Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, who carried health insurance through New West Health Services (New West), was injured in an automobile accident resulting in medical expenses totaling approximately $120,000. The tortfeasor's insurer paid approximately $100,000 of Plaintiff's medical bills. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against New West alleging individual and class claims, asserting that New West failed to pay approximately $100,000 of her medical expenses because the third party liability carrier had paid the majority of the bills. The district court certified the class complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by adopting the class definition proposed by Plaintiff and denying New West's motion to modify the class definition. View "Rolan v. New West Health Servs." on Justia Law

Leonard Landa was the sole managing member of a Montana limited liability corporation. Landa carried commercial general liability insurance through Assurance. After a former employee of Landa's filed a complaint alleging that Landa had committed various torts by inducing him to work for Landa under allegedly false pretenses, Landa tendered defense of the former employee's claim to Assurance. Assurance refused to defend Landa, stating that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy. Landa filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief establishing that Assurance had a duty to defend and indemnify Landa and alleging violations of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), negligence, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Assurance, finding that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy and that Assurance was not liable under the UTPA because the denial of coverage was grounded on a legal conclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Assurance correctly declined to provide a defense where the former employee's complaint did not allege an "occurrence" and, as a result, did not trigger a duty to defend under the policy. View "Landa v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Novus appealed the district court's refusal to enforce a non-compete clause against a franchisee as part of a preliminary injunction which prohibited the franchisee from using Novus's marks and products in his automotive glass repair business. The court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over Novus's claim that the district court erred in dismissing defendant's company for lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed that part of the appeal. The court also concluded that it did not have appellate jurisdiction over Novus's appeal of the district court's order granting defendant an additional sixty days to file and answer and, therefore, dismissed this part of the appeal. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Novus failed to show irreparable harm under the particular facts involved in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction order. View "Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson" on Justia Law

At the heart of this case was a dispute between developer, Birchwood Land Company, Inc., and contractor, Ormond Bushey & Sons, Inc. over a construction contract.  The developer sued for breach of contract, claiming mainly that the contractor had removed excavated sand from the construction site without permission.  The contractor counterclaimed for amounts due under the contract. The court found that the contractor breached the contract and granted the developer damages for the lost sand. The unpaid balance owed on the contract was offset by the damages. On appeal, the contractor argued that the court erred in denying its request for interest penalties and attorney's fees as the substantially prevailing party. The developer argued that the court erred in limiting damages for the sand removal, denying its request for punitive damages, granting prejudgment interest on contractor's net recovery, and denying its claim for slander of title. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence in the record supported the trial court's judgment in this case and affirmed the outcome. View "Birchwood Land Company, Inc. v. Ormond Bushey & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant constructed a home that it sold to its initial purchaser. The initial purchaser, in turn, sold the home to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs later learned the home's hillside retaining wall and home site had been constructed in a dangerously defective manner. Plaintiffs requested that Defendant cover the cost of repair, but Defendant claimed it was no longer responsible for any construction defects. Plaintiffs then filed an action against Defendant to force Defendant to cover the cost of repair. The trial court dismissed all of the claims, concluding, among other things, that Plaintiffs' negligence claims were barred by Arizona's economic loss doctrine. The court of appeals remanded for resolution of Plaintiffs' various negligence claims, concluding that, because Plaintiffs had no contract with Defendant, the economic loss doctrine did not bar their tort claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs' negligence claims to recover damages resulting from the construction defects. Remanded. View "Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp." on Justia Law

Decedent's ex-wife, Ann, filed a claim against Decedent's estate for compensation for nursing and convalescent services she provided to Decedent before his death. Before Decedent died, he forgave a loan he made to Ann. The trustee of Decedent's trust denied Ann's claim, asserting that the loan forgiveness constituted payment for Ann's services. Ann subsequently filed a petition for allowance of claim, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking payment from Decedent's trust. The trial court ordered that the trust pay Ann $183,538 for services rendered, concluding that Ann was entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the loan forgiveness was not compensation for the services Ann provided to Decedent and that Ann was entitled to compensation for the services she provided to Decedent; but (2) concluded that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of Ann's award. Remanded with instructions to recalculate the award. View "In re Nelson Living Trust" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between two construction companies, Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant contracted with Plaintiff to build grain storage facilities at two locations. After beginning construction, Plaintiff stopped work for Defendant's alleged failure to make progress payments. Plaintiff then filed two lawsuits against Defendant seeking to foreclose liens on the property and asserting, ultimately, claims for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. The trial court dismissed the mechanic's liens claims, granted Defendant's motions for default judgment on the counterclaims, and granted Defendant's motions for summary judgment in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of the default judgments and summary judgments, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in granting the motions for default judgment against Plaintiff on Defendant's counterclaims and in failing to grant Plaintiff's motions for enlargement of time; and (2) erred in granting the motions for summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract. Remanded. View "Donald Bucklin Constr. v. McCormick Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Sierra International purchased a manufacturing facility's operations. Sierra later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants, the facility and its president, hired Respondent (MCW) to represent them in Sierra's bankruptcy action. Sierra's bankruptcy case closed in 2008. In 2006, Appellants filed an action against MCW, alleging professional malpractice arising from its representation of Appellants in the bankruptcy action. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1(e)(2). In 2010, Appellants filed a second complaint against MCW, reasserting the claims in their first complaint. MCW filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations because the appropriate accrual date was 2006, the date of the filing of the first complaint. Appellants responded by asserting that Hewitt v. Allen, which provides that the statutory limitation period of a claim of legal malpractice involving the representation of a client during litigation does not commence until the underlying litigation is concluded, governed. The district court held that 2006 was the appropriate accrual date and that Hewitt was inapplicable because a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute litigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holing that Sierra's bankruptcy action did not constitute an adversarial proceeding under Hewitt. View "Moon v. McDonald, Carano & Wilson, LLP" on Justia Law

Appellants agreed to purchase a restaurant and real property on which the restaurant was located from Respondent. After Appellants failed to make payments on the promissory note, Respondent filed an action against Appellants to recover the principal and unpaid interest. According to Respondent, a third buy-and-sell agreement between the parties was the operative agreement. But during trial, Appellants presented evidence that a fourth written agreement, which was allegedly later destroyed by Respondent or his brother, existed containing the agreed-upon purchase price and terms of the sale. The district court concluded that Appellants' evidence of the destroyed fourth agreement was barred by the statute of frauds because Appellants failed to produce the written agreement. The court then found that Appellants breached the third agreement and entered judgment for Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute of frauds does not apply to a writing that is subsequently lost or destroyed, and oral evidence is admissible to prove the existence and terms of the lost or destroyed writing. Remanded. View " Khan v. Bakhsh" on Justia Law

In Feeney II, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the superior court invalidating a class action waiver in the parties' arbitration agreement, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not foreclose a court from invalidating an arbitration agreement that includes a class action waiver if it effectively denies the plaintiffs a remedy. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently issued an opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (Amex) holding that a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement is enforceable under the FAA even if a plaintiff proves that the class waiver effectively precludes the plaintiff from vindicating his federal statutory rights. The Massachusetts Supreme Court subsequently concluded that following Amex, the Court's analysis in Feeney II no longer comported with the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA, holding instead that a class waiver may not be invalidated on the grounds that it effectively denies the plaintiffs a remedy. Remanded. View "Feeney v. Dell Inc. " on Justia Law