Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case involved an insurance-coverage dispute governed by Massachusetts substantive law. Plaintiffs filed a claim with their insurance company after a storm caused a pile of soil to slide down a hill and into and over a retaining wall, damaging one of the buildings on Plaintiffs' property. The insurance company denied coverage. Plaintiffs sued for breach of the insurance contract and violation of the Massachusetts consumer-protection act. The insurance company counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the policy did not cover the claimed loss. The magistrate judge granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment, noting that the policy excluded damages from landslides. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the insurance company acted well within its rights in denying coverage, and the magistrate judge properly granted summary judgment for the insurance company on all claims. View "Stor/Gard, Inc. v. Strathmore Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased furniture from the Fortunoff Department Store. Along with the furniture, Plaintiffs purchased a protection plan. The plan was a contract in which Valspar Corporation agreed to provide service for damages to the furniture during the contract period. The plan contained a store closure provision providing that if the store location where customers purchased furniture closed, the purchase price of the plan would be refunded. Fortunoff subsequently closed, and Valspar tendered Plaintiffs a refund of their payment made to the plan. Plaintiffs brought a diversity action against Valspar for breach of contract under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 395, which forbids the termination before expiration of any "maintenance agreement covering parts and/or service" and for damages under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, claiming that section 395 rendered the store closure provision ineffective and that, by denying claims based on this provision, Valspar breached its contracts with Plaintiffs. The district court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals accepted certification to answer questions of law and held (1) section 395(a) does not make contract clauses that contradict its terms null and void; and (2) a violation of section 395(a) alone does not give rise to a cause of action under section 349. View "Schlessinger v. Valspar Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a number of corporations and an individual, Ariq Vanunu, alleging that he had provided telephone service to Defendants pursuant to a written agreement and had not been paid. The complaint alleged that Vanunu was a "principal officer in all the corporate defendant entities." A default judgment was later entered against all Defendants. Vanunu moved to vacate the judgment, asserting that his default was excusable and that he had meritorious defenses to the action. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that Vanunu was personally liable for the stated claims, the default judgment was a nullity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defect in this case was not jurisdictional. View "Manhattan Telecomms. Corp. v. H & A Locksmith, Inc." on Justia Law

Wife and Husband were married in 1997. A week before the wedding, they each separately signed a prenuptial agreement. Neither party was present when the other executed the document, and the signatures were witnessed by different notaries public. In the acknowledgment relating to Husband's signature, a key phrase was omitted. As a result, the certificate failed to indicate that the notary public confirmed the identity of the person executing the document. In 2010, Husband filed for divorce. Wife commenced a separate action seeking a divorce and a declaration that the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable. Supreme Court denied Wife's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding (1) the certificate of acknowledgment was defective, but (2) the deficiency could be cured after the fact, and the notary public affidavit raised a triable question of fact as to whether the prenuptial agreement had been properly acknowledged when it was signed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prenuptial agreement was invalid where, even assuming a defect in a certificate of acknowledgment could be cured, the notary public's affidavit was insufficient to raise a triable question of fact as to the propriety of the original acknowledgment procedure. View "Galetta v. Galetta" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a commission agreement with Company in 2002 in which Company agreed to pay Plaintiff a commission when Company sold its products to contacts that Plaintiff introduced to Company. Starting in 2004, Company began paying Plaintiff commissions for its sales to a certain contact (Avaya). Company terminated the agreement on the day that Plaintiff served it with a complaint claiming that Company owed him commissions on sales it made to another company. Company continued to sell to Avaya after terminating the agreement but did not pay Plaintiff any commissions on those sales. Plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint, and the case was tried to a jury on the issue of whether Plaintiff was due commissions resulting from Company's post-termination sales to Avaya. The trial court entered judgment for Company. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of Plaintiff, holding (1) the commission agreement unambiguously required Company to pay commissions to Plaintiff on sales it made to Avaya after Company unilaterally terminated the agreement; and (2) therefore, Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his breach of contract claim. View "McDonald v. Scitec, Inc." on Justia Law

Compass Construction and First Baptist Church were named as defendants in an action arising from a construction accident. Ultimately, First Baptist prevailed against the plaintiff in the main action and on its cross-claim for indemnity against Compass. First Baptist was awarded attorneys fees as part of its indemnity claim, but the parties disagreed about the appropriate hourly rate at which the fee for First Baptist's attorney should be calculated. In the main action, First Baptist's insurance company assigned an attorney to represent First Baptist. The attorney had a written fee agreement with the insurance company providing that attorney would be paid $170 per hour. In an alternative fee recovery clause, however, the agreement provided that if anyone other than the insurance company was required to pay attorney's fees, the attorney's hourly rate would be $300. The trial court calculated the award at the higher rate. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the alternative fee recovery clause was valid. Remanded for reinstatement of the judgment awarding attorney's fees. View "First Baptist Church of Cape Coral, Fla., Inc. v. Compass Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

Decedent became a resident of Golden Living Center, a nursing home, in 2009. Later that year, Courtyard Gardens took over ownership and operation of the facility. Thereafter, Decedent's son, Ronald Quarles signed a new admission agreement and optional arbitration agreement. In 2011, Kenny Quarles, another of Decedent's sons acting as power of attorney, filed an amended complaint against Courtyard Gardens and other entities associated with it and the Center, seeking damages for negligence, medical malpractice, and violations of the Arkansas Long-Term Care Residents' Act. Courtyard Gardens filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The circuit court denied Courtyard Garden's motion to compel arbitration, concluding that questions of fact remained regarding Ronald's authority to bind Decedent to the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration, holding that there was no valid arbitration agreement as a matter of law because Ronald had neither actual authority nor statutory authority to enter into the arbitration agreement on Decedent's behalf. View "Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC v. Quarles" on Justia Law

SEECO, Inc. owned oil-and-gas leases and possessed rights authorizing it to explore for and develop minerals from several tracts of land. SEECO filed an interpleader action to determine the ownership of the oil, gas, and minerals in the land. Appellee requested that the circuit court quiet title and confirm title in Appellees. Several defendants were named in the action. The circuit court ruled that a 1929 mineral deed, even with a blank left empty in the granting clause, conveyed one hundred percent of the mineral interest in three tracts of land to J.S. Martin. Appellees included the Stanton Group, as Martin's heirs and successors in interest, and SEECO. Appellants appealed, arguing that the 1929 mineral deed was void because the description of the interest was so vague that it was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1929 mineral deed was unambiguous, and the circuit court did not err by refusing to consider the parol evidence of a subsequent 1930 deed. View "Barton Land Servs., Inc. v. SEECO, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Charles Honeycutt was injured in an automobile accident involving a Mississippi state trooper. He sued the state trooper and two automobile-insurance providers, Atlanta Casualty Company and American Premier Insurance Company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari, seeking to appeal the grant of summary judgment for American Premier: (1) whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by finding an insurance agent does not have a duty to explain uninsured-motorist coverage; (2) whether summary judgment was granted improperly. The Supreme Court found that, in order to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of uninsured-motorist coverage (UM coverage), an insurance agent does have a duty to explain UM coverage to the insured. The Court also found that summary judgment was not proper in this case. Thus, the Court reversed both lower courts' judgments and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Honeycutt v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Defendant Halliburton Energy Services hired Plaintiff Edward Flemma to work as a cement equipment operator in Houma, Louisiana, in January of 1982. During his twenty-six years of employment with Halliburton, Flemma was promoted several times and worked for the company in Louisiana, Texas, Angola, and New Mexico. The last position he held was as district manager in Farmington, New Mexico, where he worked from 2006 until the time of his termination in 2008.The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a conflict of laws issue that requires the Court to determine whether enforcement of an arbitration agreement, formed in the State of Texas, would offend New Mexico public policy to overcome our traditional choice of law rule. Upon review, the Court concluded that the agreement formed in Texas would be unconscionable under New Mexico law, and it therefore violated New Mexico public policy. Thus, the Court applied New Mexico law and concluded that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties because Halliburton's promise to arbitrate was illusory. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Flemma v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc." on Justia Law