Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Circle D Contractors filed suit in district court to collect from the Bartletts money owed for the installation of a swimming pool. The district court ruled in favor of Circle D. The Barletts appealed. Circle D did not refile an additional complaint within thirty days, and the Barletts moved to dismiss Circle D's complaint as untimely. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, ruling that Circle D had failed to strictly comply with the requirements of District Court Rule 9 by failing to timely refile its complaint in circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) only substantial compliance with the rule that a plaintiff refile its complaint in circuit court is required; and (2) Circle D substantially complied with rule 9 because all of its pleadings that were previously filed in district court were filed in circuit court, albeit by the Bartletts, and moreover, Circle D also refiled its complaint in circuit court. Remanded. View "Circle D Contractors, Inc. v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

The trial court denied defendant Virginia College's motion to compel arbitration. Because the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim that they were fraudulently induced to agree to the arbitration provision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Virginia College, LLC v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

Appellants Thomas and Vera Gladden appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Respondent Palmetto Home Inspection Services, alleging the limit of liability provision in a home inspection contract was unenforceable as violative of public policy and as unconscionable under the facts of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that contractual limitation of a home inspector's liability did not violate South Carolina public policy as expressed by the General Assembly and, as a matter of law, was not so oppressive that no reasonable person would make it and no fair and honest person would accept it. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the inspector. View "Gladden v. Palmetto Home Inspections" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (ILM) appealed the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial following a $2.2 million jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Ryan Development Company, L.C., d/b/a Agriboard Industries (Agriboard). This case arose from a fire that destroyed a Texas manufacturing facility in April 2009. Agriboard, manufactured building panels made of compressed straw. At the time of the fire, Agriboard was insured under a fire and related losses insurance policy issued by ILM with various coverages including lost income. By May 2009, ILM had paid $450,000; Agriboard filed suit and thereafter ILM paid $1.8 million. Agriboard continued to seek recovery under the policy, but ILM refused to pay the amount requested and Agriboard re-filed suit, seeking $2.4 million in unpaid coverages. The trial court denied ILM's motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial. ILM timely appealed that denial to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying ILM's motion and affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "Ryan Development Co. v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Klein-Becker USA and Klein-Becker IP Holdings sued Patrick Englert and Mr. Finest, Inc., for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act; false advertising under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act; unfair competition under the Utah Unfair Practices Act; fraud; civil conspiracy; and intentional interference with existing and prospective business relations. The action arose from Englert's unauthorized selling of "StriVectin" skin care products: he posed as a General Nutrition Center (GNC) store to purchase the products at below wholesale rates. Englert then sold the products through eBay and other commercial web platforms, including his own, "mrfinest.com." Englert was sanctioned several times for failing to comply with court orders and discovery schedules. The third and final sanction resulted in the entry of default judgment for Klein-Becker on all remaining claims. Englert appealed the district court's entry of default judgment against him, determination of his personal liability and the amount of damages owed, grant of a permanent injunction, denial of a jury trial, and refusal to allow him to call a certain witness. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no fault in the district court's analysis or judgment and affirmed. View "Klein-Becker USA v. Englert" on Justia Law

Brothers Thomas and Michael Tessier allegedly swindled brothers Frederick and Thaddeus Jakobiec and the estate of their mother out of millions of dollars. This lawsuit covered the Tessiers' theft of almost $100,000 in life insurance proceeds due to a trust benefitting Thaddeus. Thaddeus and various persons affiliated with the trust and estate (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against Merrill Lynch, the company that issued the life insurance policy, claiming that Merrill Lynch made out the insurance proceeds check to the wrong trust entity in breach of the insurance contract, thus allowing the Tessiers to steal the money. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch, concluding that even if Merrill Lynch did breach the contract, its breach was not the cause of Plaintiffs' losses because the Tessiers would have stolen the money even if the check had been made out correctly. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the extensive groundwork laid by the Tessiers for their criminal scheme, they could have and would have stolen the insurance money regardless of how Merrill Lynch made out the check; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch. View "Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action against Priceline, seeking compensatory, punitive, and equitable relief for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and contract, as well as a violation of Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110b. Plaintiffs' claims arose from Priceline's alleged failure to disclose to users of its "Name Your Own Price" booking service that a successful bid for a hotel room would generally exceed the amount Priceline itself compensated the hotel vendor, with Priceline retaining the difference as profit. Because plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to allege an agency relationship between Priceline and consumers who use its "Name Your Own Price" service to reserve hotel accommodations, they could not plausibly claim that Priceline breached an agent's fiduciary duty in failing to apprise consumers that it might have procured the accommodations at costs lower than their bids, retaining the difference as profits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant formed a partnership by oral agreement. Defendant later withdrew from the venture after Plaintiff refused his demand for majority ownership of the partnership. Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, claiming that Defendant could not unilaterally terminate his obligations under the agreement. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the complaint failed to allege that the partnership agreement provided for a definite term or a defined objective, and therefore, dissolution was permissible under N.Y. P'ship Law 62(1)(b). The Appellate Division modified by reinstating the breach of contract cause of action, reasoning that the complaint adequately described a definite term and alleged a particular undertaking. The Court of Appeals reversed with directions that the breach of contract cause of action of the complaint be dismissed, holding (1) the complaint did not satisfy the "definite term" element of section 62(1)(b) because it did not set forth a specific or a reasonably certain termination date; and (2) the alleged scheme of anticipated partnership events detailed in the complaint were too amorphous to meet the statutory "particular undertaking" standard for precluding unilateral dissolution of a partnership. View "Gelman v. Buehler" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against Home Loan and Deutsche Bank, alleging state law claims based on a mortgage contract. The district court determined that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Home Owner's Loan Act (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. 1461 et seq., and its implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. 560.2. The court concluded that plaintiff's allegations supporting her first count - that the mortgage contract was unconscionable - fell under section 560.2(b) and therefore, the court concluded that her claim was preempted and affirmed the dismissal of that claim. However, because plaintiff's state tort claim for fraud only incidentally affected lending, it was not preempted by HOLA or its implementing regulation. Therefore, dismissal of that claim on preemption grounds was unwarranted. Further, the court found no basis for dismissal of plaintiff's fraud count on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds and plaintiff's complaint met the requirements of Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "McCauley v. Home Loan Investment Bank, F.S" on Justia Law

A jury found Ronald Brooks liable to his former brother-in-law, Timothy Hollaar, for the full amount of loans that had been memorialized by four promissory notes. On appeal, Ronald argued: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing Timothy to recover more than nominal damages, since Timothy was not the real source of the money and intended to pay any recovery to the family members who supplied it; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to make special findings of fact on Timothy’s promissory estoppel claim; and (3) that the trial court erred in naming Timothy the prevailing party. Because Timothy could lawfully sue to recover the loans, the promissory estoppel claim was properly submitted to the jury, and Timothy was the prevailing party, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Brooks v. Hollaar" on Justia Law