Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the Chairman of the Trustees of the Rhode Island Bricklayers Benefits Funds (the Funds), sued Union Stone Inc., alleging that Union Stone had failed to pay the full amount of fringe benefit contributions due for work performed in Massachusetts and Connecticut by members of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. After a trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Funds, awarding the unpaid contributions, interest, and attorneys' fees. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) refusing to enforce a purported settlement agreement between the parties; (2) admitting certain evidence on the ground that it was tainted by violations of the discovery rules; (3) declined to impose sanctions; and (4) awarding interest and attorneys' fees. View "Enos v. Union Stone, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant sued his former employer (Employer) in district court, alleging claims for fraud and wrongful termination. Employer, however, had been sold to a foreign corporation (Corporation), which was not a resident of Wyoming. Corporation filed a motion to dismiss the case for improper venue and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion on both grounds. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's dismissal for improper venue; but (2) vacated the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, holding that the court erred as a matter of law when it reached the merits of the case after determining that it had to be dismissed on venue grounds. Remanded for a dismissal without prejudice based upon improper venue. View "Bourke v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., LP" on Justia Law

Jerry Herling Construction, Inc. (JHCI) contracted with Plaintiff for rental and service of earthmoving equipment but defaulted on the payments due under the contract. Plaintiff sued Jerry Herling, JHCI's CEO, seeking to enforce personal guaranties of JHCI's performance. Herling, in turn, argued that he was released from his guaranties because of an assignment of JHCI's retainage account and a settlement between other parties. The trial court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment against Herling on his guaranties as a matter of law, and entered judgment against Herling in the amount of $1,383,473 based on his guaranties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Herling was entitled to credit for the $500,000 settlement. Remanded. View "Herling v. Wyo. Machinery Co." on Justia Law

YA, a nonprofit corporation serving at-risk youth, transported young people to an event using vans that it owned. After the event four people were unable to board because a van was full. A YA employee requested that 16-year-old Lee, a YA participant who had driven to the event in a separate vehicle, drive them home. Lee agreed. Lee did not possess a valid driver’s license and the car that he was driving had been stolen during a carjacking. Police saw Lee driving erratically, ran a license plate check, and gave chase. Lee lost control and hit a tree. Lee survived, but all four passengers were killed. Their estates filed suit. YA requested defense and indemnification under policies issued by Indemnity: a commercial general liability policy with a $1 million limit and a commercial excess liability policy with a $2 million limit. Indemnity provided a defense, but disputed coverage and sought a federal declaratory judgment. YA counterclaimed that Indemnity breached its duty of good faith and violated the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, by misrepresenting coverage and failing to affirm liability within a reasonable time. The district court held that Indemnity was obligated under the CGL policy but not under the excess policy. The state court action settled with Indemnity’s payment of the $1 million limit of the CGL policy, plus $800,000 of the excess policy. The federal court dismissed the bad-faith counterclaims, reasoning that, as a matter of law, Indemnity’s coverage position had not been taken in bad faith. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc." on Justia Law

Padraic Conroy and Heather Wicks owned real property as tenants in common. In 2010, Wicks filed a complaint seeking an equitable partition and sale of the house, with profits to be split equally between her and Conroy. Following a jury-waived trial, the trial court granted Wicks's petition and ordered the sale of the house. The court ordered the profits to be split equally between the parties subject to a credit due to Wicks for Conroy's rent-free occupancy of the downstairs apartment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in (1) finding there was no contract in which the parties agreed Conroy would live in the house rent-free; (2) crediting Wicks for one-half of the fair rental value of the downstairs apartment during the period Conroy lived there; and (3) denying Conroy the opportunity to buy out Wicks's interest in the property. View "Wicks v. Conroy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant for breach of a real estate contract after Defendant was unable to acquire financing to purchase a home owned by Plaintiffs. Defendant filed a third-party complaint against his real estate agent and the agent's employer. A jury returned a verdict in the Clines' favor on the breach of contract claim and in favor of Defendant on the third-party negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed the award to Plaintiffs, holding that there was no contract between the parties. On remand, the circuit court dismissed the complaint and third-party complaint. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs based on a provision in the real estate contract. The trial court awarded Defendant fees and costs but at an amount significantly less than the amount Defendant had requested. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's finding that Defendant was not entitled to recover fees and costs under the contract was consistent with the Court's holding in Carter I that there was no contract; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that Appellant was not entitled to recover fees and costs related to his third-party claim and those fees and costs associated with his attorney. View "Carter v. Cline" on Justia Law

Defendant was insured under three homeowners' policies issued to his parents (the Zamskys) by Plaintiff. Each policy covered a separate parcel of residential real estate owned by the Zamskys and required Plaintiff to defend and indemnify the insureds against claims stemming from bodily injury caused by a covered occurrence. One exclusion to the policy, the UL exclusion, pretermitted coverage for injuries arising out of a premises owned by an insured but not itself an "insured location." This case involved an fire that occurred on a piece of real estate owned by the Zamskys that was not insured by Plaintiff. An individual injured in the fire sued Defendant for bodily injuries. Plaintiff subsequently brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the UL exclusions pretermitted its obligation to defend Defendant in the negligence suit or to indemnify him against any damage award. The district court held that the UL exclusion did not apply and that Plaintiff owed Defendant a duty to defend. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the occurrence at issue here did not arise out of a condition of the premises, the district court did not err in determining that the UL exclusion did not apply. View "Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zamsky" on Justia Law

Under a 2008 master contract, governed by Minnesota law, Lyon, a Minnesota finance firm, had a right of first refusal to provide lease financing for Illinois Paper’s customers. Lyon had the option to purchase office equipment supplied by Illinois Paper and lease the equipment to Illinois Paper’s customers who were interested in that type of financing. Illinois Paper expressly warranted that “all lease transactions presented ... for review are valid and fully enforceable agreements.” Lyon purchased a copy machine from Illinois Paper and leased it to the Village of Bensenville for a term of six years. The Illinois Municipal Code provides that municipal equipment leases may not exceed five years. When the Village stopped paying, Lyon sued Illinois Paper for breach of the contractual warranty. The district court concluded that the warranty was a representation of law, not fact, and was not actionable in a suit for breach of contract or warranty. The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court, noting that Minnesota adheres to the maxim that a person may not rely on another’s representation of law, so where reliance is an element of a tort claim (such as fraud), representations of law are not actionable. View "Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. IL Paper & Copier Co." on Justia Law

Muse, Nelson, and Weiss, and two others formed DGP. The five individuals were DGP’s limited partners; its general partner was MNW LLC, consisting of Muse, Nelson, and Weiss. DGP contracted to buy Gas Solutions and Prospect agreed to lend DGP 95% of the purchase price, subject to due diligence. The agreement prevented DGP from negotiating with other lenders. Prospect’s investigation raised concerns and it informed DGP that it would not make the loan. After DGP threatened to sue, Prospect agreed to pay DGP $3.295 million as reimbursement for DGP’s expenses and DGP agreed to assign Prospect its right to buy Gas Solutions. DGP assigned the purchase contract to DGP’s general partner, MNW, owned by Muse, Nelson and Weiss, who then sold Prospect their individual membership interests, transferring the contract to Prospect. Despite a mutual release, DGP sued Prospect alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contract. Prospect counterclaimed alleging breach of the covenant not to sue. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Prospect and awarded attorneys’ fees in its award. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the covenants did not bind the individuals. Under an interpretation of the agreement giving effect to all its terms, Nelson and Muse breached the agreement by funding DGP’s lawsuits and violated the release and covenant not to sue.View "Dallas Gas Partners, L.P. v. Prospect Energy Corp" on Justia Law

Petitioners, who had a liability policy with State Farm, were involved in a motor vehicle accident. Petitioners filed an underinsured motorist claim with State Farm. Based on the absence of underinsurance coverage in Petitioners' policy, State Farm denied coverage. Petitioners filed a complaint against State Farm, asserting that a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of underinsurance coverage had not occurred. The circuit court granted Petitioners' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding (1) State Farm's underinsured motorist selection/rejection form did not precisely comply with the state Insurance Commissioner's prescribed form; and (2) State Farm's failure to use the Commissioner's prescribed forms resulted in underinsured motorists coverage being added to the policy as a matter of law. The Supreme Court answered the circuit court's certified question by holding that an insurance company's failure to use the Commissioner's prescribed forms pursuant to W. Va. Code 33-6-31(d) results in the loss of the statutory presumption that the insured provided a reasonable offer which was knowingly rejected and a reversion to the lower standards set forth in Bias v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. View "Thomas v. McDermitt" on Justia Law