the issue of revocability of a gift of stock in one company and the validity of stock transfers in two other companies. George Sipko and his two sons Robert and Rastislav managed Koger, Inc. George made an undocumented gift of 1.5 percent in Koger stock to each of his sons. George then formed Koger Distributed Solutions, Inc. (KDS) and Koger Professional Services, Inc. (KPS) The sons each owned fifty percent of KDS and KPS. According to Robert, George became angry after learning about a romantic relationship in which Robert was involved and threatened to physically harm Robert unless he signed certain documents. Robert signed a document transferring his stock in KDS "For Value Received." A second document, transferred Robert's KPS stock using the same language. Robert testified that he signed the KPS document on February 3, 2006, and it was backdated. At a 2006 board meeting, George conducted a purported recall of Robert's 1.5 percent share of Koger stock. George and Rastilav contended that any document signed by Robert was executed voluntarily. Robert then sued his father, Rastislav and the three companies seeking damages and equitable relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that George's gift of Koger stock to Robert was unconditional and therefore irrevocable. Robert's transfers of KDS and KPS stock were void for lack of consideration. View "Sipko v. Koger, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case stemmed from district court decisions regarding an uninsured motorist claim between Plaintiffs-Appellants Sam and Deva Ferrell and Defendant-Respondent United Financial Casualty Company (United Financial, d.b.a. Progressive Insurance Company). The parties underwent arbitration, and the Ferrells subsequently filed a petition that sought confirmation of the arbitration award and an award of costs and attorney fees. The district court ordered confirmation of the arbitration award and interest based upon an agreement of the parties. On the issue of attorney fees, the district court found that arbitration began five months prior to the amendment of I.C. 41-1839 which explicitly allowed attorney fees in arbitration, and therefore the statute as it existed did not provide for attorney fees in this case. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case back to the district court. View "Ferrell v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The O'Neals appealed a circuit court order that granted Bama Exterminating Company, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration. The dispute arose shortly after the O'Neals closed on the purchase of a house. As part of the loan disclosures, Bama Exterminating prepared an inspection report that the house was termite-free. The report did disclose a prior infestation at the house's carport from several years earlier. Mr. O'Neal signed the report right below the arbitration provision. Two weeks after closing, the O'Neals discovered "bugs" in the walls. They called Bama Exterminating who confirmed that the bugs were termites. The O'Neals then sued Bama Exterminating alleging negligence, wantonness and breach of contract. Bama Exterminating answered their complaint with the affirmative defense of the arbitration clause in the inspection report. The parties moved toward trial in the circuit court. When mediation failed, Bama Exterminating moved the court to compel arbitration. The O'Neals argued that the exterminator waived its right to compel arbitration by its participation in the litigation process. The Supreme Court found the exterminator did not waive its right to compel arbitration, and therefore affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant the company's motion. View "O'Neal v. Bama Exterminating Company, Inc. " on Justia Law

Dorchester appealed from the district court's dismissal of its complaint against BRJ for lack of personal jurisdiction. Dorchester initially filed suit against BRJ for breach of contract and fraud based on BRJ's purported failure to honor an irrevocable letter of credit. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that Dorchester made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over BRJ and, therefore, carried its burden in the absence of an evidentiary hearing or trial on the merits. View "Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A." on Justia Law