Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the plaintiffs’ residential mortgage loan and purchased their home at a trustee sale conducted by First American. Plaintiffs sued, alleging, that defendants violated their deed of trust’s incorporation of a pre-foreclosure meeting requirement contained in National Housing Act (NHA) regulations and the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The trial court sustained demurrers and denied a preliminary injunction. The court of appeal reversed, finding that plaintiffs pled viable causes of action for equitable cancellation of the trustee’s deed obtained by Wells Fargo based on their allegation that Wells Fargo did not comply with the NHA requirements incorporated into the deed of trust. Because compliance was a condition precedent to the accrual of Wells Fargo’s contractual authority to foreclose on the property, if, as plaintiffs allege, the sale was conducted without such authority, it is either void or voidable by a court sitting in equity. Whether void or voidable, plaintiffs were not required to allege tender of the delinquent amount owedView "Fonteno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Dan C. Morton successfully bid on several federal oil and gas leases. Morton sought the assistance of RDG Oil and Gas, LLC to develop the leases. In 2005, the parties entered into two separate agreements for the development of the leases. In 2012, Morton’s successor in interest, the Jayne Morton Living Trust, filed a complaint against RDG alleging breach of contract of both agreements. RDG did not respond to the complaint, and the district court entered a default judgment against RDG. RDG later moved to set aside the entry of default and the default judgment. The district court denied RDG’s motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying RDG’s motion to set aside the entry of default and the entry of default judgment.View "RDG Oil & Gas, LLC v. Jayne Morton Living Trust " on Justia Law

The Andrews, a married couple, contracted to purchase a newly constructed home from Appellants, Joe Seneshale and his company, Legacy Builders, LLC (together, Legacy). After the Andrews took possession of the property, they discovered that the house had numerous structural and cosmetic flaws. The Andrews filed a complaint against Legacy alleging breach of contract and breach of implied warranty of habitability. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Andrews and awarded a total of $319,302 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded with instructions to correct the damage award, holding (1) when the cost of repairs in a homeowners’ construction case alleging breach of contract and breach of warranty may be disproportionate to the loss in value to the home resulting from the breach, the plaintiff has the burden of proving damages at trial, and the defendant has the burden of challenging the reasonableness or disproportionality of the plaintiff’s method; and (2) the district court did not commit clear error when it relied upon the majority of the Andrews’ cost of repair expert’s testimony and when it found that expansive soils caused damages to the home’s foundation.View "Legacy Builders, LLC v. Andrews" on Justia Law

The Service Employees International Union, Local 509 (Union) filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department of Mental Health (DMH) violated the Massachusetts privatization statute by entering into contracts with private entities without adhering to the requirements set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, 52-55. The superior court judge allowed DMH’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which she treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, determining that the Union lacked both direct and associational standing to pursue its claim and, additionally, that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because the Union failed to join necessary parties to the action. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside the judgment of dismissal, holding (1) the judge did not err in dismissing the complaint on the basis of its failure to name all necessary parties; but (2) the Union had direct standing to seek a declaratory judgment that would invalidate the contracts at issue. Remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the Union to seek leave to amend its complaint by adding all necessary parties.View "Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 509 v. Dep’t Mental Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Helena Murphy appealed a superior court judgment in favor of defendant, Patriot Insurance Company, her homeowner’s insurer. The dispute between the parties stemmed from storm damage done to plaintiff's house in 2007, and the subsequent claims she made on her insurance policy. On appeal of the superior court's ruling in Patriot's favor, plaintiff argued: (1) Patriot was estopped from denying coverage for the removal and replacement of a chimney on her home; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing claims for negligence and bad faith. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murphy v. Patriot Insurance Company" on Justia Law

After Harold Forest Snow died, Linda Moulton, as personal representative, filed a civil action against Susan Snow, alleging that one of the transfers identified in Harold’s codicil was an improvident transfer and a product of undue influence. During discovery, the parties’ attorneys announced that they had settled the case. Neither side, however, would agree to sign the other’s proposed settlement documents. Linda subsequently filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The probate court granted Linda’s motion to enforce, finding that the record contained an “unequivocal stipulation by the parties’ attorneys that the matter was settled” and that the material terms of the agreement were clearly defined in the transcript. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was ample evidence that the parties intended to enter into an enforceable settlement agreement and that the terms placed on the record reflected all of the material terms of the contract; and (2) the probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement without holding a trial or an evidentiary hearing.View "In re Estate of Snow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted with the Town of Bethel to perform electrical work in connection with the Town’s renovation of its high school. Plaintiff later sued the Town, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and claiming that the Town must reimburse it for additional costs incurred due to the Town’s ongoing asbestos abatement work at the school. The trial court rendered judgment for the Town in part, concluding that the Town's conduct did not fall within either of two judicial created exceptions to the enforcement of “no damages for delay” clauses adopted by the Court in White Oak Corp. v. Dep’t of Transportation. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision that Plaintiff was not entitled to compensation under any of the “no damages for delay” exceptions at issue, holding (1) the term “active interference,” as used in the contract, did not require a showing of bad faith or gross negligence; but (2) the Town’s conduct in this case did not rise to the level of active interference or fall within either of the White Oak exceptions.View "C & H Elec., Inc. v. Town of Bethel" on Justia Law

Appellant and her two siblings owned certain parcels of land in Park City as tenants in common with United Park City Mines (UPCM). Appellant and UPCM decided jointly to develop the parcels, and Wasatch County approved the parties’ development plan. UPCM was subsequently acquired by Mountain Resort Developments’ (MRD) parent company. MRD and Appellant could not agree how to jointly develop the property or on a purchase price for Appellant’s interest in the parcels. The parties ultimately entered a settlement agreement and exchanged interests in the parcels. After the exchange of deeds under the settlement agreement, MRD asserted that Appellant had not retained development rights under the development plan. Appellant sued for breach of contract, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment for MRD on all of Appellant’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s breach of contract claim failed because Appellant and MRD did not agree to continue to develop their properties in compliance with the development plan, and therefore, there was no reasonable basis for Appellant to believe she would retain development rights as detailed in that plan; and (2) the remainder of Appellant’s claims failed because Appellant did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the elements of those causes of action.View "Keith v. Mountain Resorts Dev., LLC " on Justia Law

Steven Jacobs, the former chief executive officer of Sands China Ltd., filed a complaint against his former employer, alleging, among other things, breach of contract claims. Throughout discovery on the issue of whether Sands was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, Sands maintained that it could not disclose any documents containing personal information that are located in Macau due to restrictions within the Macau Personal Data Protection Act (MPDPA). The district court subsequently issued an order precluding Sands from raising the MPDPA as an objection or defense to disclosure of any documents. Thereafter, Jacobs moved for Nev. R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions, arguing that Sands had violated the district court’s order by redacting personal data contained in its Macau-related document production based on MPDPA restrictions. The Supreme Court denied Sands’s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, holding (1) the mere presence of a foreign international privacy statute does not itself preclude Nevada district courts from ordering litigants to comply with Nevada discovery rules; and (2) in this case, the district court properly found that the existence of a foreign international privacy statute did not excuse Petitioners from complying with the district court’s discovery order.View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Steven C. Jacobs, the former chief executive officer of Sands China Ltd., filed a complaint against his former employer, alleging, among other things, that Sands breached his employment contract. At issue in this case was Jacobs’ possession of purportedly privileged documents in the form of e-mails and other communications that he gathered on the day he was terminated. The district court ordered Jacobs to turn over the copies of the documents to an independent vendor. The district court granted Jacobs’ motion for the return of the documents, concluding that Jacobs was among the “class of persons” legally entitled to view and use privileged documents that pertained to his tenure at Sands. Sands then filed this original petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding (1) a corporation’s current management is the sole holder of its attorney-client privilege, and thus, Nevada law does not allow for a judicially created class of persons exception to attorney-client privilege; and (2) the district court erred in ruling that Jacobs, based solely on his former executive position with Sands, was legally allowed to use the purportedly privileged documents over Sands’s claim of privilege.View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law