Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Daisy Monzo gifted a condominium that she owned to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of her daughter, Charron Monzo. Daisy subsequently signed another deed transferring the condo back into her own name. Charron filed a petition seeking an order requiring Daisy to transfer the condo back to the trust. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Daisy, concluding that Daisy’s execution of the deed transferring title to the condo into the trust was based on unilateral mistakes. Charron then filed this original writ petition challenging the district court’s partial summary judgment order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) a donor may obtain relief from an erroneous gift if she proves by clear and convincing evidence that her intent was mistaken and not in accord with the donative transfer; (2) remedies available to correct such mistakes depend on the nature of the unilateral mistake in question; and (3) because it was uncertain what Daisy’s donative intent was at the time of the donative transfer, genuine issues of fact remained as to whether unilateral mistakes affected Daisy’s execution of the deed transferring the condo into the trust, and therefore, partial summary judgment was improper.View "In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979" on Justia Law

Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. sued Edgetech I.G.,Inc., n/k/a Quanex I.G. Systems, Inc.; Quanex Building Products Corporation; Thompson I.G., LLC, and RDM Consulting, LLC; and Wynne Enterprises, Inc. Edgetech filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction; the trial court denied the motion. Edgetech then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the Supreme Court direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss and to enter an order granting the motion and dismissing the case against it. Finding that the trial court erred in denying Edgetech's motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court granted Edgetech's petition and issued the writ. View "Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. v. Thompson I.G., LLC et al. " on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiffs Sylvia and Stanley Stroup sued defendants Peter Doran and Peter Doran Landscape Design, LLC for breach of contract, fraud, and consumer fraud after defendants failed to perform landscaping for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs obtained a judgment against defendants. Defendants failed to pay the judgment. Plaintiffs obtained a writ of execution, and the court approved plaintiffs’ motion for trustee process to attach funds owned by defendants and held by Brattleboro Savings and Loan Association (BSL). BSL disclosed to plaintiffs that it held a balance of $2,853.05 in a checking account titled in the name of one of the defendants. A few days later, the parties stipulated that BSL would release $750 to plaintiffs, and that BSL would then be discharged as a trustee and defendant’s account would be free of any lien or charge benefitting plaintiffs. Defendants further agreed to pay $3,500 to plaintiffs before January 31, 2008. BSL paid plaintiffs $750. Plaintiffs claim that defendants never paid the remainder of their debt. In 2013, plaintiffs served BSL with another trustee summons. BSL did not reply within thirty days, and on August 27 plaintiffs moved for default against BSL and entry of judgment against it as trustee for $24,155.12, the balance due under the judgment. The court ordered the clerk to schedule a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion, and directed that a copy of plaintiffs’ motion and the notice of hearing be served on BSL. On September 16, BSL filed a trustee disclosure indicating that it did not have any of defendants’ property in its possession. The court subsequently entered an order denying plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against BSL. The court stated that “[a]lthough Trustee failed to make a timely disclosure, its disclosure now made in response to Plaintiff[s’] motion for default shows that it holds no assets for the benefit of Defendant[s]. Default judgment under these circumstances would be inequitable.” Plaintiffs appealed. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion for default because applicable Vermont law makes default mandatory when a trustee fails to serve a disclosure within thirty days. Plaintiffs did not contest the information contained in the trustee’s disclosure form or request an evidentiary hearing below. See V.R.C.P. 4.2(g) (stating that party who intends to contest information contained in trustee’s disclosure is entitled to evidentiary hearing upon written request). Nor do they contest the information on appeal. Their sole argument before this Court is that default was mandatory under 12 V.S.A. § 3062 and V.R.C.P. 4.2(f). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Stroup v. Doran" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Progressive Casualty Insurance Company insured the vehicle involved in the accident at issue in this case. Given the number of victims, the policy’s liability coverage did not fully compensate at least one of the injured passengers. The parties disputed whether the injured passenger was therefore entitled to UIM benefits under Progressive’s policy. Progressive argued that coverage was barred by certain exclusions in its policy. The trial court found Progressive’s exclusions unenforceable as inconsistent with the definition of an "underinsured vehicle" set forth in 23 V.S.A. 941(f). Progressive appealed, arguing that its exclusions should be enforced, and that it should not have to provide both liability and UIM benefits to the injured passenger. The Supreme Court agreed with Progressive after its review of the case, and therefore, reversed the trial court’s decision.View "Progressive Casuality Insurance Co. v. MMG Insurnace Co." on Justia Law

In this case and its companion, LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC,(No. 88132-4), the central issues on appeal arose from a joint venture agreement regarding a debt collection business. The debt collection business operated according to the terms of the joint venture agreement, as originally proposed, from approximately winter 2005 through summer 2007. In this opinion, the issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of equitable indemnification (known as the "ABC Rule") to hold that the legal malpractice plaintiffs here suffered no compensable damages as a matter of law and that summary judgment dismissal was appropriate. "Where the only damages claimed by a legal malpractice plaintiff are attorney fees incurred in a separate litigation and the only legal basis on which plaintiff asserts those fees are compensable is the ABC Rule, then the defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissal if the ABC Rule does not apply to the undisputed facts as a matter of law." That was the situation presented in this case, and as such, affirmed the trial court. View "LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

In this case and its companion, LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC, (No. 88846-9) (Wash. July 31, 2014), the central issues on appeal arose from a joint venture agreement regarding a debt collection business. The debt collection business operated according to the terms of the joint venture agreement, as originally proposed, from approximately winter 2005 through summer 2007. This opinion addressed whether the trial court proceedings complied with due process requirements; whether, as a matter of law, the joint venture proposal was entered by an attorney in violation of one or both of former RPCs 1.7 (1995) and 1.8(a) (2000); and, if so, whether the remedy imposed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal is appropriate. The Supreme Court found: (1) the trial court proceedings satisfied the requirements of procedural due process; (2) though on different reasoning from that used by the Court of Appeals, that the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that the joint venture proposal contemplated a business transaction subject to, agreed to, and entered into in violation of former RPC 1.8(a). The Court affirmed that the former RPC 1.8(a) violation rendered the terms of the business transaction unenforceable under the circumstances presented and the remedy imposed was appropriate. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the business transaction was entered in violation of former RPC 1. 7. The Court declined to determine whether the former RPC 1.7 violation would have also justified the remedy imposed. View "LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

Sam Woodruff owned land in Rankin County. He agreed to sell a part of that land to Rita Thames, his first cousin’s daughter, who was also a neighbor. Woodruff claimed that he agreed to sell Thames one acre from a tract of land for the purchase price of $9,750. Thames claims that Woodruff agreed to sell her 6.53 acres from a different tract of land for that amount. Woodruff claimed that Thames then brought him a blank contract of sale to sign, which he did. Thames appears to claim that the blank contract of sale included attachments that described the land; however, the appellate record contained no evidence of this. The trial court entered a default judgment awarding specific performance in favor of the Thames. Woodruff moved to have the default judgment set aside, and the trial court denied the motion, finding that Woodruff lacked good cause for the default and lacked a “compelling defense.” The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the trial court record that serious question remained regarding whether a valid contract existed between the parties, giving the seller a colorable defense. Because the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set aside the default judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for proceedings on the merits. View "Woodruff v. Thames" on Justia Law

Kreisers Inc., a Subchapter S corporation, hired First Dakota Title to assist it with a like-kind property exchange in order to receive tax deferred benefits under 26 U.S.C. 1031. The like-kind exchange partially failed. Kreisers subsequently sued First Dakota for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The circuit court rejected Kreiser’s negligent misrepresentation claim but determined that First Dakota was negligent in assisting Kreisers with the exchange. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in applying tort law rather than contract law to determine the duty that First Dakota owed to Kreisers; (2) did not err in concluding that Kreisers was not contributorily negligent; and (3) did not err in its calculation of damages.View "Kreisers Inc. v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

In Spring 2008, Williams Company Construction, Inc. entered into a construction contract to remodel the Friendly Smiles Cosmetic Dentistry Office owned by Dr. Brenda Barfield. Dr. Barfield previously leased the building from Williams Company owner Glen Williams for approximately five years before she purchased the property from him in 2008. Dr. Barfield hired Williams to remodel the building because of its construction experience and familiarity and knowledge of the building. When Dr. Barfield hired Williams, she did not know whether the remodeling work would be done by Williams or subcontractors. Dr. Barfield did not deal directly with any subcontractors during the remodeling project nor did she direct Williams to hire any specific subcontractors. During the remodel, Williams served as the general contractor and hired subcontractors to do various construction tasks. In December 2008, a section of a copper water pipe froze and burst. The frozen water pipe caused minor water damage and was repaired by plumbing subcontractor Home Heating. During the repair process, a Home Heating employee cut a hole in the wall to locate the leak and discovered that the air in the plumbing wall was cold. The employee was concerned the pipe could freeze again and notified the Friendly Smiles Cosmetic Dentistry Office about the cold air. Dr. Barfield contacted Williams to express her concern about the pipes re-freezing from the cold air. According to testimony, Williams told Dr. Barfield not to worry about the pipes freezing again because of circulating warm air around the hole. Dr. Barfield also wanted the hole in the wall patched, but had difficulty in securing Williams or Home Heating to fix it. Dr. Barfield made repeated requests for Williams or Home Heating to resolve the cold air issue, but they did not fix the problem. Approximately one week after the pipe was fixed, the water pipe froze and broke again, this time causing extensive water damage to the dental office. Dr. Barfield and her insurance company, Travelers Insurance, brought suit against Williams, Home Heating (and other subcontractors) for negligence, and breach of contract. Before trial, the parties stipulated that the total amount of damages was $220,046.09. Williams requested the trial court to include a jury instruction concerning the independent contractor distinction (C-55.25), and a jury instruction pertaining to the failure of a party to produce witnesses (C-80.30). The court denied the two requests. At the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated that the case would be tried before the jury based on comparative fault. The jury was given a special verdict form and found Williams seventy percent at fault, Home Heating twenty-five percent at fault, and Dr. Barfield five percent at fault. Judgment was entered against Williams. Williams subsequently filed a motion for a new trial arguing the court erred in denying its requested jury instructions and there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find Williams seventy percent at fault for the damages. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Williams appealed the district court's judgment, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of America v. Williams Co. Construction" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a joint operating agreement (JOA) for Wyoming oil and gas interests entered into in 2000 by the predecessors in interest to Windsor Energy Group, LLC and Windsor Beaver Creek, LLC (together, Windsor) and Noble Energy, Inc. (Noble). In 2004, Noble’s predecessor assigned its interest to another party. In 2010, Windsor filed suit against Noble’s predecessor, claiming it was obligated for costs under the JOA. The district court ruled (1) an assignor of an interest who was not formally released was still obligated under the JOA, but (2) Windsor’s claim against Noble for breach of the JOA was barred by laches. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment without addressing the contract issue, holding that the district court (1) did not err in ruling that the equitable doctrine of laches was an available defense to Windsor’s claim for breach of the JOA even though the statute of limitations had not expired; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by finding the elements of laches were satisfied in this case.View "Windsor Energy Group, LLC v. Noble Energy, Inc." on Justia Law