Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Tenant leased certain property from Landlord. Landlord filed a petition for a declaratory judgment seeking a ruling that it could have reasonable access to the property to show it to prospective buyers. The district court found the lease to be unambiguous and granted summary judgment to Tenant, concluding that Tenant could exclude Landlord from showing the property until ninety days remained in the term of the lease. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that lease provisions that gave Landlord the right to sell the property at any time during the lease term encompassed the right to access the property temporarily at reasonable times to show the property to prospective buyers.View "Alta Vista Props., LLC vs. Mauer Vision Ctr., PC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lori Edwards appealed a trial court's ruling denying her petition for writ of mandate, challenging Edwards's classification and payment as a substitute teacher for the 2007/2008 school year. Edwards contends that, because she provided teaching services during the entire school year, she was a permanent employee and therefore was unlawfully deprived of backpay for the 2007/2008 school year. Edwards also argued the trial court erred in finding her writ petition barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded Edwards's writ petition was not barred by the statute of limitations because the limitation period was tolled while Edwards was pursuing internal administrative remedies. Nevertheless, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying Edwards's petition on the grounds the Lake Elsinore Unified School District did not misclassify Edwards as a substitute teacher and was not required to pay Edwards backpay.View "Edwards v. Lake Elsinore Unified etc." on Justia Law

Valensa filed suit against Cyanotech for tortious interference with contract and breach of a confidentiality agreement. Cyanotech then moved to compel arbitration based on two contracts between the parties. The district court denied the motion. The court reversed and remanded where the district court erred when it refused to allow an arbitrator to decide whether their dispute is arbitrable under one of the parties' contracts because the parties clearly and unmistakably incorporated the rules of the American Arbitration Association into their arbitration provisions.View "U.S. Nutraceuticals, LLC v. Cyanotech Corp." on Justia Law

Beginning in 1983, Defendant law firm represented Alice Lawrence and her three children in litigation arising from the death of her husband and their father, a real estate developer. For over three decades, Lawrence and Seymour Cohn, the decedent’s brother and business partner, litigated issues surrounding the sale of the decedent’s properties and the distribution of the proceeds. After Cohn and Lawrence settled the matter, this dispute followed between Lawrence and Defendant with respect to the law firm’s fee and the validity of gifts made by Lawrence to three law firm partners. Lawrence died in 2008. Thereafter, the Lawrence estate argued that a revised retainer agreement between the parties was void procedurally and substantively and made claims for refund of the gifts. The Court of Appeals held (1) the revised retainer agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable and was therefore enforceable; and (2) the Lawrence estate’s claim for return of the gifts was time-barred.View "Matter of Lawrence" on Justia Law

RNT appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on its claim for breach of insurance contract against RNT, arguing that the trial court erroneously determined that the claim failed in light of the terms of RNT's policy. The court concluded that summary judgment on RNT's claim for breach of insurance contract was properly granted on the basis of the undisputed facts; condition 10(b) of the policy, which terminates an insurer's liability when the loan is paid off or the related mortgage is released; and exclusion 3(a) of the policy, which precludes coverage for defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to by RNT. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "RNT Holdings v. United Gen. Title Ins." on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute between an insurance carrier (Plaintiff) and its insured (Defendant) regarding Plaintiff’s obligation to pay underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration panel concluded that the issue of whether the relevant policy provisions provided coverage for the claim should be resolved under the choice of law rules governing claims sounding in tort, rather than claims sounding in insurance and contract, and therefore, that New Jersey law rather than Connecticut law governed Defendant’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the policy. The trial court vacated the arbitration award, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court, in its opinion adopting the decision of the trial court, properly applied sections 6(2), 188 and 193 of the Restatement (Second), contract choice of law, to determine that Connecticut law governed the claim.View "Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. Mortara" on Justia Law

America's Home Place, Inc. ("AHP") appealed a Circuit Court order denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration of the claims brought by the plaintiff below, Gregory Rampey. In August 2012, Rampey and AHP entered into a contract, the terms of which provided that AHP would construct a house for Rampey in Chambers County. AHP constructed the house; however, after he took possession of the house, Rampey began to notice "settlement and sinking of the foundation," which, according to Rampey, resulted in significant structural and other damage to the house. AHP attempted to stabilize the foundation and to repair the damage to the house that had occurred as a result of the unstable foundation; those efforts were unsuccessful. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and to enter an order granting AHP's motion to compel arbitration.View "America's Home Place, Inc. v. Rampey" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the district court’s approval of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions’ (UDFI) seizure of America West Bank Members, L.C. (Bank) and the appointment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the Bank. The Bank filed a complaint against the State, UDFI, and the director of UDFI (collectively, the State), alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, constitutional takings, and due process violations. The district court dismissed the Bank’s claims for lack of sufficient factual allegations under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it dismissed the Bank’s claims; and (2) the district court did not hold the Bank to a heightened pleading standard.View "America West Bank Members, L.C. v. State" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal concerned a preliminary injunction entered against Joshua Powell in litigation resulting from several contracts between the company Powell founded and a new joint venture formed with a non-party. At issue before the First Circuit was whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. The First Circuit left the preliminary injunction temporarily in place and remanded with instructions, directing that the district court review the matter of irreparable injury and vacate the preliminary injunction if it finds irreparable harm to be lacking, and if the court find irreparable harm and an otherwise sufficient basis for injunctive relief, that it hear the parties’ arguments on the appropriate scope and language of the injunction.View "JL Powell Clothing LLC v. Powell" on Justia Law

After Stratton stopped making payments on her credit card, GE “charged off” Stratton’s $2,630.95 debt, as uncollectible. GE stopped charging Stratton interest. By charging off the debt and ceasing to charge interest GE could take a bad-debt tax deduction, I.R.C. 166(a)(2), and avoid the cost of sending Stratton statements. A year later, GE assigned Stratton’s charged-off debt to PRA, a “debt buyer.” Two years later, PRA filed suit in state court, alleging that Stratton owed interest during the 10 months after GE charged off her debt, before GE sold that debt, and that Stratton owed 8% interest rather than the 21.99% rate established in her contract with GE. The 8% rate is the default rate under Kentucky’s usury statute, KRS 360.010. Stratton filed a putative class action, alleging that PRA’s attempt to collect 8% interest for the 10-month period violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, in that the 8% interest was not “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law,” that PRA had falsely represented the “character” of Stratton’s debt and the “amount” owed, and that PRA’s suit was a “threat” to take “action that cannot legally be taken.” The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under Kentucky law a party has no right to statutory interest if it has waived the right to collect contractual interest; any attempt to collect statutory interest when it is “not permitted by law” violates the FDCPA.View "Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law