Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Two companies, Derma Pen, LLC and 4EverYoung, entered a sales distribution agreement. Under the agreement, Derma Pen, LLC obtained the exclusive right to use the DermaPen trademark in the United States. 4EverYoung had a contractual right of first refusal, allowing purchase of Derma Pen, LLC’s U.S. trademark rights upon termination of the distribution agreement. Derma Pen, LLC terminated the agreement, and 4EverYoung wanted to exercise its contractual right of first refusal. The parties reached an impasse, and 4EverYoung started using the DermaPen trademark in the United States. Derma Pen, LLC sued and requested a preliminary injunction to prevent 4EverYoung’s use of the trademark. The district court declined the request, concluding that 4EverYoung was likely to prevail. This appeal to the Tenth Circuit followed, presenting the question: whether Derma Pen, LLC was likely to prevail on its claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition by proving a protectable interest in the trademark. The Court concluded Derma Pen, LLC was likely to prevail by satisfying this element. The district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Derma Pen v. 4EverYoung Limited" on Justia Law

The issue at the heart of this appeal to the Tenth Circuit centered on indemnity stemming from a promise by Martin K. Eby Construction Company’s predecessor to build a water pipeline. Eby engaged another company (the predecessor to Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC), promising to indemnify claims resulting from Eby’s work. While building the water pipeline, Eby accidentally hit a methanol pipeline, causing a leak. At the time, no one knew about the leak. It was discovered over two decades later, and the owner of the methanol pipeline had to pay for the cleanup. The owner of the methanol pipeline sued to recover the expenses from Kellogg and Eby. Kellogg and Eby prevailed, but Kellogg incurred over $2 million in attorneys’ fees and costs. Kellogg invoked Eby’s indemnity promise, suing Eby and its liability insurer, Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. The district court granted summary judgment to Eby and Travelers, leading Kellogg to appeal. To resolve the Kellogg-Eby portion of the appeal, the Tenth Circuit focused on the enforceability of Eby’s promise of indemnity: the promise was broad enough to cover the pipeline owner’s claims against Kellogg for its inaction after Eby caused the leak, but the indemnity clause was not conspicuous; thus, it was unenforceable. The Kellogg-Travelers appeal turned on Kellogg’s argument that Travelers’ insurance policy covered liabilities assumed by its insured (Eby). The Tenth Circuit concluded that because the indemnity clause was unenforceable, it is as if Eby never agreed to assume Kellogg’s liabilities. In the absence of Eby’s assumption of Kellogg’s liabilities, Travelers did not insure Kellogg. Accordingly, Kellogg was not entitled to indemnity from Eby or insurance coverage from Travelers, and Eby and Travelers were entitled to summary judgment. View "Martin K. Eby Construction v. OneBeacon Insurance" on Justia Law

In 2006, Robert and Teresa James brought a lot in a rural subdivision. At the time of the purchase, Chicago Title Insurance Company issued a title insurance policy that insured against loss or damage by reason of “lack of right of access to and from the land.” In 2013, the Jameses sued Chicago Title, contending that the title insurance policy required Chicago Title to provide them “legal” access to their lot. The district court granted summary judgment to Chicago Title, concluding that the Jameses failed to establish that the title insurance policy entitled them to “legal access” to their lot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted judgment to Chicago Title on the Jameses’ claim, under the title insurance policy, that they lacked a right of access to their real property, as the language of the policy insured against loss from not having “a right” of access, and the Jameses clearly had a right of access when they bought the lot. View "James v. Chicago Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Colorado Golf Club Holding Company LLC (CGC Holding), Harlem Algonquin LLC and James Medick proposed certification of a class action suit. They alleged a group of lenders conspired to create a fraudulent scheme to obtain non-refundable up-front fees in return for loan commitments , and misrepresented their ability and their objective to make good on the promises to meet certain financing obligations as part of a scheme to entice borrowers to pay the up-front fees. The class intended to offer generalized proof that the lenders concealed the financial history of Sandy Hutchens, the principal defendant, and his use of pseudonyms, to preserve the superficial integrity of the operation. The borrowers argued that had they known about this pretense, no putative class member would have taken part in the financial transactions that caused each to lose its up-front fees, amounting to millions of dollars of cumulative losses. The ultimate issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the class could pursue claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In opposing the claims, the lenders argued that each class member would have to demonstrate that it relied on the lenders’ misrepresentations or omissions to satisfy RICO’s causation element, making a single trial unwieldy and unworkable. The Tenth Circuit held that the lenders were wrong in this respect: RICO class-action plaintiffs are not entitled to an evidentiary presumption of a factual element of a claim. The Court agreed with the district court that a class could be certified in this context. Plaintiffs' theory sufficiently allayed any concerns about Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate over those idiosyncratic to individual class members. The Tenth Circuit affirmed certification of the class, but reversed the district court with regard to certification decision as to the lenders’ law firm and lawyers, Broad and Cassel, Ronald Gache and Carl Romano. Because several claims were not properly before the Court in this interlocutory appeal, the Court declined to address: (1) whether plaintiffs’ claims constituted an impermissible extraterritorial application of RICO; (2) whether the plaintiffs could prove proximate cause; or (3) whether the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over certain defendants. View "CGC Holding v. Gache" on Justia Law

Universal, a leather wholesaler located in North Carolina, filed suit against Koro, a leather company in Argentina, in North Carolina state court, alleging breach of contract. Koro removed to federal court and the district court granted its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that Universal met its initial burden of demonstrating that Koro purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state by submitting affidavits stating that Koro contacted Universal in the forum state, conducted repeated in-person solicitations and meetings concerning the parties' business relationship there, and engaged in numerous business transactions over a two-year period. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Universal Leather v. KORO AR" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff fell behind on her payments to Attorney in the underlying litigation, Attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiff and requested a charging lien in the amount of approximately $300,000. Plaintiff did not oppose Attorney’s withdrawal but did oppose the entry of a charging lien. The Court of Chancery found that a charging lien was appropriate and granted a charging lien in the amount of $200,000 against any judgment in this action, holding (1) a fee agreement between the parties did not preclude the entry of a charging lien; (2) the total amount of the charging lien that was appropriate in this case should not exceed Plaintiff’s lowest-possible net recovery of $263,872; and (3) Attorney was not liable to the experts for their fees, so there was no basis for include those fees in the charging lien. View "In re Zutrau v. Jansing & ICE Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Victor Deng and DM Technology & Energy, Inc. ("DM") appealed a judgment based on a jury's verdict in favor of Clarence "Buddy" Scroggins and Complete Lighting Source, Inc. ("Complete Lighting"), on their claims against Deng and DM alleging breach of contract and fraud. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of Scroggins and Complete Lighting on the fraud claim and remanded the case for the entry of an order granting a new trial as to that claim. The Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment in all other respects. View "Deng v. Scoggins" on Justia Law

The trial court granted a motion to enforce a settlement between plaintiffs and defendants. The trial court found that defendant Fair’s printed name at the end of his email where he had agreed to settlement terms set forth in an email from plaintiffs’ counsel was an “electronic signature” within the meaning of California’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Civ. Code, 1633.1) and what it referred to as the “common law of contract” or “contract case law.” Subsequently, plaintiffs requested attorney fees under a provision in an arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court found plaintiffs to be the prevailing parties but denied the request for attorney fees because the matter never proceeded to arbitration and plaintiffs had failed to show that any contract authorized fees in the litigation. The court of appeal reversed the order enforcing the settlement: the agreement was not signed by plaintiffs and the trial court erred in determining that Fair’s printed name at the end of his email was enforceable. Since plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, they are not entitled to attorney fees. View "J.B.B. Inv. Partners v. Fair" on Justia Law

In 2006, Thompson signed a $354,800 mortgage note with AME as the lender. Several sections of the note and deed of trust noted AME’s intent to transfer the note. Its signature page contains a signed, undated stamp memorializing AME’s transfer to Countrywide and another signed, undated endorsement from Countrywide to blank. BOA purchased Countrywide and has the note. In 2012, BOA offered to short-sell her house in lieu of foreclosure. Thompson requested modification of her repayment terms under the HAMP program (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. 5201), that gives lenders incentives to offer modifications to borrowers with a payment-to-income ratio over 31%. Thompson claims that she complied with numerous document requests. BOA never granted her application. She sued BOA, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, and unidentified persons she believes to be the note’s true owners, claiming: that BOA falsely induced her to sign the mortgage by pretending it was an actual lender; that her title is clouded by the note’s transfer; and that BOA fraudulently induced her to seek modification, knowing it lacked authority to modify her terms or intending to drive her into foreclosure. The district court dismissed for failure to comply with pleading standards. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Thompson v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

In 1997, Memorylink’s founders approached Motorola about jointly developing a handheld camera that could wirelessly transmit and receive video signals. After a successful demonstration, they sent Motorola a letter, agreeing “that any patents would be jointly owned by Motorola and Memorylink,” agreeing that Motorola should “head up the patent investigation,” and providing a “Wireless Multimedia Core Technology Overview for Patent Review” Motorola’s attorney sent a letter concerning the patent applications, stating an understanding that the inventors were Memorylink’s founders and Motorola employees Schulz and Wyckoff. A proposed patent filing agreement was enclosed. The named inventors signed an invention disclosure and an Assignment of rights to Motorola and Memorylink. Memorylink sued Motorola in 2008, alleging patent infringement and torts sounding in fraud, and seeking a declaration that the Assignment was void for lack of consideration. The district court rejected Memorylink’s argument that its claims did not accrue until an inventorship problem was discovered and dismissed most claims, reasoning that Memorylink should have known that the Motorola employees were not co-inventors in 1998, so that its claims were untimely. The court found that the consideration issue was a contract claim, not time-barred, but granted Motorola summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Memorylink Corp. v. Motorola Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law