Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Contractors Cargo, engaged in heavy-haul operations, commissioned Empire Bucket to fabricate a steel deck to be used with Cargo’s specialized rail freight car for transporting oversized loads. A third party designed the deck, specifying that the deck be fabricated from T-1 high-strength steel and that welding be performed to American Welding Society specifications. The deck was designed to transport up to 800,000 pounds. Empire fabricated the deck, which passed inspection by an outside agency and all nondestructive tests, and delivered it. Cargo connected the deck to its railcar and loaded it to 820,000 pounds. The next morning, an employee observed that the deck had dropped about three inches. Cargo attempted to raise it with a hydraulic jacking system, but the deck fractured. Cargo hired a metallurgical engineer, who determined that a portion of the weld was composed of material with properties different from the properties of the material in the rest of the weld where the crack originated. Cargo refused to pay the full purchase price. Empire sued and Cargo filed counterclaims. The district court granted Empire’s motion in limine to exclude testimony concerning one test performed on the deck after it failed. The jury returned a verdict for Empire. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that, given testimony admitted at trial, the excluded evidence would have added little to the implied warranty claims. View "Empire Bucket, Inc. v. Contractors Cargo Co." on Justia Law

Union-affiliated benefit funds sued Haluch to collect benefits contributions required to be paid under federal law, plus attorney’s fees and costs, which were obligations under a federal statute and the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. The district court issued an order on June 17, on the merits of the contribution claim, and a separate ruling on July 25, on the motion for fees and costs. The Funds appealed on August 15. Haluch argued that the June 17 order was a final decision under 28 U.S.C. 1291, so that notice of appeal was not filed within the 30-day deadline. The First Circuit acknowledged that an unresolved fee issue generally does not prevent judgment on the merits from being final, but held that no final decision was rendered until July 25 because entitlement to fees and costs under the CBA was an element of damages and thus part of the merits. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the appeal of the June 17 decision untimely. The Funds’ claim that contractual attorney’s fees provisions are always a measure of damages failed. There is no justification for different jurisdictional effect based solely on whether an asserted right to fees is based on contract or statute. View "Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Operating Eng'rs & Participating Emp'rs" on Justia Law

White Oak Manor, Inc. owns and operates a nursing home in York. After sustaining injuries from the improper replacement of a feeding tube, a White Oak resident filed a lawsuit against the nursing home. White Oak ultimately settled the lawsuit without the involvement of its insurer, Lexington Insurance Company. White Oak subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action against Lexington to determine coverage for the malpractice claim. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court concerned the validity of a service-of-suit clause in an insurance policy in light of Section 15-9-270 of the South Carolina Code (2005) which provides for service of process on an insurer through the Director of the Department of Insurance. The circuit court upheld the service-of-suit clause and refused to relieve the insurer from default judgment. The court of appeals reversed, holding section 15-9-270 provided the exclusive method for serving an insurance company. In its review, the Supreme Court disagreed that section 15-9-270 provided the exclusive means of service on an insurer and held that insurance policy provisions creating alternative methods of service are valid and binding on insurers. Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision was reversed. View "White Oak Manor v. Lexington Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Jeff Trosen appealed a district court judgment that dismissed his legal and equitable claims against Shirley Trosen and Brent Trosen. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the district court did not err by granting the Trosen's motion for judgment as a matter of law and dismissing Jeff Trosen's legal claims. Further, the Supreme Court concluded the district court reached the right result with respect to Jeff Trosen's equitable claims, but for the wrong reason. View "Trosen v. Trosen" on Justia Law

In 2001, Appellant moved into Decedent’s home at Decedent’s request, where he lived and cared for Decedent until Decedent’s death in 2010. After Decedent’s death, Appellant filed a creditor’s claim against Decedent’s estate, seeking compensation for the care and services he provided. Defendants, the co-administrators of the estate, denied Appellant’s claim. Appellant subsequently brought an action against Defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding no question of material fact existed and that Appellant failed as a matter of law on his claims for implied-in-fact contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. View "Symons v. Heaton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant each held a one-third interest in property as tenants in common. Plaintiff and Defendant, assisted by counsel, had discussions via email regarding the possible sale of Plaintiff’s interest. The emails stated that Defendant “offered” to acquire Plaintiff’s interest and that Plaintiff “accept[ed]” the offer. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against Defendant seeking, among other things, specific performance of the contract for the sale of his interest in the property to Defendant. The superior court granted partial summary judgment on the specific performance claim, concluding there had been no valid contract formation because the emails between Plaintiff and Defendant did not contain all the material terms necessary to form a contract for the sale of land. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding (1) an email can constitute a writing pursuant to the statute of frauds and the Maine Uniform Electronic Transactions Act; and (2) unresolved issues of material fact existed as to whether a contract for the sale of land was formed in this case. View "McClare v. Rocha" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his discrimination claim against his former employer under Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue. Defendants moved to dismiss on the basis of a clause contained in plaintiff's employment contract, which indicated that English law governed the agreement and that "any dispute arising hereunder shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts." The court affirmed, holding that where a contract contained both a valid choice-of-law clause and a forum selection clause, the substantive law identified in the choice-of-law clause governed the interpretation of the forum selection clause, while federal law governed the enforceability of the forum selection clause; under English law, plaintiff's discrimination claims arose under the employment agreement, within the meaning of the forum selection clause; and the forum selection clause was enforceable under federal law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Martinez v. Bloomberg LP" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiffs entered into a five-year oil and gas lease covering 47 acres in Ross Township, Ohio, and granting Chesapeake exclusive rights to “all oil and gas and their constituents” for $5.00 per mineral acre per year and a royalty on production. The lease provides for extension, if “Operations” are being “conducted on the Leasehold, or on lands pooled, unitized or combined with all or a portion of the Leasehold.” In 2011, Chesapeake submitted drilling-permit applications for property that did not include Plaintiffs’ property. Later, Chesapeake filed a “Declaration and Notice of Pooled Unit,” consisting of 21 properties, including Plaintiffs’ property, and declared that “operations and/or production … anywhere within the Unit shall be deemed to be operations and/or production on each separate tract sufficient to extend and maintain each included lease in the Unit.” It specified that production from the unit would be allocated among all leases in the unit proportional to the surface area of each lease. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the lease expired; Chesapeake filed a counterclaim. The district court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Chesapeake’s actions did not extend the lease because the lease required that a permit application pertaining to the leased property or a property already unitized with the leased property, be filed before the expiration of the lease. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. View "Henry v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1989, Alva Hickerson signed a ten-year promissory note payable to Vessels Oil and Gas Company. Under the terms of the note, the debt was due for full payment in 1999. The holder of the note sued in 2009 for collection of the full, unpaid amount of the debt, plus interest. The six-year statute of limitations would have barred suit after 2005, but the unpaid balance was restarted because a partial payment was deemed a promise to repay the remaining debt. The trial court allowed the laches defense, but the Court of Appeals ruled that Colorado's separation of powers doctrine prohibited a court form applying laches to shorten the filing period. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the separation of powers doctrine did not bar a laches defense to a debt collection action filed within the original or restarted limitations period because laches does not conflict with the statute of limitation. View "Hickerson v. Vessels" on Justia Law

When Rita Licata was transferred to a nursing facility operated by Defendant Rita’s son Salvatore signed an agreement with the facility to arbitrate disputes arising from Rita’s stay at the facility. Salvatore signed the agreement in the space provided for the resident’s “authorized representative.” Rita suffered personal injuries at the nursing facility resulting in her death. Salvator filed a complaint as administrator of Rita’s estate against Defendant for, inter alia, wrongful death and negligence. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration. The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that Salvatore lacked authority to execute the arbitration agreement on Rita’s behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Salvatore lacked authority to execute the agreement on Rita’s behalf; and (2) the arbitration agreement did not otherwise bind Rita’s estate. View "Licata v. GGNSC Malden Dexter LLC" on Justia Law