Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

VP & PK purchased an insurance policy from Lexington Insurance Company for work on a construction site. Kila Kila, one of VP & PK’s subcontractors, purchased an insurance policy from Nautilus Insurance Company. Both policies contained an “other insurance” provision and included duties to defend and indemnify. When VP & PK and Kila Kila were sued for damages resulting from the construction, Nautilus funded the defense of both Kila Kila and VP & PK. Lexington satisfied the judgment against VP & PK but did not contribute to the defense costs. Nautilus filed a complaint seeking (1) a declaration that Lexington owed VP & PK a duty to defend, which it breached; and (2) equitable contribution from Lexington for defense costs. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Lexington, holding that Lexington’s policy was in excess to Nautilus’s policy, and therefore, Lexington’s duty to defend was not triggered. The Hawaii Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the court of appeals and held, inter alia, that (1) an “other insurance” clause purporting to release an otherwise primary insurer of the duty to defend if the insurer becomes excess as to liability is enforceable, but only as between two or more insurers seeking to allocate or recover defense costs; and (2) an otherwise primary insurer who becomes an excess insurer by operation of an “other insurance” clause has a duty to defend as soon as a claim is tendered to it and there is the mere possibility that coverage of that claim exists under its policy. View "Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer and supervisors, alleging that he suffered discriminatory conduct while employed as a car salesman. Plaintiff asserted claims for state harassment and retaliation, federal harassment and retaliation, unlawful termination as against public policy, and breach of his employment contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) (1) vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer and one of Defendant’s supervisors on the state harassment and retaliation claims and vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the federal harassment and retaliation claims and the public policy claim, and (2) otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the ICA’s judgment on the state harassment and retaliation claims with respect to Plaintiff’s supervisor, holding that individual employees are not liable as employers under Haw. Rev. Stat. 378-2(1)(A) and 378-2(2); and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Lales v. Wholesale Motors Co." on Justia Law

Machon Lyons suffered severe injuries as the result of an automobile accident. The accident occurred when a vehicle operated by Roderick Holliday left the road and collided with a tree. As a result, Lyons obtained a default judgment of $72,500 against Holliday. Holliday's mother, Daisy Lang, insured the vehicle through Direct General Insurance Company of Mississippi. Lang's policy included a provision specifically excluding Holliday from any coverage under the policy. Accordingly, Direct denied coverage for the judgment. Lyons sought a declaratory judgment, asking the Circuit Court to hold that Lang's policy covered the judgment against Holliday. Lyons acknowledged the policy exclusion, but argued that Lang's policy covered the judgment against Holliday because Mississippi law required minimum-liability coverage for all permissive drivers, and because Lang's insurance card failed to mention any permissive-driver exclusions. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Direct, finding that the policy clearly and specifically excluded coverage of Holliday. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that 63-15-4(2)(a) required liability insurance for all vehicles operated in Mississippi and that Mississippi Code Section 63-15-43 required that the liability insurance policy "pay on behalf of the named insured and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured." Although the Court of Appeals reached the right result, it cited as its authority the incorrect statute, so the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court concluded the policy exclusion violated Mississippi law: even though Holliday was an excluded driver under the Direct General policy issued to Daisy Lang, the exclusion did not operate to eliminate liability coverage in the minimum amounts required by statute. The trial court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Lyons v. Direct General Insurance Company of Mississippi " on Justia Law

In 2006, Joseph and Mary Romero signed a mortgage contract with the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as nominee for Equity One, Inc. They pledged their home as collateral for the loan. The Romeros alleged that Equity One urged them to refinance their home for access to the home's equity. The terms of the new loan were not an improvement over their then-current loan: the interest rate was higher and the loan amount due was higher. Despite that, the Romeros would receive a net cash payout they planned to use to pay other debts. The Romeros later became delinquent on their increased loan payments. A third party, Bank of New York (BONY), identified itself as a trustee for Popular Financial Services Mortgage, filed suit to foreclose on the Romeros' home. BONY claimed to hold the Romeros' note and mortgage with the right of enforcement. The Romeros defended by arguing that BONY lacked standing to foreclose because nothing in the complaint established how BONY held their note and mortgage, and that the contracts they signed were with Equity One. The district court found that BONY had established itself as holder of the Romeros' mortgage, and that the bank had standing to foreclose. That decision was appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding BONY's evidence demonstrated that it had standing to foreclose. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York v. Romero" on Justia Law

Retired Employees and their spouses filed suit against the County, alleging that the Retired Employees have an implied vested right to the pooling of their health care premiums with those of current employees ("pooled premiums"). The court affirmed the district court's order granting the County's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Retired Employees failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact where they did not show any link to Retired Employees' claim of an implied right to an ongoing pool premium; a practice or policy extended over a period of time did not translate into an implied contract without clear legislative intent to create that right - and intent that Retired Employees has not demonstrated in this case; Retired Employees' assertions that its involvement in negotiations with the County revealed an implied contract right to the pooled premium also lacked evidentiary support; and the nature of Retired Employees' evidence underscored the absence of any definitive intent or commitment on the part of the County to provide for the pooled premium. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the County's motion for summary judgment. View "REAOC v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

Appellant, Century Indemnity Company (CIC) appealed a Superior Court order that granted Respondent Roger Sevigny, Commissioner of Insurance and Liquidator of the Home Insurance Company (Home) an award of statutory prejudgment interest on certain monies owed to Home by CIC. Home is an insurance company, organized under the laws of New Hampshire, which was declared insolvent and placed in liquidation in 2003. CIC is an insurance company organized under the laws of Pennsylvania. CIC and Home have a set of co-insurance and reinsurance relationships. In prior litigation, the Supreme Court held that an asserted $8 million setoff claim by CIC, which had been waived and then reacquired by CIC in a pair of settlement agreements with PECO, was impermissible under New Hampshire law. The New Hampshire Court explicitly declined, without prejudice, to decide the issue at issue here: whether Home’s estate was entitled to prejudgment interest on the payments CIC wrongfully withheld based upon setoff. The Court denied CIC’s motion for reconsideration in the "Home IV" appeal; after remand, the Liquidator filed a motion in superior court for interest on amounts withheld by CIC based upon improper setoff, to which CIC objected. CIC removed the PECO setoff from its monthly statement to Home and paid the previously withheld $8 million to the Liquidator. The trial court entered an order granting the motion and finding that Home was entitled to prejudgment statutory interest under RSA 524:1-a (2007) accruing from October 2007 (the date of the Liquidator’s letter notifying CIC of his determination to disallow the PECO setoff). This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Rehabilitation of the Home Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was a trial court's order denying a motion to compel nonparties to a contract to arbitrate pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Clearwater REI v. Boling" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the grant of a summary judgment that dismissed his claim seeking to enforce a vendee’s lien in real property. Because the appellant only addressed on appeal one of two possible grounds upon which the district court granted summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Cuevas v. Barraza" on Justia Law

Block appealed a district court order denying its motion for a preliminary injunction requiring defendant to comply with post-termination covenants in a Puerto Rican franchise agreement. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that Block had not demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the court did not issue an injunction. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that the district court failed to make specific findings and explain its ruling. Even if the record permitted the court to infer why the district court concluded that Block's initial showing of irreparable injury was inadequate, without adequate Rule 52(a) findings and reasons, the court could not evaluate whether summary denial of Block's motion without an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion, when other procedural alternatives were clearly available. The court declined to direct the district court to enter the requested injunction on remand. View "H&R Block Tax Services, LLC v. Acevedo-Lopez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a breach of contract action against Defendants. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and the appellate court affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the appellate court improperly upheld the trial court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on grounds not raised by Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a reviewing court has the discretion to raise and decide an issue that the parties themselves have not raised if (i) exceptional circumstances exist that would justify review of such an issue if raised by a party, (ii) the parties are given an opportunity to be heard on the issue, and (iii) no unfair prejudice to the party against whom the issue is to be decided results; (2) the appellate court in this case did not exceed its authority in resolving Plaintiff’s appeal on the basis of an issue that Defendants had not raised; and (3) the appellate court did not err in deciding the issue and in granting summary judgment to Defendants. View "Blumberg Assocs. Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Conn., Inc." on Justia Law