Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Defendant constructed a home that it sold to its initial purchaser. The initial purchaser, in turn, sold the home to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs later learned the home's hillside retaining wall and home site had been constructed in a dangerously defective manner. Plaintiffs requested that Defendant cover the cost of repair, but Defendant claimed it was no longer responsible for any construction defects. Plaintiffs then filed an action against Defendant to force Defendant to cover the cost of repair. The trial court dismissed all of the claims, concluding, among other things, that Plaintiffs' negligence claims were barred by Arizona's economic loss doctrine. The court of appeals remanded for resolution of Plaintiffs' various negligence claims, concluding that, because Plaintiffs had no contract with Defendant, the economic loss doctrine did not bar their tort claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs' negligence claims to recover damages resulting from the construction defects. Remanded. View "Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp." on Justia Law

Decedent's ex-wife, Ann, filed a claim against Decedent's estate for compensation for nursing and convalescent services she provided to Decedent before his death. Before Decedent died, he forgave a loan he made to Ann. The trustee of Decedent's trust denied Ann's claim, asserting that the loan forgiveness constituted payment for Ann's services. Ann subsequently filed a petition for allowance of claim, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking payment from Decedent's trust. The trial court ordered that the trust pay Ann $183,538 for services rendered, concluding that Ann was entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the loan forgiveness was not compensation for the services Ann provided to Decedent and that Ann was entitled to compensation for the services she provided to Decedent; but (2) concluded that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of Ann's award. Remanded with instructions to recalculate the award. View "In re Nelson Living Trust" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between two construction companies, Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant contracted with Plaintiff to build grain storage facilities at two locations. After beginning construction, Plaintiff stopped work for Defendant's alleged failure to make progress payments. Plaintiff then filed two lawsuits against Defendant seeking to foreclose liens on the property and asserting, ultimately, claims for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. The trial court dismissed the mechanic's liens claims, granted Defendant's motions for default judgment on the counterclaims, and granted Defendant's motions for summary judgment in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of the default judgments and summary judgments, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in granting the motions for default judgment against Plaintiff on Defendant's counterclaims and in failing to grant Plaintiff's motions for enlargement of time; and (2) erred in granting the motions for summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract. Remanded. View "Donald Bucklin Constr. v. McCormick Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Sierra International purchased a manufacturing facility's operations. Sierra later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants, the facility and its president, hired Respondent (MCW) to represent them in Sierra's bankruptcy action. Sierra's bankruptcy case closed in 2008. In 2006, Appellants filed an action against MCW, alleging professional malpractice arising from its representation of Appellants in the bankruptcy action. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1(e)(2). In 2010, Appellants filed a second complaint against MCW, reasserting the claims in their first complaint. MCW filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations because the appropriate accrual date was 2006, the date of the filing of the first complaint. Appellants responded by asserting that Hewitt v. Allen, which provides that the statutory limitation period of a claim of legal malpractice involving the representation of a client during litigation does not commence until the underlying litigation is concluded, governed. The district court held that 2006 was the appropriate accrual date and that Hewitt was inapplicable because a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute litigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holing that Sierra's bankruptcy action did not constitute an adversarial proceeding under Hewitt. View "Moon v. McDonald, Carano & Wilson, LLP" on Justia Law

Appellants agreed to purchase a restaurant and real property on which the restaurant was located from Respondent. After Appellants failed to make payments on the promissory note, Respondent filed an action against Appellants to recover the principal and unpaid interest. According to Respondent, a third buy-and-sell agreement between the parties was the operative agreement. But during trial, Appellants presented evidence that a fourth written agreement, which was allegedly later destroyed by Respondent or his brother, existed containing the agreed-upon purchase price and terms of the sale. The district court concluded that Appellants' evidence of the destroyed fourth agreement was barred by the statute of frauds because Appellants failed to produce the written agreement. The court then found that Appellants breached the third agreement and entered judgment for Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute of frauds does not apply to a writing that is subsequently lost or destroyed, and oral evidence is admissible to prove the existence and terms of the lost or destroyed writing. Remanded. View " Khan v. Bakhsh" on Justia Law

In Feeney II, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the superior court invalidating a class action waiver in the parties' arbitration agreement, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not foreclose a court from invalidating an arbitration agreement that includes a class action waiver if it effectively denies the plaintiffs a remedy. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently issued an opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (Amex) holding that a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement is enforceable under the FAA even if a plaintiff proves that the class waiver effectively precludes the plaintiff from vindicating his federal statutory rights. The Massachusetts Supreme Court subsequently concluded that following Amex, the Court's analysis in Feeney II no longer comported with the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA, holding instead that a class waiver may not be invalidated on the grounds that it effectively denies the plaintiffs a remedy. Remanded. View "Feeney v. Dell Inc. " on Justia Law

Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Indiana is a municipal corporation that operates a major hospital and other facilities, including a health center operated in partnership with Citizens Health to serve the medically under-served population in Indianapolis. The health center was funded in part by a Section 330 Grant, awarded by the federal Health Resources and Services Administration, which is part of the Department of Health and Human Services. Section 330 grants fund qualifying health centers that provide primary health care services to medically under-served populations, 42 U.S.C. 254b. A In 2012, Health and Hospital decided to terminate the partnership with Citizens and relinquish the federal grant, which still had several years of funding remaining. Citizens sued Health and Hospital, HRS, and others in an effort to retain the grant funds. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding that Citizens had no contractual, statutory, or constitutionally cognizable interest in the grant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Health and Hospital was the grantee; Citizens had no constitutionally-protected entitlement to the grant; and the terms of the contract between Health and Hospital and Citizens clear; there was no obligation to renew. View "Citizens Health Corp. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former employees of Boston Medical Center (BMC), brought this wage-and-hour action against BMC, BMC's former president and COE, and BMC's former senior human resources officer, alleging that Defendants deprived them of their wages through the use of timekeeping policies and employment practices that required them to put in extra work time in addition to their regularly scheduled work shifts and to work through their meal and rest periods. Plaintiffs asserted causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Massachusetts common law. The federal district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the dismissal of the FLSA claim against BMC and its former CEO, the contract claims, and the money had and received, unjust enrichment, and conversion claims; (2) vacated the district court's order striking the class and collective action allegations; and (3) otherwise affirmed. Remanded. View "Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp." on Justia Law

Four upper-level managers at Tradesmen, a construction staffing company, formed a competing company in 2009. Tradesmen filed suit alleging breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information, breach of duty of loyalty, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with business expectancy, conversion, and civil conspiracy, and seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to covenants not to compete and injunctive relief. Proceedings against one defendant were stayed, due to bankruptcy. The district court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants, except with respect to the declaratory judgment count, but found that the covenants had already expired. The district court denied attorney’s fees. The Seventh Circuit held that because of the stay, the summary judgment ruling was not a final decision, so that it lacked jurisdiction on appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291, except with respect to the request for injunctive relief (28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1)). The court affirmed on that issue, reasoning that Tradesmen failed to show that it suffered any harm, let alone irreparable harm, from the remaining defendants’ actions. View "Tradesmen Int'l, Inc. v. Black" on Justia Law

Reynolds acquired Pactiv in 2010 under an agreement that calls for severance pay to any non‐union employee terminated without cause, within a year, as a result of the acquisition. Pactiv established a severance‐pay plan with implementing terms, including a requirement that the departing worker execute a separation agreement in a form acceptable to the company, releasing all other claims against Pactiv. Within a year, Pactiv directed Rupert to relocate. He declined. Pactiv acknowledged entitlement to severance pay and sent him an agreement, which required that Rupert promise, for the next year, not to work for competitors in research and development, solicit sales of competing goods and services, or try to hire Pactiv employees. He had not previously been subject to a restrictive covenant and declined to sign. Pactiv withheld severance benefits. The district court held that Rupert was entitled to benefits because the formal plan, governed by ERISA, lacks any language conditioning benefits on signing a restrictive covenant; material terms must be in writing, 29 U.S.C.1102(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Rupert did not ask for benefits under Pactiv’s plan, but asked for benefits under the acquisition agreement, repeatedly asserting that the plan is irrelevant to his claim. The court remanded for consideration under that agreement. View "Pactiv Corp. v. Rupert" on Justia Law