Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(a)(4), which allows a party to obtain discovery from a nonparty. John Kapon was the CEO of Acker, Merrall & Condit Company (AMC), a retailer and auctioneer of fine and rare wines, and the employer of Justin Christoph. In 2008, William Koch commenced an action against AMC in Supreme Court concerning alleged counterfeit wine that Rudy Kurniawan had consigned to AMC and that AMC had sold to Koch. In 2009, Koch commenced a fraud action in California against Kurniawan, alleging that Kurniawan had sold Respondent counterfeit wine through AMC’s auctions and sales. In 2012, Koch, seeking disclosure in the California action, served subpoenas on Kapon and Christoph (together, Petitioners). Petitioners filed motions to quash the subpoena, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners failed to show that the requested deposition testimony was irrelevant to the prosecution of the California action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the subpoenas satisfied the notice requirement of section 3101(a)(4); and (2) in moving to quash the subpoena, Petitioners failed to meet their burden of establishing that their deposition testimonies were irrelevant to the California action. View "Kapon v. Koch" on Justia Law

Appellants retained Mary Dorman to represent them in a lawsuit. During the litigation, Dorman and Appellants entered into three separate retainer agreements pertaining to Dorman’s work on the trial, on the appeal to the Appellate Division, and on the appeal to the Court of Appeals. A jury ruled in Appellants’ favor, awarding them $986,671 in damages. Dorman was awarded $296,826 for her trial work. The verdict and trial fee awards were upheld on appeal. Dorman subsequently requested fees for her appellate work, and Supreme Court awarded Dorman $233,966. After a monetary dispute arose between Dorman and Appellants, Dorman sought a declaratory judgment to enforce the three retainer agreements. Supreme Court granted Dorman’s motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Dorman correctly interpreted the fee calculation. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order with regard to the trial agreement and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the trial agreement entitled Dorman to one third of the jury award; and (2) because the trial agreement did not address the treatment of statutory counsel fees, Dorman was entitled to the more generous alternative of either one third of the jury verdict or the statutory award for her trial work. View "Albunio v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained a homeowners insurance policy from American Family Mutual Insurance Company. After Plaintiffs’ home sustained substantial fire damage, a dispute arose regarding the amount of insurance claim benefits payable under the policy. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against American Family and Michael Meek, the insurance agent through whom they obtained their insurance, for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to commence the action within the applicable statute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court was correct to grant summary judgment on the basis of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. View "Groce v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the decade-long litigation regarding the regulation of Puerto Rico’s milk industry. The district court approved a comprehensive Settlement Agreement reached by the original parties: the government defendants, including the Office of the Milk Industry Regulatory Administration for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Spanish acronym “ORIL”), and the plaintiff milk processors, Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. and Suiza Dairy, Inc. After the district court approved of the Agreement, ORIL filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, challenging the portion of the district court order opining that Puerto Rico had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by entering into the Agreement. The district court denied ORIL’s motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) held that the language at issue was merely a statement of dicta and not a judgment, and consistent with this construction, the district court was strongly encouraged to strike the statement; and (2) otherwise dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. View "Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Comas-Pagan" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the decade-long litigation regarding the regulation of Puerto Rico’s milk industry. Intervenor Puerto Rico Dairy Farmers Association (“PRDFA”) appealed the district court’s approval of a comprehensive Settlement Agreement (“the Agreement”) reached by the original parties, including government defendants and plaintiff milk processors, arguing that the district court did not grant it a fair opportunity to be heard on its objections to the Agreement and erred in its approval of the Agreement. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) PRDFA’s procedural rights as an objecting intervenor were not violated where it had an adequate hearing to air its grievances and where the district court held that PRDFA remained free to challenge the constitutionality of the Agreement as implemented in its still-pending companion case; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving of the Agreement. View "P.R. Dairy Farmers Ass'n v. Comas-Pagan" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Laborers Health and Welfare Fund (“the Funds”) filed a declaratory judgment action against Granite Re, Inc. seeking clarification of their right to payment on a surety bond. The district court granted summary judgment to Granite Re, concluding, among other things, that the Funds’ lawsuit was time-barred because the Funds failed to commence litigation within the one-year contractual limitations period set out in the bond. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that fraudulent concealment by the bond principal tolled the limitations period set out in the bond. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) fraudulent concealment can be applied to a surety that was not involved in the fraudulent concealment by the principal; and (2) therefore, the one-year contractual limitations period set out in the bond may be tolled against Granite Re. View "Minn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Granite Re, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant entered into a mortgage with Aegis Lending Corporation. The mortgage was later assigned to Pacifica L. Ninteen, and the servicing rights were eventually transferred to Vantium Capital, Inc. (“Acqura”). After foreclosure proceedings were commenced against Appellant, Appellant filed suit against Acqura, alleging numerous state law claims. Specifically, Appellant claimed that Acqura’s violated its Servicer Participation Agreement with Fannie Mae by failing to follow guidelines applicable under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that Minn. Stat. 58.18(1) did not provide a private cause of action for Appellant to pursue damages for Acqura’s alleged violation of its agreement with Fannie Mae and that Appellant therefore lacked standing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 58.18(1) provides for a private right of action and therefore gave Appellant standing to pursue her claim. View "Gretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

Northwest terminated plaintiff’s membership in its frequent flyer program. A provision in the frequent flyer agreement gave Northwest sole discretion to determine whether a participant had abused the program. Plaintiff claimed that Northwest breached its contract by revoking his membership without valid cause and violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing because it terminated his membership in a way that contravened his reasonable expectations. The district court dismissed, holding that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 pre-empted the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that claim “too tenuously connected to airline regulation to trigger” ADA pre-emption. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The Act pre-empts a state-law claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if it seeks to enlarge contractual obligations that the parties voluntarily adopted. The Act prohibits states from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to [an air carrier’s] price, route, or service,” 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1). The phrase “other provision having the force and effect of law” includes state common-law rules like the claimed implied covenant. Exempting common-law claims would disserve the Act’s central purpose: to eliminate federal regulation of rates, routes, and services so they could be set by market forces. Northwest’s program connects to “rates” by awarding credits redeemable for tickets and upgrades, thus eliminating or reducing ticket prices. It also connects to “services,” i.e., access to flights and higher service categories. Because the implied covenant claim sought to enlarge contractual agreement, it is pre-empted. Under controlling Minnesota law, parties may not contract out of the implied covenant; when state law does not authorize parties to free themselves from the covenant, a breach of covenant claim is pre-empted. Participants in frequent flyer programs can protect themselves by avoiding airlines with poor reputations and enrolling in more favorable rival programs; the Department of Transportation has authority to investigate complaints about frequent flyer programs. The Court also noted that the plaintiff did not appeal his breach of contract claim. View "Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg" on Justia Law

Philip Barter hired Philip Tobin to produce a book encompassing Barter’s artistic works. The parties subsequently entered into a written agreement providing that Tobin would write the text for the book and setting forth the financial arrangements. Tobin drafted a manuscript of the book and gave Barter a draft of the manuscript, but Barter did not respond. Thereafter, Tobin filed a complaint alleging that Barter had breached the parties’ contract. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Tobin. The next day, the trial court granted Barter’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law, concluding that Tobin had failed to present sufficient evidence that the parties had a meeting of the minds necessary to form a legal contract. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the jury’s verdict in favor of Tobin, holding (1) the trial court erred in issuing its judgment in favor of Barter as a matter of law; and (2) a jury rationally could have found that Barter had materially breached the contract by failing to respond to Tobin. View "Tobin v. Barter" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the settlement of a lawsuit alleging Libya's responsibility for the 1986 LaBelle discotheque bombing in Berlin. The victims' lawyers received nearly $36 million for their efforts. Plaintiff, a retired federal agent who allegedly provided investigative and other services to the lawyers in the litigation, filed suit against the lawyers, alleging a claim of unjust enrichment. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's claim was untimely under the three-year statute of limitations because it accrued when plaintiff received a letter refusing his request for compensation. Although plaintiff's right to recover on his contractual claim - still pending in district court - may turn on the success of the lawsuit, his right of recovery on his unjust enrichment claim was based on the services he performed. View "Bregman v. Perles, et al." on Justia Law