Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case involved multiple litigations among three parties - Insurer, insured Mortgagee, and Homeowner - arising out of a defect in the title to Homeowner's home. Insurer brought suit in the land court on behalf of Mortgagee seeking to reform the deed to the property or to equitably subrogate Homeowner's interest in the property behind Mortgagee's mortgage. Homeowner initiated suit in the superior court against Mortgagee. Eventually, all claims in both actions became part of a federal court case, which settled. Thereafter, Mortgagee filed a complaint against Insurer in the U.S. district court seeking to recover from Insurer for the costs Mortgagee incurred in defending against Homeowner's claims. The judge determined Insurer had no obligation under its title insurance policy to pay Mortgagee's defense costs but certified two questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The Court answered by holding that, under Massachusetts law (1) a title insurer does not have a duty to defend the insured in the entire lawsuit where one claim is within the scope of the title insurance coverage and other claims are not; and (2) a title insurer that initiates litigation similarly does not have a duty to defend the insured against all reasonably foreseeable counterclaims. View "GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Law Firm, located in Virginia, leased a vehicle from Company. Tortfeasor, who was driving the car with permission by Law Firm, collided with a car driven by Plaintiff. The day before the accident, the insurance policy on the vehicle lapsed for nonpayment. Plaintiff filed suit in Florida against Law Firm, Tortfeasor, and Company, alleging that because Company had failed to comply with the insurance requirements of Fla. Stat. 324.021(9)(b)(1), Company was vicariously liable for Tortfeasor's negligent operation of the car under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Company moved for summary judgment, contending that its liability should be based on Virginia tort law and that if Florida law applied, section 342.021(9)(b)(1) was preempted by the Graves Amendment, a federal law providing that the owner of a motor vehicle who leases the vehicle shall not be vicariously liable from harm that results from the operation of the vehicle during the lease. The trial court concluded that Florida law applied but that the Graves Amendment did preempt section 324.021(9)(b)(1). The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court approved the decision, holding that the Graves Amendment preempts section 324.021(9)(b)(1). View "Rosado v. Daimlerchrysler Fin. Servs. Trust" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Union submitted three grievances on behalf of Company employee and Union member Lubik, alleging that the company violated a past practice by failing to schedule Lubik, a maintenance clerk, for Saturday overtime when the maintenance department was scheduled to work. After the Arbitrator sustained the three grievances and ordered the company to pay Lubik back wages for the missed overtime. The district court vacated the award because it concluded that the award did not draw its essence from the Collective Bargaining Agreement, determining that the plain language of the CBA unambiguously‖ gave the company the exclusive right to schedule its workforce. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered enforcement of the arbitration award. View "Akers Nat'l Roll Co. v. United Steel, Paper & Forest,Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union" on Justia Law

The Sponsors formed West Run to construct and manage West Virginia University off-campus housing and retained CBRE to secure financing. CBRE provided prospective lenders with confidential information. Huntington’s predecessor loaned $39.975 million and construction began. A competing project (Copper Beach) was built across the street. West Run learned that Huntington had loaned $20 million for that project; West Run alleged that Huntington divulged to Copper Beach proprietary West Run information provided by CBRE. West Run‘s occupancy dropped from 95 percent to 64 percent. West Run sued, alleging that Huntington had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by financing Copper Beech. Two similar projects, involving the Sponsors, alleged breach of contract based on Huntington‘s failure to provide funds under their construction loan agreements. Huntington claimed that they had sold insufficient units to require Huntington to disburse additional funds under the agreements. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the complaint contained no corroborating facts that confidential information was disclosed and that no contract terms prohibited Huntington from lending to competitors. The court vacated with respect to the other projects for a chance to provide evidence showing that the pre-sale numbers in the original complaint were incorrect. View "W. Run Student Hous. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment against Jax, the exclusive manufacturer and distributor of a game he invented. Plaintiff alleged that Jax breached their contract by granting unauthorized sublicenses and failing to apprise him of unauthorized sales and Jax's response to them. The court held that, even if plaintiff did not waive Jax's breach with his own breach, any factual disputes were not outcome determinative because Jax's breach was neither damaging nor material. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment. Further, the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. View "Reuter v. Jax Ltd., Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a verbal agreement entered into by Contractor and Landowner to construct a subdivision on a parcel of land. Disagreements arose between the parties, and the subdivision was never completed. Landowner filed this action against Contractor asserting Contractor had failed to make payments on an endloader that had been purchased for the project. Contractor counterclaimed for unjust enrichment based on excavation services he performed on the property. The jury found in favor of Landowner with regard to the endloader and in favor of Contractor with regard to his counterclaim. The trial court found Contractor was entitled to a prejudgment interest on his award of damages on his unjust enrichment claim. Contractor filed a motion to amend the judgment order, contending that the court erred in determining the date on which prejudgment interest began to accrue and had utilized an incorrect prejudgment interest date. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Contractor's motion to amend the judgment order, holding that the trial court erred by awarding Contractor prejudgment interest instead of allowing the jury to determine whether an award of prejudgment interest was warranted. Remanded. View "Ringer v. John" on Justia Law

Defendants installed video surveillance cameras at the entrance to an easement crossing their property. Members of a subdivision who benefitted from the easement (Plaintiffs) filed an action for a declaratory judgment and to enjoin Defendants from obstructing their easement rights. Plaintiffs relied on a 2006 settlement to support their position that Defendants were prohibited from installing the cameras. The trial court concluded that Defendants' video surveillance cameras constituted an unreasonable interference with the easement. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the 2006 settlement was relevant evidence to the reasonableness of the cameras, although it was not binding as between the parties to this suit, and the trial court did not err by considering that agreement because its terms provided evidence of the need for injunctive relief; and (2) the placement of the video cameras at issue here did not unreasonably interfere with the access easement benefitting Plaintiffs, nor did the cameras violate the non-disturbance clause in the settlement. Remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Defendants on the video camera issue. View "Flaherty v. Muther" on Justia Law

Cogent sued, alleging that Hyalogic was disseminating false information regarding Cogent’s product Baxyl, an “oral, liquid HA supplement that is sold into the human natural products market.” Shortly after the filing, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Cogent moved to enforce the settlement agreement, claiming that Hyalogic caused false and misleading videos to be uploaded to You Tube and by statements made at a conference. The district court found no breach of the settlement agreement and denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The contract unambiguously refers to a clear statement “about the other Party’s product.” Statements that refer to preservatives that can be found in a number of products, including Cogent’s products, are not statements “about the other Party’s products.” View "Cogent Solutions Grp, LLC v. Hyalogic, LLC" on Justia Law

The law firm represented a potential buyer in the purchase of a drugstore. Buyer and Seller executed the sales contract separately. The firm misfiled the contract executed by Buyer, however, and Seller subsequently attempted to rescind the contract, which it characterized as an offer, because it had not timely received a copy of the contract executed by Buyer. When Seller’s efforts to avoid the purported contract were successful, Buyer sent a “formal notice of claim” to the firm, which sought coverage from its professional liability insurer. That insurer concluded that the firm was not entitled to coverage because it failed to properly notify the insurer of the mistake that ultimately led to the malpractice claim. The firm sought a declaratory judgment. The district court granted the insurer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the firm’s knowledge of the email exchange with Seller’s counsel and of an Alabama declaratory-judgment action constituted knowledge of “any circumstance, act or omission that might reasonably be expected to be the basis of” a malpractice claim. View "Koransky, Bouwer & Poracky, P. C. v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act established a plan for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated by nuclear power plants, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270. The Act made utilities responsible for SNF storage until the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) accepts the material. The Secretary of Energy entered into contracts with nuclear utilities to accept SNF in return for payment of fees. The Act provided that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission “shall not issue or renew a license” to any nuclear utility unless the utility has entered into a contract with DOE or DOE certifies ongoing negotiations. Nuclear utilities, including the owner of the Entergy nuclear power stations, entered into contracts and began making payments, which have continued. By 1994, DOE knew it would be unable to accept SNF by the Act’s January 31, 1998 deadline. In 1995, DOE issued a “Final Interpretation” that took the position that it did not have an unconditional obligation to begin performance on that date. Entergy sued, asserting that DOE’s partial breach caused it to incur additional costs for SNF storage. The claims court struck an unavoidable delay defense, based on a prior decision rejecting DOE’s argument that its failure was “unavoidable” under the contract. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Entergy Nuclear Fitzpatrick, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law