Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Rose’s Bidwell, Ohio home was insured by State Farm. Rose also had a Personal Articles Policy that covered two Rolex watches. In 2009, a fire destroyed the house. Later that day, Rose made a claim of $696,373.30 for the dwelling, $512,765.57 for damage to personal property, $30,000 for living expenses, and $29,850 for one Rolex watch. State Farm’s investigator took a recorded statement from Rose and his wife and spoke with Rose’s ex-wife; gathered information by searching public records; and retained a fire investigator, who issued a report, finding that the fire originated in the kitchen, that electrical items did not appear to be the source of the fire, and that neither smoking nor cooking was suspected as a cause. The report indicated that non-reported human action could not be eliminated as a cause, but did not specify that the fire was deliberately ignited. State Farm denied Rose’s claims, alleging that Rose violated “Intentional Acts” and “Concealment or Fraud” conditions of his policies. Rose sued, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. The district court declined to grant summary judgment on the “Intentional Acts” clause, but found that some answers Rose gave, failing to identify multiple tax liens and judgments, in statements to State Farm were misleading and material, and granted summary judgment on the other claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding material questions of fact concerning whether Rose misled investigators.View "Rose v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

The parties in this case met in 2002 or 2003 and had a romantic relationship. In August 2007, the pair bought a house in Orwell. Prior to the purchase, plaintiff had been renting an apartment within the house from the owners of the property, the Tricketts. After the sale, defendant moved in with plaintiff. The parties bought the house for $245,000: Defendant’s mother contributed $200,000, defendant paid about $4,300 in closing costs, and the Tricketts financed a $45,000 private mortgage to the parties. Defendant’s mother did not ask for a promissory note, and her contribution was a gift rather than a loan. In particular, the contribution was intended as a gift to defendant, not to plaintiff. Although both parties signed the promissory note to the Tricketts, plaintiff took responsibility for making those payments, and was supposed to pay the balloon payment on the mortgage in August of 2010. The property was titled to the parties as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Sometime after the closing, plaintiff signed an indemnification agreement that expressly acknowledged that defendant paid $200,000 plus the closing costs, that plaintiff was solely responsible for the $45,000 mortgage debt, and that plaintiff would indemnify defendant for any default on that debt. Plaintiff testified that she always believed that each party had a fifty percent interest in the property, while defendant testified that his understanding was that the parties had interests in the property commensurate their respective contributions. The trial court expressly rejected plaintiff’s testimony and concluded that both parties understood that their interests were defined by their respective contributions to the purchase price. The parties’ relationship ended, and defendant moved out of the house in 2009. In February, he stopped paying the expenses for the property and ignored plaintiff’s requests for assistance. Plaintiff has rented out a portion of the house since April 2010, collecting $700 per month. As of the trial, plaintiff had earned $27,300 from renting the house. She did not share any of this income with defendant. Plaintiff did not pay the balloon payment on the mortgage, and in 2010, the Tricketts filed a petition for foreclosure. In November 2011, plaintiff filed for bankruptcy to avoid losing the property. Plaintiff’s mother helped her to redeem the property by borrowing $143,000 against the equity in her own home. Plaintiff paid toward the mortgage on her mother’s house used to finance the redemption of the parties' house, $56,691 to the Trinketts, $12,031 for past-due property taxes, and $71,722 to pay off a home equity loan. In August 2011, in the face of an inevitable foreclosure sale, the court ordered plaintiff to sell the house. Plaintiff did not comply with the order, and the court found plaintiff in contempt on that basis. In a partition action, plaintiff sought to keep the house and buy out defendant’s interest. Defendant wanted the property awarded to him so that he could sell it and then disburse the amounts allocated by the court to plaintiff. Neither party sought to divide the property into two lots. The property was appraised at $240,000. The parties submitted the matter to the court. Plaintiff challenged the partition order reflecting the trial court’s conclusion that defendant had an 81.7% interest in the home and for applying various setoffs for contributions to the maintenance of the home after the parties purchased it. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the order.View "Currie v. Jané" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, APA members, filed a class action suit seeking recovery of all special assessment fees paid after they learned that there was no requirement to pay the special assessment to maintain APA membership. Plaintiffs alleged that the APA intentionally misled members into believing that payment of the special assessment fee was a condition of membership, and that they would not have paid the fee had they known it was optional. The district court dismissed the claims, principally concluding that plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that the assessment fee was mandatory rather than optional. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim where their claim is not precluded by an express contract; the court rejected defendant's argument that their retention of the assessment fees was not "unjust"; and there is no reason to conclude that D.C. courts would impose a would-be member any heightened duty to investigate before relying on facially straightforward billing language. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' California statutory claims where the District of Columbia - not California - law governed the dispute. The court denied plaintiffs' request to add a fraudulent inducement claim; affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' request to add claims for rescission and negligent misrepresentation; and, in regards to the negligent misrepresentation claim, reversed to the extent that the dismissal was with prejudice. The court remanded for further proceedings.View "In re: APA Assessment Fee Litigation" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a performance bond issued by Stanley Black and Decker, Inc. to secure the obligation of an environmental consulting company to perform environmental remediation of contaminated property, a portion of which was owned by Stanley. A.J. Properties, LLC commenced the underlying action against Stanley alleging that it had been assigned the right to recover all funds paid to Stanley under the performance bond. Specifically, A.J. Properties argued that Stanley had assigned the rights to payment when it assigned a mortgage on the property to the Wyman-Gordon Company, which assigned the mortgage to A.J. Properties. A federal district court judge determined that A.J. Properties was entitled to the amounts paid to Stanley under the rule of Quaranto v. Silverman. Stanley appealed, and the court of appeals recommended certification of a question of law to the First Circuit. The First Circuit answered the question as follows: “Where a mortgage and a surety agreement secured an obligation, and both the mortgagor and the surety committed a breach of that obligation prior to a written assignment of the mortgage, the assignee does not necessarily acquire the right against the surety’s receiver for the surety’s breach of its obligation.” View "A.J. Props., LLC v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc." on Justia Law

G&K filed suit against Bill's for breach of contract and sought liquidated damages. Bill's counterclaimed, asserting common-law clams and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code 4-88-113. A jury found in favor of G&K on the common-law counterclaims but returned a verdict for Bill's on its deceptive trade practices counterclaim, awarding Bill's damages. The district court subsequently awarded G&K attorney's fees and denied Bill's motion for attorney's fees. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $82,766.50 in attorney's fees to G&K where the district court expressly considered G&K's degree of success and reduced its requested award based on time devoted to unsuccessful causes of action; the district court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly finding that the hourly rates claimed by G&K's Little Rock-based attorneys were reasonable; the documentation was sufficient to support the district court's conclusion where the record includes invoices that detail the amount of time spent on this litigation and the activities on which that time was spent; although the district court did not expressly mention all eight of the Chrisco factors, the district court did address several and provided enough explanation for the court to conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court rejected Bill's challenge to the award of attorney's fees to G&K. In light of comments from the Arkansas courts and the absence of mandatory language in section 4-88-113(f), the court agreed with the district court that Bill's was not automatically entitled to an award of fees when it prevailed on a claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. However, the court found little explanation for the district court's ruling and remanded for the district court to consider whether Bill's should be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee under section 4-88-113(f). The Act establishes an independent basis for awarding fees and does not restrict awards to a party that prevails in whatever larger litigation involves a claim under the Act. A party who prevails on a cause of action to recover actual damages under the Act is eligible for an award of attorney's fees, even when another party is the prevailing party in the overall action for purposes of Ark. Code Sec. 16-22-308.View "G&K Services Co., Inc. v. Bill's Super Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employers, BoA, on his claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and breach of contract. Under the McDonald Douglas Corp v. Green framework, assuming arguendo that plaintiff met his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of age discrimination, the court agreed with the district court that BoA has satisfied its burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. BoA has explained that plaintiff's employment was terminated as part of a company-wide reduction in force; two months prior to his termination, plaintiff received a negative mid-year performance review; and as of September 2010, plaintiff was ranked 136th across all BoA sales personnel for the year and his performance was the worse of all employees in his group. In regards to the breach of contract claim, the district court correctly determined that plaintiff was an at-will employee and that although annual bonuses were discretionary, there is no record evidence, or even an allegation, indicating that plaintiff was promised a mid-year bonus. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Delaney v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Fair Wind owns sailing schools, including one in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. In 2007 Fair Wind hired Bouffard as a captain and instructor, under a contract precluding Bouffard from joining a competitor within 20 miles of the St. Thomas school for two years after the end of his employment. In 2010, relying on BouffardView "Fair Wind Sailing Inc v. Dempster" on Justia Law

Aleynikov is a computer programmer who worked as a vice president at GSCo in 2007 through 2009. After accepting an employment offer from another company, Aleynikov copied source code developed at GSCo into computer files and transferred them out of GSCo. He was convicted of violations of the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. 2314, and the Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. 1832. The Second Circuit reversed the conviction. He was then indicted by a New York grand jury and that case remains pending. Aleynikov filed a federal suit, seeking indemnification and advancement for his attorney’s fees from Goldman Sachs. He claims his right to indemnification and advancement under a portion of Goldman Sachs Group’s By-Laws that applies to non-corporate subsidiaries like GSCo, providing for indemnification and advancement to, among others, officers of GSCo. The district court granted summary judgment in Aleynikov’s favor on his claim for advancement but denied it on his claim for indemnification. The Third Circuit vacated with respect to advancement. The meaning of the term “officer" in GS Group’s By-Laws is ambiguous and the relevant extrinsic evidence raises genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The court otherwise affirmed.View "Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, citizens of Rhode Island, brought state law contract claims against Defendants, alleging, among other claims, breach of an oral contract. After the Rhode Island state court dismissed the only non-diverse defendant from the case, the remaining defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand to state court, correctly pointing out that, at the time of removal, the dismissal of the non-diverse defendant was not final. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and awarded attorneys’ fees to defendant Southworth-Milton, Inc. (Southworth). Plaintiffs appealed the judgment in favor of Southworth and argued that the case should be remanded to state court. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) remand to state court was not required, and the district court had jurisdiction, because despite Defendants’ failure to comply with the statutory removal requirements, complete diversity existed at the time of judgment, and Plaintiffs failed to object to the statutory procedural defect in a timely manner; and (2) the district court correctly granted summary judgment and awarded attorneys’ fees in favor of Southworth.View "Universal Truck & Equip. Co. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc." on Justia Law

Western Horizons sued Dakota Travel Nurse, a North Dakota corporation that contracts with healthcare facilities to provide licensed nursing staff, alleging Western Horizons and Dakota Travel Nurse entered a 2008 contract for Dakota Travel Nurse to provide licensed nursing staff for Western Horizons Care Center, a nursing home in Hettinger owned and operated by Western Horizons. Western Horizons claimed the parties' contract required Dakota Travel Nurse to "indemnify, hold harmless and defend Western Horizons against any and all claims, losses, demands, actions, administrative proceedings, liabilities and judgments, including reasonable attorneys fees, court[] costs and other expenses, arising from or associated with the action or inaction of [Dakota Travel Nurse] personnel." Western Horizons alleged Dakota Travel Nurse refused to defend or indemnify Western Horizons in a nursing home resident's prior lawsuit against Western Horizons for injuries allegedly arising from the actions or inactions of Dakota Travel Nurse personnel providing care to the resident at the time of his injury. Dakota Travel Nurse was not a party to the resident's prior lawsuit, and Dakota Travel Nurse refused Western Horizons' tender of a defense in that action. Western Horizons thereafter settled the resident's lawsuit and brought this action against Dakota Travel Nurse, seeking a monetary judgment equal to the amount paid to settle the resident's lawsuit, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Western Horizons in defense of that action. Western Horizons Living Centers petitioned the Supreme Court for a supervisory writ directing the district court to reverse an order compelling Western Horizons to answer discovery requests by Dakota Travel Nurse, Inc., for information involving a nursing home resident's prior lawsuit against Western Horizons. Western Horizons argued that its insurer's claims file in the prior lawsuit was protected by the lawyer-client privilege and that settlement negotiations and related documents from the prior lawsuit are not subject to discovery in this action. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded this was an appropriate case to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court directed the district court to vacate its order compelling discovery. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Western Horizons Living Centers v. Feland" on Justia Law