Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Shirley Gregg Dean (Shirley) and Marion Casey Dean (Casey) married in 1978. Shirley died in 1999. At the time, Shirley’s daughters (the sisters) decided not to probate their mother’s estate, basing their decision on their belief that Shirley had an oral contract with Casey for him to provide for them in his will. After Casey died in 2010, the sisters sued Casey’s estate for breach of an oral contract between Casey and Shirley. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the sisters, concluding that they carried their burden of proving that there was an oral agreement between Casey and Shirley to leave one-third of Casey’s estate to Shirley’s children if Shirley predeceased Casey. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court ruling that a contract existed between Shirley and Casey, holding that the record lacked clear and convincing evidence as to the terms of the agreement between Casey and Shirley. View "Dean v. Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a home that a pre-closing inspection revealed had corrosion on the oil heating system in the basement. Although the boiler and oil tank were replaced prior to the sale of the home, the oil feed line buried beneath the concrete floor in the basement was not replaced. After Plaintiffs discovered an oil leak at the feed line, they initiated claims under their homeowners’ insurance policy issued by Defendant. Defendant denied Plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant for breach of contract. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claim was caused by gradual corrosion of an oil fuel feed line, not by a sudden or accidental loss, and the claim was therefore barred by the clear and unambiguous terms of the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the undisputed evidence indicated that the damage to Plaintiffs’ property was caused by corrosion, which was not covered by their insurance policy, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Nunez v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Rhode Island Department of Administration and the Rhode Island Department of Health (collectively, the State), selected Plaintiff as its livery service provider through a bidding process. Plaintiff and the State entered into a contract setting forth the terms of the parties’ agreement. In 2007, the State terminated Plaintiff’s contract for alleged violations of the terms of the bid award. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the State breached the contract by terminating the agreement in bad faith and without cause. Before trial, the trial justice granted the State’s motion in limine to prohibit Plaintiff from introducing evidence to suggest that the contract was an exclusive agreement between the State and Plaintiff. The trial justice subsequently found that the State lawfully terminated its contract with Plaintiff in good faith and did not breach the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in finding that the contract was not exclusive and that the State’s unilateral termination of the contract upon a finding of unsatisfactory performance did not constitute a breach. View "JPL Livery Servs., Inc. v. R.I. Dep't of Admin." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Christiana Mall, LLC appealed the Superior Court’s finding of substantial prejudice. Plaintiff-appellee Emory Hill and Company appealed the Superior Court’s finding of excusable neglect and a meritorious defense with respect to the claim of quantum meruit. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court concluded that Christiana’s failure to file a timely answer to the Complaint was not due to excusable neglect. The Court affirmed the trial court's order but on different reasons. View "Christiana Mall, LLC v. Emory Hill and Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (the customer) filed suit against State Street (the custodian bank), alleging in essence that it had a duty to notify him that the securities in his account were worthless. The district court granted State Street's motion to dismiss the contract claims on the ground that State Street had a merely administrative role in managing plaintiff's accounts and thus owed him no duty to guard against his investment advisor's misconduct. The district court concluded that plaintiff's negligence claims were barred by Florida's economic loss rule and plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged knowledge on the part of State Street in regards to the aiding and abetting claims. The court affirmed, holding that, under these facts, the custodian bank breached no duty, contractual or otherwise, by accepting on behalf of its customer securities that later turn out to be fraudulent and listing those securities on monthly account statements issued to the customer. Plaintiff's allegations failed to state claims for breach of contract; plaintiff failed to establish that State Street owed him an independent duty to monitor the investments in his account, verify their market value, or ensure they were in valid form; therefore, he failed to state valid negligence claims; plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to state a claim for aiding and abetting; and plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation also failed. View "Lamm v. State Street Bank and Trust" on Justia Law

In February 2011, two years and four months after Plaintiff learned she had been disinherited by her mother, Plaintiff filed a complaint against financial advisor Bradley Lott for fraud and constructive fraud. A jury found that Lott had committed constructive fraud but that Plaintiff knew or should have known before February 2007 that the fraud occurred. Based on the jury’s findings, the district court dismissed the action, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding (1) the evidence did not support a finding that Plaintiff could have discovered the fraud sooner, and (2) therefore, the district court erred by dismissing the case based on the statute of limitations. Remanded for a new trial. View "Erdelyi v. Lott" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, filed a quiet title action against owners of adjacent lots, seeking a declaration that express easements granted in favor of the adjacent lots were invalid. The defendants filed counterclaims asserting that the express easements were valid. Plaintiffs submitted to Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") a claim for defense pursuant to a policy of title insurance issued by Commonwealth insuring Plaintiffs’ property, but Commonwealth denied the claim. In the quiet title action, the district court extinguished the express easements and denied the counterclaims but concluded that the defendants possessed implied easements. While the quiet title action was pending, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Commonwealth, seeking a determination that Commonwealth breached its duty under the policy by refusing to provide a defense to the counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in sustaining Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment because Commonwealth did not violate its contract with Plaintiffs by denying coverage or indemnification. View "Woodle v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Union filed suit against WUSA-TV, a television station, alleging that the station breached its contractual obligations by laying off a technician. Because the grievance did not "arise under" the 2008 bargaining agreement, and the 2012 agreement was not yet in effect, the district court concluded that the station was not obligated to arbitrate. The court affirmed, concluding that seniority provisions in the 2008 agreement did not create vested or accrued rights and therefore, the grievance was not arbitrable under the 2008 agreement. Nor do the qualified seniority protections against layoffs contained in the 2008 agreement survive expiration under normal principles of contract interpretation. Moreover, the union's extrinsic evidence was itself ambiguous. Finally, the court rejected the Union's claim that the grievance was arbitrable under the 2012 agreement. View "Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Detroit Free Press, Inc." on Justia Law

Guardian Builders, LLC, and E. Wayne Tackett appealed a Circuit Court order denying their motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award entered in favor of Randy Uselton and his wife Melissa. In 2010, the Useltons sued Guardian alleging several claims arising from Guardian's construction of a house for the Useltons. Guardian subsequently filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the circuit court granted that motion. In late 2011, the arbitrator entered a final award in favor of the Useltons. Guardian subsequently filed a motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award to the circuit court, to which it attached a copy of the arbitration award. The Useltons filed a 'motion to confirm' the arbitration award. The circuit court entered an order purporting to deny Guardian's motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award, purporting to grant the Useltons' motion to confirm the arbitration award, and purporting to order Guardian to pay $1,421.75 in Better Business Bureau fees and facility costs related to the arbitration. Guardian objected only to a subset of the damages that were awarded the Useltons that were not directly related to the poorly constructed house, specifically, attorney fees and arbitration fees (including both the arbitrator fee and the forum fee charged by the Better Business Bureau of North Alabama ("the BBB"), which administered the arbitration). Furthermore, Guardian argued the arbitrator lacked the authority to award the Useltons attorney fees and arbitration fees. The Supreme Court agreed that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding those remedies. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to enter a modified judgment subtracting attorney fees and arbitration fees from the award made to the Useltons. View "Guardian Builders, LLC v. Uselton " on Justia Law

In 2006, the U.S. Army Contracting Agency solicited bids for repair, maintenance, and construction services at Fort Rucker, Alabama, with indefinite delivery and quantity terms. The mechanism for pricing such jobs involves identification of costs and multiplication by certain “coefficients” set in the contract. It was well known that construction costs in the region had increased after Hurricane Katrina, 15 months before the government solicited bids. The Army awarded the contract to Lakeshore in 2007. In 2008, Lakeshore began 78 construction projects at Fort Rucker. When the Army exercised its option to extend the contract, it increased payments based on the contract’s price-adjustment clause. Lakeshore began 74 more delivery orders. After two years under the contract, Lakeshore concluded that it had incurred higher costs than were covered by payments under the contract and requested an equitable adjustment. The government denied the request. Acting under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7101, the contracting officer denied a claim for recovery of $1,996,152.40. The Claims Court rejected claims of breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of implied warranty, and mistake on summary judgment, stating that the government was not obliged to provide accurate local prices or to bear “economic consequences if one or more prices in the guide proved inaccurate.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Lakeshore Eng'g Servs., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law