Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The contract between the general contractor and subcontractor provided for arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. When a complaint was filed, the general contractor Appellant Sean Barnes and property owner Appellant Wando E. sought to enforce the construction contract's arbitration clause. The trial court refused to compel arbitration on the basis that the contract did not sufficiently impact interstate commerce. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in finding the parties' transaction had an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce and reversed. View "Cape Romain v. Wando E., LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on a written consumer contract for the sale of goods and whether it incorporated by reference a separate document entitled "Terms of Sale" which was available on the seller's website, but that the contract stated that it was "subject to" the seller's "Terms of Sale" but does not specifically reference the website? Finding no controlling precedent, the Tenth Circuit decided to certify the question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. View "Walker, et al v. BuildDirect.com Technologie" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a license agreement for the development of boron-based small-molecule drug candidates for the treatment of acne. As part of the agreement, the parties agreed to arbitrate certain disputes. The parties also agreed that each had the right to initiate judicial proceedings to enforce their rights through equitable relief. A dispute arose under the agreement, and Defendant initiated arbitration regarding it. Approximately two weeks later, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to enjoin Defendant from proceeding with arbitration and seeking specific performance of the agreement. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the parties agreed to resolve the claims at issue in arbitration. The Court of Chancery denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiff's claims were not subject to mandatory arbitration under the parties' license agreement. View "Medicis Pharm. Corp. v. Anacor Pharms., Inc." on Justia Law

A class of Plaintiffs brought suit against Insured, a hotel proprietor, alleging that Insured violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The class and Insured subsequently reached a settlement. The class then filed a garnishment action against Insurer. Insurer sought a declaratory judgment that its policy with Insured did not provide coverage because the policy did not cover damages awarded related to the TCPA. The trial found (1) Insurer owed Insured a duty to defend in the class actions because the class's claims were covered under the policy; and (2) Insurer had a duty to indemnify Insured for the full settlement plus interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly determined that Insurer wrongly refused to defend Insured under its policy coverage; (2) Insurer was not entitled to a reassessment of the reasonableness of the settlement; and (3) policy limits did not bar Insurer's indemnification of the settlement. View "Columbia Cas. Co. v. HIAR Holding, LLC" on Justia Law

Karl McGhee, a financial advisor at LPL Financial, acted as financial planner for Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint against McGhee and LPL, asserting claims for, inter alia, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Defendants moved for an order compelling the parties to proceed to arbitration due to an arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff. The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that none of Plaintiff's claims could be compelled to arbitration because claimants under chapter 93A, section 9 are not required to submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) claims alleging an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of chapter 93A, section 9 must be referred to arbitration where the contract involves interstate commerce and the agreement is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); and (2) because Plaintiff and Defendants in this case entered into a valid contract whereby they agreed to settle all controversies related to Plaintiff's financial account by arbitration, and because the arbitration agreement was governed by the FAA, Defendants as a matter of law were entitled under the FAA to a stay of judicial proceedings and an order compelling arbitration. Remanded. View "McInnes v. LPL Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants for failing to pay compensation he alleged was owed to him under an employment contract. The complaint asserted claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and violations of the Wage Act. The superior court dismissed all but Plaintiff's claim under the Wage Act, concluding that the Wage Act was the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid claims, thereby preempting Plaintiff's common-law claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend the Wage Act to be the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages, and therefore, Plaintiff's common-law claims should not have been dismissed. Remanded. View "Lipsitt v. Plaud" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation engaged in international asset recovery operations, filed a complaint against Defendants, the Republic of Ukraine and some of its agents and instrumentalities, for, inter alia, breach of contract after Plaintiff performed asset recovery work for which Defendants allegedly did not compensate Plaintiff. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that they were entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court denied the motion in regard to the breach of contract claim, concluding that jurisdiction could be asserted over that claim under the commercial activity exception to the FSIA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, holding that Defendants' transactions with Plaintiff constituted commercial activity exempt from immunity under FSIA. View "Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Bureau for Representing Ukrainian Interests" on Justia Law

In 1996, Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with an underinsured driver. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff had an automobile insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers). In 2001, Plaintiff settled with the underinsured driver. In 2011, Plaintiff filed this action based on contract, alleging that her damages from the accident exceeded the coverage she received from the tortfeasor's insurer and that Farmers had failed to pay "sums available" for her benefit pursuant to her underinsured motorist coverage. Farmers responded by alleging that Plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations or by laches. The district court entered summary judgment for Farmers, concluding that the limitations period commenced when Plaintiff settled with the tortfeasor in 2001 and that her claim was barred by the five-year contract statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it determined that Plaintiff's action accrued upon her settlement with the tortfeasor; and (2) instead, the Court should have applied the Supreme Court's holder in Snyder v. EMCASCO that the action accrues upon the insurer's breach. Remanded. View "Shada v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

The City of Boston transferred a Boston police sergeant who served as a union representative due to what the City said were ongoing concerns about the officer's supervisory authority. The Boston Police Superior Officers Federation (union) sought to enforce a provision of its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the City, which prohibited the involuntary transfer of certain union representatives between stations or assignments. A grievance arbitrator concluded that the City had violated the CBA and awarded the officer damages and reinstatement to his original position. The superior court confirmed the award. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for judgment vacating the award, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in invalidating the officer's transfer, where assignment and transfer of officers within the Boston police department are nondelegable statutory powers of the Boston police commissioner. View "City of Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n" on Justia Law

Insureds purchased a homeowner's insurance policy from Insurer with a personal liability limit of $500,000. The policy contained an animal liability endorsement (endorsement) which limited coverage to $25,000 for claims arising from animal bites. Both Insurer's agent and Insureds mistakenly believed the policy did not contain the limitation of liability but neither conveyed their mistaken belief to the other. After Plaintiff was bitten by Insured's dog, he and his wife successfully brought an action against Insureds. Insurer paid only $25,000 of this judgment. Plaintiffs and Insureds reached a settlement regarding the balance of the judgment and Plaintiffs became assignees of Insureds' claims against Insurer. Plaintiffs sued Insurer, alleging that Insureds and Insurer were mutually mistaken as to the application of the endorsement, and therefore, the policy should be reformed by striking the endorsement. The superior court concluded Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the reformation claim. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that, absent full, clear, and decisive proof of some prior agreement between the parties as to coverage for animal bites different than that contained in the policy, there was no mutual mistake warranting reformation of the policy. View "Caron v. Horace Mann Ins. Co." on Justia Law