Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his amended complaint, which alleged that FXDD engaged in dishonest and deceptive practices in managing its online foreign exchange trading platform in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), and New York General Business Law 349(h), and 350. Plaintiff also alleged breach of contract and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court concluded that, at this stage, some part of the underlying transaction occurred in New York State, giving plaintiff statutory standing to sue for deceptive practices and false advertising under sections 349 and 350; because the complaint alleged that FXDD failed to act in good faith and intentionally delayed trades or caused them to fail in order to enrich itself at the expense of its customers, these practices were incompatible with a promise to execute orders on a best-efforts basis and, therefore, the court vacated the dismissal of the breach of contract claim; and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court as to the RICO claim and the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC" on Justia Law

This diversity case involved a dispute over insurance coverage between Starr and SGS. The district court, relying on Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., held that Starr did not need to show prejudice before denying coverage to SGS for late notice under the pollution buy-back provision. Bound by Matador, which concluded that a notice requirement in this type of supplemental pollution endorsement was essential to the bargained-for coverage, the court affirmed the judgment and found SGS's arguments unpersuasive. View "Starr Indemnity & Liablity Co. v. SGS Petroleum Serv. Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of an allision between a vessel owned by Settoon and an oil well. On appeal, Settoon challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the umbrella insurers. The court concluded that the umbrella insurers were not liable for damages resulting from the allision because Settoon failed to provide them notice within 30 days; SNIC was liable to Settoon because delayed delivery prevented SNIC from relying on the exclusions in the policy and the conditions precedent of the exceptions to the exclusions; and prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date Settoon paid for the allision. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for calculation of prejudgment interest and affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "In Re: Settoon Towing, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a janitorial cleaning services franchisee, along with franchisees from other states, filed a putative class action in the U.S. district court against Defendant, the Massachusetts corporation that franchised Plaintiff's business, alleging that Defendant misclassified him as an independent contractor and committed various wage law violations. The district court certified several questions of law to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which answered by holding (1) a plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150 by filing a complaint with the attorney general does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's claims under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148, 148B, 150, and 151(1) and (1a); (2) a franchisor is vicariously liable for the conduct of its franchisee only where the franchisor controls or has a right to control the specific policy or practice resulting in harm to the franchisee; and (3) a defendant may be liable for employee misclassification where there was no contract for service between the plaintiff and the defendant. View "Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

This suit stemmed from plaintiff's suit for breach of contract against his former employer, ICD, and tortious interference with contract against ICD's president. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order, which amended a judgment to provide that plaintiff was entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1961, contending that he was entitled to a post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in C.P.L.R. 5004. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to .25% post-judgment interest where section 1961's plain terms governed the rate of post-judgment interest applicable in this case. Accordingly, the district court correctly and constitutionally applied section 1961, notwithstanding that the judgment had been entered in a diversity action and had been docketed by plaintiff in a New York state court. View "Cappiello v. ICD Publ'ns, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court. The questions related to the Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford Connecticut's umbrella policy issued to Louis and Betty Wilson. At the time, Georgia law required policies to have uninsured motorist coverage unless the insured rejected that coverage in writing. The Wilsons did not reject uninsured motorist coverage; their policy excluded such coverage despite being required by law. Because it was not written into the policy but required, it was implied by operation of law. In 2010, Louis Wilson was seriously injured in an accident, and gave notice of a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. The insurance company denied the claim, contending that a 2008 amendment to the Georgia law specifically excluded umbrella policies from mandatory uninsured motorist coverage. The questions from the federal court centered on whether the amendment to the applicable Georgia law applied to the Wilson's umbrella policy after 2009, and whether the notice requirements of the amended law applied to umbrella policies. After review, the Georgia Court concluded that the amendment in question here did not apply to the Wilson's umbrella policy, nor did the notice requirement. View "Wilson v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, Connecticut" on Justia Law

Petitioner here was Gaddy Engineering Company, and Respondents were an individual lawyer, Thomas Lane, and a law firm in which Lane was a partner (Bowles Rice). Petitioner contended that the Lane agreed to pay Petitioner one-third of all sums Bowles Rice received in connection with its legal representation of a group of land companies in a case to be filed against a company for alleged underpayment of gas royalties. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents as to all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court (1) correctly applied the doctrine of impracticability as to Petitioner's breach of contract claims; (2) did not err in ruling that no attorney-client relationship existed between Petitioner and Respondents, and thus the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Petitioner's professional negligence claim; (3) correctly granted summary judgment on Petitioner's claim of fraud; and (4) did not err in granting summary judgment on Petitioner's claim seeking relief in quantum meruit. View "Gaddy Eng'g Co. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, LLP" on Justia Law

Braunger Foods sold food product supplies to Hungry's North, a business owned by Michael Sears. Braunger Foods filed this action against Sears and Hungry's (collectively Hungry's), seeking to recover amounts Braunger Foods claimed were due for sales it had made on credit to Hungry's. The district court (1) entered judgment against Hungry's for amounts it concluded were owing to Braunger Foods; and (2) entered no judgment against Sears, concluding that a guaranty, by which Braunger Foods sought to hold Sears personally liable for the debt, was ineffective. Braunger Foods appealed the trial court's conclusion that the guaranty was unenforceable against Sears. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the guaranty was enforceable against Sears. Remanded with directions to enter judgment against Sears. View "Braunger Foods, LLC v. Sears" on Justia Law

In 1907, Florence conveyed her 1/7 interest in "the surface only" of a 225-acre tract of land to Walter, her brother, who was vested with an undivided 6/7 interest in the tract. The subject tract was subsequently conveyed several times. In 1967, Respondent purchased the interest in the 225-acre tract that was previously owned by Walter. Respondent asserted that he was the sole owner of all oil and gas rights under the tract. Petitioners, successors to Florence, contended that they owned a portion of the 1/7 interest in the oil and gas under the tract. The circuit court ruled in favor of Respondent after declaring that the term "surface only" was ambiguous and relying on contemporary testimony to interpret the deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "surface," when used as a term of conveyance, is not presumptively ambiguous and does have a definite and certain meaning; (2) the deed clearly conveyed from Florence to Walter her share of "the surface only" to the tract and reserved to Florence the remainder of the tract, including the oil and gas underlying the tract; and (3) accordingly, Petitioners were owners of a portion of Florence's 1/7 interest in the minerals underlying the tract. View "Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery of Terra Alta v. Morgan " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an in-home registered nurse, was injured in an automobile accident while driving her employer's vehicle to to a patient's home to perform her nursing duties. Plaintiff incurred $382,849 in medical expenses as a result of the accident. After Plaintiff's employer's workers compensation carrier (AIG) denied Plaintiff's workers compensation claim, Plaintiff filed a medical payments claim with Allstate, with whom Plaintiff had a personal automobile insurance policy that provided $100,000 in medical payments coverage. Allstate failed to provide medical payments benefits immediately to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and AIG later settled Plaintiff's worker's compensation claim for $150,000. Plaintiff then commenced this breach of contract and bad faith action against Allstate based on Allstate's failure to pay medical benefits. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law for $33,000 on the breach of contract claim and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred in excluding Allstate's evidence of AIG's acceptance of the worker's compensation claim, and that exclusion prejudiced Allstate's ability to defend the bad faith and punitive damages claims. View "Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law