Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Seller and his real estate agent (Agent) entered into an agency agreement requiring Agent to inform potential buyers of material defects in Seller's home of which she had actual knowledge. Seller completed a signed a seller's disclosure form. After Buyers purchased the home, Buyers filed this lawsuit against Seller, Agent, and Agent's brokerage firm (Firm), alleging, inter alia, fraud, negligent misrepresentation for providing false representations in the disclosure form, breach of contract, and violations of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. The court of appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Seller and affirmed summary judgment in favor of Agent and Firm. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment to Seller on Buyers' fraudulent inducement, fraud by silence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract claims; and (2) erred in granting summary judgment to Agent and Firm for Buyers' negligent misrepresentation and KCPA claims. Remanded. View "Stechschulte v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against his employer, Union Pacific, for injuries he sustained at a railyard operated by Gunderson. Union Pacific filed a third-party complaint for indemnity against Gunderson, and Union Pacific and Gunderson settled with plaintiff, each agreeing to pay half of plaintiff's settlement demand. After settling with plaintiff, Union Pacific and Gunderson proceeded to trial to determine whether Gunderson should also be liable for Union Pacific's half of the settlement. The court affirmed the district court's award to Union Pacific of half of its attorney's fees and costs incurred as of the settlement pursuant to the parties' Track Lease Agreement but denied Union Pacific's motion for additional attorney's fees arising out of the post-settlement indemnification proceedings. View "Rice v. Union Pacific RR Co." on Justia Law

The Thornhocks filed an action against the Esterholdts and others seeking to quiet title to certain lands in Lincoln County. The district court granted summary judgment to the Thornocks as to some of the land but denied summary judgment as to a certain strip of property. After a bench trial, the district court quieted title in the disputed strip of land in the Esterholdts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an appurtenant easement was not created by a deed that granted, in addition to tracts of fee title land, also that "right of way to be used in connection with said land"; and (2) an appurtenant easement was not created by a deed that granted a "right-of-way" described as the land now in question. View "Thornock v. Esterholdt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased real property after a real estate broker gave him incorrect information about the zoning classification of the property. Plaintiff was thereafter unable to use the property as he intended. Plaintiff sued the broker and the real estate agency that employed her, alleging misrepresentation and violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 2. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) a broker has a duty to exercise reasonable care in making representations as to a property's zoning designation, and where the misrepresentations were based on information provided by the seller, as in this case, the question of whether it was reasonable in the circumstances to rely on such information is to be determined by the trier of fact; and (2) an exculpatory clause in the purchase and sale agreement did not preclude the buyer's reliance on prior written representations as to zoning classification. View "DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against a check advance company, asserting claims based on numerous Florida statutes. Plaintiffs later amended the complaint to add Tiffany Kelly as an additional plaintiff and named class member. Because Kelly had signed the version of Defendant's arbitration agreement that contained a class action waiver, this case focused on her contracts with Defendant. The trial court eventually denied Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the class action waiver was unenforceable because it was void as against public policy. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that no other reasonable avenue for relief would be available if it enforced the class action waiver. After the court of appeal decided this case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion. Applying the rationale of Concepcion to the facts set forth in this case, the Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted invalidating the class action waiver in this case on the basis of the waiver being void as against public policy. View "McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts" on Justia Law

Respondent Nissan North America, Inc. (Nissan) appealed a superior court decision that vacated decision of the New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board (Board) and ruled that RSA chapter 357-C rendered unenforceable a provision of a written settlement agreement between Nissan and petitioner, Strike Four, LLC, a Nissan dealer. Nissan also appealed the superior court's ruling that it was entitled to neither specific performance of the settlement agreement nor attorney's fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, but vacated that court's dismissal of Nissan's claim for attorney fees. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Strike Four, LLC v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Grigoleit supplied knobs for Whirlpool’s washing machines and dryers for several years, and sought to increase prices and amend the parties’ purchase contracts in 2004. The parties reached an amended agreement in 2005, which Whirlpool terminated later that year. When Grigoleit demanded final payment, Whirlpool sued, arguing the contract was unenforceable. The district court upheld the contract but found some aspects of it unconscionable. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the contract was enforceable. Under Michigan law both substantive and procedural unconscionability are required to hold an agreement unenforceable. Refusing to certify questions to the state’s supreme court, the Sixth Circuit reversed the holding that a $40,000 flat fee and 8% increase are unconscionable. Whirlpool created the urgent and unfavorable conditions under which it proposed these terms, and had ample time and opportunity to negotiate more favorable terms. Whirlpool had the resources, experience, and ability to avoid the terms entirely, yet chose not to do so. View "Whirlpool Corp. v. Grigoleit Co." on Justia Law

Norma Slater-Moore hired the Goeldner Law Firm and its attorneys to represent her in what ultimately was an unsuccessful lawsuit and its appeal. Slater-Moore and Goeldner entered into two separate contracts during the course of that litigation, both containing nearly identical provisions stating that any attorney-fee disputes would be submitted to arbitration. Slater-Moore later sued Goeldner for legal malpractice and breach of contract, disputing, among other allegations, the amount she was billed for attorney fees. Goeldner successfully moved the Circuit Court to compel arbitration of the attorney-fee dispute, and Slater-Moore appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Because the Supreme Court found ]no grounds for revocation of a valid agreement to arbitrate the fee dispute, the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Slater-Moore v. Goeldner" on Justia Law

Susie Stohm, the one-time CFO of ClearOne Communications, was charged with eight federal criminal counts relating to an investigation into certain accounting practices at ClearOne. Strohm was eventually acquitted of all but one count. Strohm and her counsel (Counsel) filed this action against ClearOne, alleging that ClearOne was required to indemnify Strohm for her criminal defense costs. The district court (1) ordered ClearOne to indemnify Strohm for her defense costs subject to certain restrictions, and (2) found that a contract between the parties entitled Counsel to charge ClearOne eighteen percent interests on the amounts that were billed to ClearOne but not timely paid and to collect the costs it expended in enforcing ClearOne's contractual obligation to indemnify Strohm. A unanimous court affirmed the district court affirmed the district court's indemnification decisions in large part, its rulings relating to contract termination rights, its reasonableness determination for fees in the criminal case, and its decision to enforce the eighteen percent interest rate. A majority of the court, however, reversed the district court's decision to allow Counsel to recoup its fees in the collection matter. Remanded. View "Strohm v. ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while participating in a guided horseback ride near Sundance Resort. Prior to the ride, Plaintiff signed a release (waiver) waiving her right to sue Defendants, Sundance-related entities (collectively, Sundance) for injuries caused by Sundance's ordinary negligence. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the waiver was unenforceable under the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (Equine Act) and that it violated the public policy expressed in the Equine Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Equine Act does not invalidate preinjury releases for ordinary negligence, nor does the Equine Act evidence a public policy bargain struck by the legislature; and (2) therefore, the waiver is enforceable. View "Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. " on Justia Law