Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellants were injured in automobile accidents, but Geico, which insured both Appellants, denied coverage of their medical expenses. Appellants subsequently instituted a class action of behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, alleging that Geico violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.145(3), which provides that a motor vehicle insurer must offer its insured the option of purchasing medical payment coverage, because, while Geico may have offered its insureds medical payment coverage, it did not obtain written rejections from them of the offered coverage. The district court granted Geico’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 687B.145(3) does not require a written rejection of medpay coverage, and therefore, Appellants’ claims failed. View "Wingco v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a civil complaint against The Power Company, Inc. (“TPCI”) and TPCI’s president, Rick Rizzolo. Less than five years after Plaintiffs filed their action, they entered into a settlement agreement with TPCI and Rizzolo providing that Plaintiffs would receive $9 million upon the sale of Crazy Horse Too, which TPCI owned. More than five years after Plaintiffs filed their complaint, TPCI and Rizzolo filed two motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) for want of prosecution. The district court denied the motions. After the Crazy Horse Too sold at a foreclosure sale, Plaintiffs filed a third motion to reduce the settlement agreement to judgment. The district court granted the motion. TPCI and Rizzolo appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 41(e)’s provision requiring dismissal for want of prosecution does not apply to an action in which the parties enter into a binding settlement agreement before Rule 41(e)’s five-year deadline has expires, and therefore, the district court properly denied TPCI and Rizzolo’s motions to dismiss for want of prosecution; and (2) the district court did not err in reducing the parties’ settlement agreement to judgment. View "The Power Co., Inc. v. Henry" on Justia Law

Randall and Toni Faehnrich were Mississippi residents when they entered into an automobile insurance policy with Progressive Gulf Insurance Company that was negotiated, delivered, and renewed in Mississippi. The policy contained a choice-of-law provision providing that disputes about coverage shall be governed by Mississippi law. The couple subsequently divorced, and Toni moved to Nevada. While driving the Jeep that she and Randall co-owned, Toni was involved in an accident in which the couple’s two boys, who were Nevada residents when the accident occurred, suffered serious injuries. Randall presented a claim to Progressive for his sons’ injuries, but Progressive denied coverage, citing a household exclusion included in the policy that eliminated coverage for the boys’ claims against Toni. The district court held that the exclusion violated Nevada public policy, and, in accordance with Nevada choice of law rules, Mississippi law validating such exclusions did not apply. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Nevada public policy to the Supreme Court, which answered by holding that Nevada’s public policy did not preclude giving effect to the choice-of-law provision in the insurance contract, even when that effect would deny recovery to Nevada residents who were injured in Nevada. View "Progressive Gulf Ins. Co. v. Faehnrich" on Justia Law

The developer (“Developer”) of a residential community hired a general contractor (“Contractor”) to construct homes in the community, and Contractor subcontracted with Subcontractor for construction services. Subcontractor performed services on several homes, including Appellant’s. Because Subcontractor was not fully paid, it recorded liens on properties within the community, including Appellant’s. Subcontractor filed a civil action against Developer, Contractor, Appellant, and other homeowners, seeking to foreclose on its liens. Appellant filed a cross-claim against Developer and Contractor for breach of contract and seeking to recover attorney fees as damages. The district court denied Appellant’s request to recover attorney fees, concluding that, under the standard set forth in Horgan v. Felton regarding the recovery of attorney fees in cloud-on-title cases, because the breach of contract in this case related to title of real property, and because Appellant failed to allege and prove slander of title, she could not recover the attorney fees that she sought as special damages. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment to the extent that it denied Appellant’s request for special damages, holding that Horgan did not apply to preclude such recovery in this case. View "Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed a district court judgment in a real property contract action. Based on Appellants’ failure to file their opening brief and appendix by the deadline and failure to comply with court rules and directives, Appellants’ appeals were dismissed. Appellants sought the en banc Court’s reconsideration, arguing that the dismissal of their appeals were based on the missteps of their lead appellate attorney, and therefore, the dismissal was contrary to the Supreme Court’s precedent recognizing public policy favoring dispositions on the merits. The Supreme Court denied en banc reconsideration, holding that precedential uniformity did not provide a basis to reinstate these appeals, as the policy was not absolute and must be balanced against countervailing policy considerations such as the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of appeals and judicial administration concerns. View "Huckabay Props., Inc. v. NC Auto Parts, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the State Center Project, a $1.5 billion redevelopment project intended to revitalize property owned by the State in Baltimore. In 2005, the State issued a public request for qualifications to solicit a master developer for the project. The State Center, LLC was chosen as the master developer. The Maryland Department of General Services (“DGS”), the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) and the State Center, LLC negotiated for the Project, entering a series of agreements between 2007 and 2010 to complete the Project in a timely manner. In 2010, Plaintiffs, property owners in downtown Baltimore and taxpayers, filed suit against the DGS, MDOT, and the State Center and its subsidiaries, seeking a declaratory judgment that the formative contracts for the Project were void and seeking an injunction to halt the Project. The trial court voided the formative contracts, concluding that they violated the State Procurement Law. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of laches due to an unreasonable delay in bringing their claims, causing prejudice to the defendants. View "State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Vista, plaintiff's employer, appealed the district court's denial of Vista's motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's on-the-job injury claim. The court held that even if the Benefit Plan and the Arbitration Agreement were properly considered as part of a single contract, the termination provision found in the Benefit Plan did not apply to the Arbitration Agreement. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Arbitration Agreement was not illusory under Texas law because Vista's power to terminate the Arbitration Agreement was properly constrained. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to enter an order compelling arbitration. View "Lizalde v. Vista Quality Markets" on Justia Law

The Union sought to set aside an arbitration award that ruled in favor of the MADA and several member car dealerships. At issue was the transition between the 2006 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and the 2010 CBA and its impact on above-scale time allowances for hybrid car warranty and recall work. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court agreed with the district court and found that the arbitrator was "warranted" in determining the CBA's plain language to be "silent or ambiguous with respect to the disputed issue - how the above-scale time allowances could be legitimately terminated." With MADA's attorney's unrebutted testimony and the letters documenting other dealerships' similar conduct to help the parties' past practice with respect to the ambiguous CBA language at issue, the court concluded that the arbitration award drew its essence from the CBA. Therefore, the court found no basis to vacate the arbitration award. The court affirmed the district court's order granting MADA's motion to dismiss with prejudice. View "Garage Maintenance, etc. v. Greater Metropolitan, etc., et al." on Justia Law

Corning hired Hyundai, an ocean shipper, to transport thin glass sheets for use in televisions and computer monitors from the U.S. to Asia. Although it is not clear when the damage occurred, damage was noted when Hyundai unloaded the containers from flatcars operated by its subcontractors (Norfolk Southern Railway and BNSF, another rail carrier). Corning had no role in selecting and no relationship with the subcontractors. There were opinions that the damage was caused by movement of the railcars, not by packing, but the actual cause was not established. Corning’s insurer paid Corning $664,679.88 and filed suit. The district court held that the case would proceed solely under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 11706, apparently reasoning that the damage undisputedly occurred while the cargo was in the possession of a rail carrier. The court found that a Subcontracting Clause did not immunize the rail carriers from suit, but obligated Corning to indemnify Hyundai for any resultant claims by a subcontractor against Hyundai arising out of the same facts. The court held that a $500-per-package limit of liability did not apply to the rail carriers or Hyundai. After a jury trial, the court found Hyundai and the railroads liable, but denied prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Hyundai, reversed and vacated judgments against the railroads, and remanded for reconsideration of prejudgment interest.View "CNA Ins. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a subcontract for the maintenance of aircraft required a contractor to turn to a subcontractor for all maintenance the contractor needs to fulfill a contract with the United States Army. The contractor, DynCorp International, LLC, contended the contract did not create an exclusive relationship between the parties and it could send aircraft to other maintenance providers. The subcontractor, Stevens Aviation, contended the contract was a requirements contract under which DynCorp had to send all aircraft requiring maintenance to Stevens. Stevens moved for a partial summary judgment on the issue, the trial court granted the motion, and the court of appeals reversed and granted partial summary judgment to DynCorp. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision in part and affirmed in part, holding the contract was a requirements contract for certain aircraft. View "Stevens Aviation v. DynCorp International" on Justia Law