Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Mary Gwyther was in a multi-vehicle accident while driving a pickup she co-owned with her mother, Peggy Gwyther, who died in the accident. The claimants allegedly suffered injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Gwyther vehicle was insured under a policy issued by Nodak Mutual Insurance Company, issued to Peggy as the named insured. Peggy lived in a home she co-owned with Mary in Bismarck. Although Mary was listed as a co-owner of the Bismarck property, she had never actually lived in the home, and had not lived with her parents since 1972. Mary had been living in Switzerland since 2000. She owned a business in Switzerland, owned and insured a vehicle there, and had a Swiss driver's license and residence permit. However, Mary voted by absentee ballot in North Dakota as a resident, declaring in applications and affidavits that she was a resident at her mother's Bismarck address. She also designated the Bismarck address as her permanent home address with the State Department. Nodak brought an interpleader action seeking a declaration it was only liable to pay the reduced step-down policy limits because Mary was not a resident of Peggy's household at the time of the accident and therefore was not a "family member" under the policy. The case was tried as a bench trial on stipulated facts. The district court found Mary was not a resident of Peggy's household, concluded the policy did not violate North Dakota law, and concluded Nodak was required to pay only the lower step-down policy limits. The claimants appealed that decision, but the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous and the step-down endorsement to the insurance policy did not violate North Dakota law. View "Nodak Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bahr-Renner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint against Defendants, asserting claims related to the alleged breach of various agreements involving the sale of aviation equipment. Ultimately, a jury trial was held, and the jury awarded Plaintiff $1,112,476 in damages. After dismissing the jury, the parties filed several post-trial motions, which the district court resolved partially in favor of Plaintiff and partially in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s orders, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding that Defendants did not breach a support agreement with Plaintiffs as a matter of law; (2) holding that Plaintiff waived the issue of prejudgment interest; and (3) upholding the jury’s award of damages for Plaintiff’s claim alleging breach of a purchase agreement. View "Atlantech Inc. v. Am. Panel Corp." on Justia Law

In 2002 oil companies filed breach of contract actions against the government, concerning sales of offshore oil and glass leases in the 1980s. The Claims Court held that the government had breached its contracts by preventing the companies from drilling for oil in the offshore areas covered by the leases. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment and restitution awards of approximately $1 billion. Nycal, which held a 4.25 percent interest in two of the leases, waived its right to restitution and pursued a claim for lost profits. The Claims Court held that it was permissible for Nycal to seek lost-profits damages even though the other owners of the leases in which Nycal held a partial share had accepted restitution, but concluded that Nycal had not proved its case for lost profits. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting the government’s evidence that Nycal could not have made a profit on its share of the leases.View "NYCAL Offshore Dev. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

The parties in this dispute were Koninklijke Philips N.V. (“Philips N.V.”), a Netherlands holding company, and Carlo Vichi, an Italian businessman who had a longstanding business relationship with Philips N.V. Philips N.V. was a participant in a joint venture, LG.Philips Displays Holdings B.V. (LPD), that did business with Vichi and other entities. LPD approached Vichi for a substantial loan, which Vichi agreed to make. The joint venture eventually defaulted on the loan. Vichi filed a complaint against Philips N.V., claiming that Philips N.V. committed fraud by misrepresenting the joint venture’s financial condition and prospects and by falsely promising that it would stand behind LPD to ensure it could meet its financial obligations. The Court of Chancery held that Philips N.V. was not liable to Vichi on any of the claims he presented at trial and that Philips N.V. should not be held responsible for the loss Vichi suffered on the loan he made to LPD. View "Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V." on Justia Law

PTM provided the services of a CEO to the Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority (SORTA) to control daily operations, while ultimate management authority remained with SORTA’s Board of Trustees. PTM hired Plaintiff as SORTA’s Chief Operating Officer. Plaintiff, an African American woman, a graduate of West Point and University of Michigan Business School, had no prior industry experience. Two years later, PTM changed hands and Plaintiff became CEO on an at-will basis. Within months, PTM began questioning her allegiance to PTM. Plaintiff repeatedly declined to participate in PTM programs. Tensions escalated during negotiations for renewal of PTM’s management contract, which prohibited PTM employees from working for SORTA within a year of its expiration. Plaintiff’s PTM contract contained the same prohibition. PTM suspected that Plaintiff and SORTA were conspiring to have SORTA hire Plaintiff directly. The contract was extended and the one-year hiring prohibition was removed from the contracts. PTM executives continued to regard Plaintiff as a “prima donna” and exchanged several emails critical of Plaintiff. Following a dispute concerning unionization of SORTA workers, PTM fired Plaintiff, purportedly for lying about the dispute. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding PTM’s investigation inadequate to establish that Plaintiff lied.View "Shazor v. Prof'l Transit Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law

Balvitsch and Weisgram sued Tollefson for breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment, and other claims. Balvitsch and Weisgram moved to hold Tollefson in contempt, alleging Tollefson failed to obey a February 8, 2013 court order that instructed Tollefson not to make any further attacks on the parties and other non-party individuals during the course of the litigation. Balvitsch and Weisgram alleged the court ordered Tollefson at the scheduling conference to stop all attacks against a non-party individual and to stick to the facts of the case during the litigation. They alleged Tollefson ignored the court's order by threatening to launch websites defaming Weisgram and the non-party individual. The trial court entered an order to show cause noting the time and place for the contempt hearing and ordered that Tollefson appear and show why he should not have been held in contempt. The hearing took place, and the court found Tollefson in contempt and ordered sanctions. Tollefson appealed that order and sanction, arguing he did not receive proper notice of the hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding Tollefson did not have adequate notice of the contempt proceeding. View "Balvitsch v. Dakota Burger N Fries Corp." on Justia Law

The Zavadils alleged they loaned Jon and Hollie Rud $32,000 under an April 2008 verbal agreement. The loan was to be repaid when the Ruds sold their home or within six months. When the Ruds failed to repay the loan, the Zavadils agreed to renew and extend the original verbal loan agreement. In 2009, the Ruds executed a third mortgage on their property in favor of the Zavadils, and on a few months later, the Ruds executed a promissory note for $32,000 plus interest due and payable to the Zavadils a year later. The Ruds divorced in June 2009, between executions of the third mortgage and the promissory note. The Zavadils sued the Ruds to foreclose the third mortgage after the Ruds failed to make all payments required under the promissory note. Wells Fargo Bank subsequently brought an action against the Ruds, the Zavadils and others to foreclose its first position mortgage on the property. The Zavadils admitted their third mortgage was subordinate to the bank's mortgage on the property and stipulated to dismissal of their foreclosure action against the Ruds. Jon Rud appealed the grant of summary judgment that awarded Zavadils $33,490.19 in their action to recover on the promissory note. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in ruling no genuine issues of material fact existed and the Zavadils were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Zavadil v. Rud" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs entered into a loan agreement with Potomac Realty Capital LLC (PRC) to rehabilitate and renovate certain property. As security for the loan, NV One granted a mortgage on the property. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint against PRC, asserting violations of the Rhode Island usury law, among other claims. The trial justice granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs with respect to the usury claim, entered an order declaring the loan usurious and void, and voided the mortgage. At issue on appeal was whether a usury savings clause in the loan document validated the otherwise usurious contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their usury claim because (1) the loan was a usury; and (2) the usury savings clause was unenforceable on public policy grounds. View "NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought legal malpractice claims against Jeffrey Daniels, American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Company’s insured. American Guarantee wrongly refused to defend the claims. A default judgment was entered against Daniels, who assigned his rights against American Guarantee to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought the present action seeking to enforce American Guarantee’s duty to indemnify Daniels for the judgment. Summary judgment was awarded in favor of Plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that American Guarantee’s breach of its duty to defend barred it from relying on policy exclusions as a defense to the present lawsuit. The Court later granted reargument, vacated its prior decision, and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding (1) under controlling precedent, American Guarantee was not barred from relying on policy exclusions as a defense; and (2) the applicability of the exclusions American Guarantee relied on presented an issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. View "K2 Inv. Group, LLC v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Filippo Gallina and his wife (Plaintiffs) commenced a personal injury action against Preferred Trucking Services Corp. Preferred Trucking was insured by County-Wide Insurance Company under a policy that required insureds to cooperate with Country-Wide in its investigation of a claim or defense against a lawsuit. The next year, Country-Wide disclaimed its obligation to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking based upon Preferred Trucking’s refusal to cooperate in the defense. Supreme Court subsequently awarded judgment to Plaintiffs. Thereafter, Country-Wide filed this action against Preferred Trucking and Plaintiffs seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking in the underlying action. Supreme Court concluded that Country-Wide was obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking. At issue on appeal was whether Country-Wide’s disclaimer was timely as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that Country-Wide’s disclaimer was untimely because it came four months after Country-Wide learned of the ground for the disclaimer. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Country-Wide was not obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking, as Country-Wide established as a matter of law that its delay was reasonable. View "Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Preferred Trucking Servs. Corp. " on Justia Law