Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Central Utah Water Conservancy District (CUWCD) entered into an agreement with three canal companies to improve irrigation structures belonging to the canal companies in exchange for rights to the increased water flow arising from the improvements. CUWCD failed to complete its obligations under the agreement and filed a declaratory action to establish its contractual rights. The district court determined that because CUWCD breached its obligations under the agreement, two of the canal companies were entitled to enforce the bargained-for damages provisions, which resulted in CUWCD's losing its prospective water rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CUWCD's breach was material, and the breach was not excused by the doctrine of impracticability or CUWCD's tender of cash in lieu of performance. View "Cent. Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. Upper East Union Irrigation Co." on Justia Law

Steve and Karen Donatelli hired D.R. Strong Consulting Engineers Inc. to help the Donatellis develop their real property. Before development could be completed, the Donatellis suffered substantial financial losses and lost the property in foreclosure. The Donatellis sued D.R. Strong for breach of contract, violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. D.R. Strong moved for partial summary judgment on the CPA and negligence claims. D.R. Strong argued that the negligence claims should have been dismissed under the economic loss rule because the relationship between the parties was governed by contract and the damages claimed by the Donatellis were purely economic. The trial court and Court of Appeals held that as a matter of law, the Donatellis' negligence claims were not barred. Finding no error in that analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng'rs, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was involved in a car accident with Kent Blough. Appellant's insurer, USAA Casualty Insurance Company, concluded that Appellant was the majority at fault for the accident and refused to honor Appellant's $300,000 UM/UIM coverage. Appellant filed suit against Blough, and in an apparent attempt to prevent Appellant from prevailing, USAA unsuccessfully tried to intervene in the lawsuit. Blough's insurer paid Appellant the limit of Blough's insurance policy. USAA's expert eventually determined that Blough, whom USAA had already paid under Appellant's policy, had been the majority at fault. USAA then tendered to Appellant its $300,000 UM/UIM policy limit. Appellant filed a complaint against USAA for, among other claims, violations of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act and emotional distress as a result of the mishandling of her claim. The district court entered summary judgment for USAA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in determining that Appellant may not pursue a claim based upon USAA's alleged failure to reasonably investigate her claim as required under Mont. Code Ann. 33-13-201(4); and (2) erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of USAA regarding Appellant's claim for damages arising from emotional distress. View " McVey v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here were related entities that leased a building to The Salvation Army. The Salvation Army operated the building as a homeless shelter under an agreement with the City of New York. After the City terminated its agreement with The Salvation Army, The Salvation Army terminated the lease. Plaintiffs brought this action to collect damages from The Salvation Army, claiming that the leased premises were returned in bad condition in violation of the lease. The appellate division concluded that Plaintiffs had adequately pleaded a breach of the lease. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' claim was barred by the plain language of the lease. View "JFK Holding Co. LLC v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In 2007, Sandpointe Apartments obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust to real property. Stacy Yahraus-Lewis personally guaranteed the loan. After Sandpointe defaulted on the loan, the interest in the loan and guarantee was transferred to CML-NV Sandpointe, LLC. In 2011, CML-NV pursued its rights under the deed of trust's power of sale provision and purchased the property securing the loan at a trustee's sale. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which limits the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by persons who acquired the right to obtain the judgment from someone else who held that right. Subsequently, CML-NV filed a complaint against Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis for deficiency and breach of guaranty. Yahraus-Lewis moved for partial summary judgment, requesting that the district court apply the limitation contained in section 40.459(1)(c) to CML-NV's action. The district court concluded that the statute applies only to loans entered into after June 10, 2011. Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that the statute may not apply retroactively, and therefore, the statute's limitations did not apply in this case. View "Sandpointe Apartments, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Burcalow Family, LLC purchased property that sat adjacent to The Corral Bar, Inc. property. Burcalow and The Corral signed a license agreement whereby The Corral agreed to pay Burcalow for the use of Burcalow's property for its drain field and well. After the license agreement expired, Burcalow filed suit against The Corral, alleging claims for trespass and a declaratory judgment. The Corral counterclaimed for, inter alia, prescriptive easement, detrimental reliance, and mistake. The district court (1) determined that The Corral possessed a prescriptive easement over and across Burcalow's property, and (2) rescinded the license agreement, ordering Burcalow to refund the fees The Corral had paid under the license agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) The Corral failed to demonstrate the elements required to establish a prescriptive easement; and (2) Burcalow's counsel did not make fraudulent representations entitling The Corral to rescind the parties' license agreement, and therefore, Burcalow did not have to return The Corral's payments made pursuant to the agreement. Remanded. View "Burcalow Family, LLC v. The Corral Bar, Inc." on Justia Law

Decedent was a resident of Searcy Healthcare Center (SHC) from January 7 to January 29. On January 8, Decedent executed a written arbitration agreement with SHC that was binding on Decedent's children, personal representatives, and administrators of Decedent's estate. Decedent died on February 12. The next year, Appellee filed a nursing-home-malpractice action against SHC as administrator of Decedent's estate and on behalf of the statutory wrongful-death beneficiaries. The circuit court denied SHC's motion to compel arbitration against the wrongful-death beneficiaries, concluding that Decedent had not extinguished the substantive rights of the wrongful-death beneficiaries by signing the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in finding that the wrongful-death beneficiaries were not bound by the arbitration agreement executed by Decedent. Remanded. View "Searcy Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Les Marlow filed a complaint against Glenn Petkovsek and United Systems of Arkansas, Inc. for breach of contract and breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing. Additionally, Appellants, Les Marlow and other individuals, filed claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy against Petkovsek and United Systems. Various counterclaims were filed against Appellants, including breach of contract and conversion. The jury (1) entered verdicts in favor of United Systems on its claims but awarded zero damages, and (2) entered defense verdicts for Petkovsek and United Systems, finding Plaintiffs failed to prove their claims. The circuit court subsequently found United Systems and Petkovsek were entitled to attorney's fees and costs but awarded them only to Petkovsek. Appellants appealed the award. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's award, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) finding that Petkovsek was a prevailing party; and (2) finding that attorney's fees and costs are available to a prevailing party in a wrongful-discharge against public-policy case. View "Marlow v. United Sys. of Ark., Inc." on Justia Law

The Market sought a declaration that its employment separation agreement with defendant was invalid because defendant had altered the agreement and fraudulently induced the president of the Market to sign it. Defendant counterclaimed to enforce the agreement. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Market where defendant failed to fulfill a condition precedent - returning company property - and such failure meant that the Market had not duty to perform under the agreement. Alternatively, the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking defendant's pleadings based on defendant's deliberate and willful discovery abuses. The district court acted within its discretion to impose sanctions under Rule 37. View "St. Louis Produce Market v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Hard Hat Workforce Solutions, LLC (Hard Hat) appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Great American Insurance Company (GAI). Hard Hat argued it was entitled to make a claim against a payment bond GAI issued on a construction project. The threshold issue in this case was whether Hard Hat's bond claim must comply with section 29-5-440's "notice of furnishing" provision. The Supreme Court found it did not: three e-mails Hard Hat sent to a subcontractor, Walker White, created an issue of fact as to whether Hard Hat satisfied section 29-5-440's notice provisions. View "Hard Hat Workforce v. Mechanical HVAC" on Justia Law