Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Wilson Sporting Goods agreed to pay Frolow royalties for “Licensed Article(s),” defined as “tennis rackets which are covered by one or more unexpired or otherwise valid claims” of Frolow’s 372 patent. After conducting an audit, Frolow concluded that Wilson was not paying royalties on all the Licensed Articles and filed suit alleging that Wilson breached the License Agreement and infringed the 372 patent. Due to an arbitration provision in the Agreement, the court limited the breach of contract case to determining which Wilson racket models were Licensed Articles and summarily dismissed the patent infringement claim. The court ultimately entered summary judgment for Wilson. The Federal Circuit reversed with respect whether certain rackets were Licensed Articles, reasoning that the fact that Wilson marked their products with Frolow’s patent number supports his allegation that Wilson’s products fall within the claims. View "Frolow v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co." on Justia Law

Appellants purchased Mom's Malt Shop (Mom's) from Meisinger Investments, which was subsequently dissolved. Six years later, Appellants filed a complaint against Meisinger Investments and one of its owners, Richard Meisinger (Appellees) for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith, alleging that Appellees misrepresented the inventory of the equipment of Mom's, among other things. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that the sale of Mom's was between Appellants and Meisinger Investments and that Appellants had not made any allegations that would justify piercing the corporate veil to hold Richard personally responsible. The district court dismissed Appellants' complaint, finding that the complaint was insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court improperly converted Appellees' motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment; (2) the district court correctly found that Appellants failed to present any allegations that would put Appellees on notice that Appellants were seeking to pierce the corporate veil in an attempt to hold Richard personally liable for the claims against Meisinger Investments; and (3) Appellants did present a proper claim against Meisinger Investments. View "Ridgerunner, LLC v. Meisinger" on Justia Law

Construction Company contracted with Subcontractor for construction of elements of an HVAC system. As partial collateral for a revolving line of credit, Subcontractor assigned to Bank its right to receive payment under the contract with Construction Company. Construction Company instead made twelve payments to Subcontractor. Subcontractor subsequently ceased business operations, leaving an outstanding debt to Bank on its line of credit. Bank filed an action against Construction Company for breach of contract and violation of the UCC. A jury found (1) Construction Company liable on both counts for ten of the twelve checks that it had delivered to Subcontractor, and (2) Bank was estopped from recovering with respect to the final two checks. The judge entered judgment on the statutory claim in the amount of $3,015,000, the full face value of the ten checks. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial judge (1) properly entered judgment on Bank's statutory claim in the amount of the wrongfully midirected payments; but (2) erred in denying the bank's motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the final two checks, as there was insufficient evidence to support Construction Company's defense of estoppel. View "Reading Coop. Bank v. Constr. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved a contractual interpretation dispute over whether overriding royalties were payable out of the initial oil and gas production from a tract of land on the outer continental shelf (OCS) adjacent to Louisiana. The court concluded, under applicable Louisiana law, that the "calculate and pay" clauses in the overriding royalty interests assignment contracts did not clearly and explicitly express the intent that overriding royalty payments shall be suspended whenever the U.S. landowner royalties were suspended under the OCS Deepwater Royalty Relief Act, 43 U.S.C. 1337(a); and that the "calculate and pay" clauses must be interpreted further in search of the common intent of the parties to the assignment contracts. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Total E&P USA, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil and Gas Corp, et al" on Justia Law

Bayside installed hurricane-resistant windows manufactured by Viracon and supplied by EFCO. Shortly after installation, cracking and delamination occurred in some of the windows. Bayside filed suit against Viracon and EFCO nine years after it noticed the defect. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Viracon and EFCO, concluding that Minnesota's two-year statute of limitations applied to Bayside's breach of warranty claims and therefore, these claims were time-barred. View "Bayside Holdings, Ltd., et al v. Viracon, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an online application for a payday loan with Geneva-Roth Ventures, which charged Plaintiff an interest rate of 780 percent APR. The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff entered into the contract over the Internet and did not separately sign or initial the arbitration clause. Plaintiff brought a putative class action against Geneva-Roth for charging an interest rate higher than the thirty-six percent APR permitted by the Montana Consumer Loan act for payday loans. Geneva-Roth filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The district court denied the motion, determining that the arbitration clause was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration clause qualified as a contract of adhesion and fell outside Plaintiff's reasonable expectations. Therefore, the arbitration clause was unconscionable. View "Kelker v. Geneva-Roth Ventures, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants Stryker Biotech, LLC, Stryker Sales Corporation (collectively Stryker) and Turner Construction Company, appealed a superior court ruling which found them liable on a theory of unjust enrichment and awarded damages to the plaintiff, Axenics, Inc. f/k/a RenTec Corporation. Axenics cross-appealed, challenging the amount of damages awarded and the trial court's failure to find the defendants liable on its breach of contract and New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claims. This case arose from the construction of a biotech facility for Stryker for which Turner served as the general contractor. Axenics subcontracted with Turner to furnish labor, materials, equipment, and services for the installation of "process pipe" at the facility. A dispute arose when Axenics notified Turner of additional change orders related to delays and work that it believed to be outside the scope of the contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the subcontract addressed the subject matter of Axenics' unjust enrichment claim. The Court reversed the trial court's decision finding Turner liable to Axenics on its theory of unjust enrichment. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence that Stryker accepted a benefit that would be unconscionable to retain. Therefore the Court held that the trial court erred in allowing Axenics to recover against Stryker under a theory of unjust enrichment. The Court found that an internal memorandum was admitted into evidence in error; the trial court erred in relying upon it in assessing damages. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision with respect to Axenics' CPA claims. The case was ultimately affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Axenics, Inc. v. Turner Construction Co." on Justia Law

Tenant rented a house pursuant to a lease agreement with Landlord. Tenant later lease another of Landlord's properties pursuant to a lease agreement. For both properties, Landlord charged Tenant additional monthly "appliance fees" in excess of the stated rent amounts. Tenant brought this action against Landlord for noncompliance with the terms of her two lease agreements and for failure to return her security deposit. Landlord counterclaimed for damages. After a bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of Tenant. Tenant was represented by senior certified law students operating under the supervision of an attorney who was the director of the general civil practice clinic at Creighton University School of Law. Landlord argued that attorney fees could not be covered because Tenant's attorneys were working pro bono. The district court disagreed and awarded statutory fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Tenant but modified the designee of the attorney fee award, directing the district court to amend its order so as to award the attorney fees directly to the legal services provider. View "Black v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Tiara Condominium Association (Tiara) retained Marsh & McLennan (Marsh) as its insurance broker. Marsh secured windstorm coverage through Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), which issued a policy that contained a loss limit in an amount close to $50 million. Tiara's condominium subsequently sustained damages caused by two hurricanes. After being assured by Marsh that the loss limits coverage was per occurrence, Tiara spent more than $100 million in remediation efforts. However, when Tiara sought payment from Citizens, Citizens claimed that the loss limit was $50 million in the aggregate, not per occurrence. Tiara filed suit against Marsh, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Marsh on all claims. The appeals affirmed with the exception of the negligence and breach of fiduciary claims, as to which it certified a question to the Supreme Court to determine whether the economic loss rule prohibits recovery, or whether an insurance broker falls within the professional services exception that would allow Tiara to proceed with the claims. The Court answered by holding that the application of the economic loss rule is limited to products liability cases. View "Tiara Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos. " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action in Maryland state court seeking a declaration as to Allstate's duty under a renters insurance policy to defend and indemnify plaintiffs in a tort suit brought against them, and others. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Allstate, concluding that Allstate did not have a duty to defend. The court held that Maryland law applied to the issue of whether Allstate had a duty to defend plaintiffs if Maryland law would apply without the choice-of-law provision in the policy; according to Maryland's lex loci contractus rule for choice-of-law decisions, California law governed the analysis of whether Allstate had a duty to defend plaintiffs in the underlying action; and the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Allstate nonetheless owed them a duty to defend under the policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Francis v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law