Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

DHS sued VHS for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and trademark violations. DHS engaged VHS to market and sell the drug Provasca. After that relationship ended, VHS began to manufacture, market, and sell Arterosil, a product similar in many respects to Provasca. The court held that the district court granted DHS's request for a preliminary injunction after making sufficient findings of fact to support each element of the analysis and applying the correct legal standard to those facts. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction in full and lifted the stay of the injunction. The court remanded and directed the district court to expedite the trial on the permanent injunction and to attempt to narrow the breadth of its preliminary injunction. View "Daniels Health Sciences, L.L.C v. Vascular Health Sciences, L.L.C." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two agreements: a ground lease agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. (ASCU) and Wolf Mountain Resorts, and a specifically planned area (SPA) development agreement, which had thirty-six signatories, including ASCU, Wolf Mountain, the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (Osguthorpe). ASCU and Wolf Mountain began litigating claims involving both the ground lease and the SPA agreement. Shortly thereafter, Osguthorpe sued ASCU and Wolf Mountain, alleging that each party had breached a land-lease agreement distinct from the ground lease or the SPA agreement. The district court consolidated Osguthorpe's separate actions into ASCU's litigation. Osguthorpe later moved to compel arbitration on all the claims related to the SPA agreement, including the claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain, to which Osguthrope was not a party. The district court denied Osguthrope's motion. Osguthrope withdrew its SPA claims from the case, leaving for appeal only Osguthrope's motion to compel arbitration of the SPA claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disputes for which Osguthrope sought to compel arbitration were not subject to the SPA agreement's arbitration provision; and (2) furthermore, as a non-party to the disputes, Osguthrope had no contractual right to compel their arbitration. View "Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

This action arose from easement disputes at Big Sky Lake. Plaintiffs were homeowners who owned lakeshore lots. The access road was owned by the Homeowners Association and provided the access to each lakeshore lot. Later, the larger tracts of land outside the access road were divided between the Hollinger and Williams families. The Hollingers' land did not abut the lakeshore and did not abut the lakeshore lots. Plaintiffs claimed a right, based upon language in various documents that arose from the initial development of the lake, to an express easement allowing them the unrestricted use of four roads or trails on the Hollingers' lands for motorized access. After the Hollingers installed gates at several points to block motorized access to the disputed roads, Plaintiffs sued in district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the Hollingers, holding that none of the documents relied upon by Plaintiffs established an easement across the Hollingers' land. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly applied the facts and the law to conclude that Plaintiffs had not established any right to easements over the Hollingers' land. View "Thayer v. Hollinger" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Katherine and Michael, were living together in a home that was destroyed by a fire in 1998. Seeking to rebuild their home, Michael and Katherine completed an application for property insurance with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. American Family issued the policy. In 2003, Plaintiffs' garage was destroyed in a fire, and Plaintiffs filed a claim with American Family. During follow-up investigations, Michael disclosed the 1998 fire to American Family. American Family, treating the prior fire loss nondisclosure as a misrepresentation, voided the insurance policy ab initio and denied Plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs filed suit against American Family claiming breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment for American Family. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the grant of summary judgment on grounds that American Family failed to return the premiums paid by Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' assignment of error was not properly before the Court on appeal. View "Dodd v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the explosion and sinking of Transocean's Deepwater Horizon in April 2010. At issue were the obligations of Transocean's primary and excess-liability insurers to cover BP's pollution-related liabilities deriving from the ensuing oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Because the court, applying Texas law, found that the umbrella policies between the Insurers and Transocean did not impose any relevant limitation upon the extent to which BP was an additional insured, and because the additional insured provision in the Drilling Contract was separate from and additional to the indemnity provisions therein, the court found BP was entitled to coverage under each of Transocean's policies as an additional insured as a matter of law. The court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

After Nada Payich's death, her son, Ivan Payich, sued Sorensen for negligent care of Nada, among other claims. Sorensen subsequently appealed the district court's denial of its application to compel arbitration in the suit filed by Ivan, the Special Administrator for the Estate of Nada Payich. On appeal, Sorensen argued that Nada was a third-party beneficiary of an Arbitration Agreement between Sorensen and Ivan and that the Estate was therefore compelled to arbitrate its claims. The court affirmed the judgment because it found no clear error in the district court's determination that Sorensen failed to prove it executed a valid contract with Ivan. View "GGNSC Omaha Oak Grove, LLC v. Payich" on Justia Law

Margaret Hunt, a teacher, sued her former employer, the Richmond County Board of Education for breach of her employment contract. The parties stipulated to the amount of damages, and after a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in the stipulated amount plus prejudgment interest. The Board cut two checks, one reflecting the interest and fees, and another intended to reflect the damages award. The award was treated as wage income, with various sums withheld to comply with state and federal tax laws. Hunt objected to that treatment of the damages award, contending that the second check prepared by the Board should have been for the full amount of the damages, and that the payment should be reported for tax purposes using an IRS Form 1099. The parties could not agree on the tax treatment of the damages award. As a result, the Board filed suit seeking an injunction against Hunt in the event she resorted to certain collection methods (such as garnishment of the Board's assets). The superior court grated a temporary restraining order. Hunt appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court reversed: "the mere apprehension of injury does not support the grant of an injunction." View "Hunt v. Richmond County Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

Gladys Garner and Randolph Scott defaulted on their respective automobile loan agreements. Both contracts were governed by the provisions of the Creditor Grantor Closed End Credit Act of the Commercial Law Article (CLEC). The contracts were later assigned to Ally Financial, Inc., Nuvell National Auto Finance, and Nuvell Financial Services (collectively, GMAC). GMAC repossessed both vehicles and informed the debtors that the vehicles would be sold at a "public auction." Both cars were later sold. The debtors filed separate complaints against GMAC alleging, in part, that GMAC violated the CLEC because the sales of their cars were in reality "private sales," requiring GMAC to provide a detailed post-sale disclosure to them under the CLEC, which GMAC had not done. The federal district court combined the cases and granted summary judgment for GMAC, concluding the sales were "public auctions" because they were both widely advertised and open to the public for competitive bidding. The federal appellate court then certified an issue for clarification to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The Court answered that the auctions were in reality "private sales" because attendance was limited to those who paid a refundable $1,000 cash deposit. View "Gardner v. Ally Fin., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard J. Sternberg, M.D. brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, its CEO and members of the hospital's Medical Executive Committee (MEC) (collectively "Nanticoke") for tortious interference with existing business relationships, defamation, and breach of the Medical Staff Bylaws. The suit arose from a precautionary suspension of his clinical privileges imposed by Nanticoke under its professional review procedures. Nanticoke asserted immunity under federal and state law and sought attorneys fees, citing state law and a fee-shifting provision of Nanticoke's Medical Staff Bylaws Credentials Policy. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court denied Sternberg's motion and granted Nanticoke's motion, awarding attorney's fees under state law without addressing Nanticoke's claim for costs and fees under the Credentials Policy. Sternberg appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed on the issue of immunity but reversed the award of attorney's fees under the applicable statute because Sternberg refuted the only fact supporting the requisite bad faith for an award under that law. Upon remand, the Superior Court awarded attorney's fees and costs based upon the Credentials Policy. Sternberg raised three claims on appeal: (1) he claimed that the Superior Court erred by granting Nanticoke's motion for summary judgment for attorney's fees under the Credentials Policy, because the bylaw violates public policy; (2) he claimed the Credentials Policy was unenforceable against him because Nanticoke materially breached the bylaws; and (3) he claimed that the Superior Court abused its discretion in determining the amount of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded. Finding no merit to any of his claims on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Sternberg, M.D. v. Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Matrix Construction Co. was a South Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in South Carolina. Matrix was the general contractor on a project to renovate schools in South Carolina. Matrix hired Contract Supply as a subcontractor. Contract Supply had a relationship with BlueTarp Financial, a company providing commercial credit to the construction industry that had its principal place of business in Maine. After Matrix accepted Contract Supply's bid, Matrix signed BlueTarp's account agreement, which stated that disputes would be governed by the laws of Maine. Matrix later learned that Contract Supply was not paying its suppliers and stopped paying Contract Supply. BlueTarp filed this action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the federal district court for the District of Maine invoking diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Matrix. BlueTarp appealed, arguing that the forum selection clause in the account agreement authorized jurisdiction in the Maine district court and, in any event, Matrix had sufficient connections with Maine to satisfy the personal jurisdiction requirements. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, having found the relatedness, purposeful availment, and reasonableness factors satisfied, the district court had personal jurisdiction over Matrix. View "Bluetarp Fin., Inc. v. Matrix Constr. Co." on Justia Law