Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The School District entered into a construction contract with Amoroso. Pursuant to Public Contract Code 22300, Amoroso elected to have the retention held in an escrow account in the form of securities. The escrow agreement stated that “District shall have the right to draw upon the securities and/or withdraw amounts from the Escrow Account in event of default by Contractor as determined solely by District.” The District gave written notice of material breach on March 30, 2011, based on Amoroso’s failure to complete, timely or at all, any of the three project phases and requested that Amoroso cure by April 4. Amoroso contested the assertions of material breach by letter dated April 1. The District sent notice of termination on April 18 and filed suit. On April 28, the parties entered into an “Exit and Demobilization Agreement,” “in lieu of any final termination or statement of default under the Contract.” The District sent a letter requesting withdrawal of $3.5 million from the escrow account, attaching its attorney’s memorandum as to why withdrawal was permissible. Amoroso unsuccessfully sought an injunction. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Amoroso’s claim that a public project owner must await judicial resolution of the underlying contract dispute before it can withdraw retention funds. View "Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist. v. S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

MileagePlus, United’s frequent flyer program, rewards customers with free flights and seat upgrades. Its Rules have always allowed United to change the terms of the program unilaterally, without notice. In 1997 United announced a new Million-Mile Flyer status: Lifetime Premier Executive status. “Mileage Plus members who have earned a total of one million paid flight miles on United will retain the benefits and privileges of Premier Executive status for life.” After merging with Continental, United changed the status levels and moved the Million-Mile Flyers from Premier Executive status to the new system. United decided that the Premier Gold level was equivalent, but Gold customers receive only a 50% bonus on miles flown, not 100%, and do not have regional and system-wide upgrades that Million-Mile Flyers previously received. Lagen enrolled in MileagePlus in 1993 and became a Million-Mile Flyer in 2006 after switching his airline loyalty from British Airways. He sued for breach of contract under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2)(A). The district court granted United summary judgment, finding that no rational trier of fact could conclude that United had a distinct Million-Mile Flyer program that was not part of MileagePlus, subject to unilateral change. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Lagen v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Rosana Claudio-de Leon (Claudio) and the University of the East of the Ana G. Mendez University System (SUAGM) entered into an employment contract that contained a forum selection clause precluding adjudication in federal court. Claudio, Luis F. Carrasquillo-Rivera, and the conjugal partnership Carrasquillo-Claudio (collectively, Appellants) filed suit against SUAGM in the district court, alleging, among other claims, pregnancy and gender discrimination. The district court dismissed Appellants’ Title VII pregnancy and gender discrimination claim and supplemental state law claims due to the forum selection clause. The First Circuit affirmed as modified, holding (1) the forum selection clause was applicable and enforceable; but (2) the district court should have dismissed the case without prejudice to permit Appellants to refile in the appropriate forum. Remanded. View "Claudio de-Leon v. Ayala" on Justia Law

In building their home, Plaintiffs purchased SuperFlex, a stucco-like material, to cover the house’s exterior. GrailCoat Worldwide, LLC and GrailCo, Inc. (collectively, GrailCoat), the manufacturers of SuperFlex, provided an express twenty-year warranty for the product. Several years after the construction of their home was completed, the product failed. Plaintiffs brought suit against GrailCoat and Hartley Construction, Inc., the company that had designed and built the home, for damages. Hartley moved for summary judgment under N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-50(a)(5), North Carolina’s six-year statute of repose for claims arising out of improvements to real property. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of express warranty against GrailCoat, holding that GrailCoat knowingly and freely entered into a valid contract of sale with Plaintiffs that provided for a warranty term that exceeded the repose period, and therefore, GrailCoat waived the protections provided by the statute of repose. View "Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

The respondents, Shared Towers VA, LLC and NH Note Investment, LLC, appealed, and petitioner Joseph Turner, individually and as trustee of the Routes 3 and 25 Nominee Trust, cross-appealed, Superior Court orders after a bench trial on petitioner’s petition for a preliminary injunction enjoining a foreclosure sale and for damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. The parties’ dispute stemmed from a commercial construction loan agreement and promissory note secured by a mortgage, pursuant to which petitioner was loaned $450,000 at 13% interest per annum to build a home. Respondents argued the trial court erred when it: (1) determined that they would be unjustly enriched if the court required the petitioner to pay the amounts he owed under the note from November 2009 until April 2011; (2) applied the petitioner’s $450,000 lump sum payment to principal; (3) excluded evidence of the petitioner’s experience with similar loans; (4) ruled that, because the promissory note failed to contain a "clear statement in writing" of the charges owed, as required by RSA 399-B:2 (2006), respondents could not collect a $22,500 delinquency charge on the petitioner’s lump sum payment of principal; and (5) denied the respondents’ request for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner argued that the trial court erroneously concluded that respondents’ actions did not violate the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded: contrary to the trial court’s decision, petitioner’s obligation to make the payments was not tolled. Because the loan agreement and note remained viable, it was error for the trial court to have afforded the petitioner a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. The trial court made its decision with regard to the payment of $450,000 in connection with its conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. Because the Supreme Court could not determine how the trial court would have ruled upon this issue had it not considered relief under that equitable theory, and because, given the nature of the parties’ arguments, resolving this issue requires fact finding that must be done by the trial court in the first instance, it vacated that part of its order and remanded for further proceedings. In light of the trial court’s errors with regard to the attorney’s fees and costs claimed by respondents, the Supreme Court vacated the order denying them, and remanded for consideration of respondents’ request for fees and costs. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s rejection of petitioner’s CPA claim. View "Turner v. Shared Towers VA, LLC" on Justia Law

Gail and Scott Helm filed a personal injury action against Gallo Realty, Inc., one of its real estate agents, and 206 Massachusetts Ave, LLC (owner of the property). The Helms rented a beach house at 206 Massachusetts Avenue in Lewes for a week in 2010. As Gail descended the stairs, she fell and sustained injuries. Gail sought to recover damages based on claims of negligence and breach of contract; Scott claimed loss of consortium. The Superior Court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, dismissing the Helms' claims. The Helms appealed, arguing: (1) the Superior Court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of primary risk assumption and comparative negligence as a matter of law; (2) the Superior Court erred in holding that an indemnification clause provision in the lease protected defendants from liability; and (3) the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment on the contract claims. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court applied both the doctrine of primary assumption of risk and the doctrine of comparative negligence incorrectly. The record reflected that the Superior Court never specifically based its decision on the indemnification clause. The Superior Court's initial ruling in favor of defendants was only on the negligence claims. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the record reflected that the Superior Court's dismissive rulings on the Helms' contract claim was "cursory and inextricably intertwined" with its erroneous rulings on the negligence claims. As such, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Helm v. 206 Massachusetts Avenue,LLC" on Justia Law

Dennis and Charlene Deckert appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their action for a declaratory judgment and specific performance of an option to purchase certain Burleigh County real property and quieting title to the property in Margaret McCormick and Judy Hertz. Because the Supreme Court concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact that the Deckerts did not properly exercise the gratuitous option before it was revoked, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Deckert v. McCormick" on Justia Law

Milwaukee County calculates pension payments for its retired employees by multiplying a retiree’s final average salary by a certain percentage known as a multiplier. The resulting number is then multiplied by the retiree’s total years of county service. Suzanne Stoker and her labor union filed a complaint against the County and the Milwaukee County Pension Board, arguing that an ordinance passed by the County in 2011 that reduced the multiplier for all county service performed on or after the effective date of the ordinance was a breach of contract because she had a vested right to have the former, higher multiplier apply to her post-2011 county service and because she did not personally consent to the reduction. The circuit court granted summary judgment and declaratory and injunctive relief to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County did not breach Stoker’s contractual right to retirement system benefits earned and vested when it amended the pension multiplier, and the County did have the ability to make the reductions of the multiplier without Stoker’s personal consent. Remanded. View "Suzanne Stoker v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

This case involved three small school districts, Northeast Community School District, East Central Community School District, and Preston Community School District. In 2010, the school boards of Northeast and East Central entered into a whole grade sharing agreement. Thereafter, citizens from Preston and East Central voted to reorganize their districts and merge the districts together into a new school district called Easton Valley Community School District (Easton). The Easton school board subsequently sent a notification of cancellation of the agreement to the superintendent of Northeast, claiming that when East Central ceased to exist the agreement was null. Northeast filed a petition for declaratory action and mandamus and then amended its petition alleging repudiation of the agreement. The district court granted summary judgment for Easton, concluding (1) the agreement and the reorganization were valid but that the two were in direct conflict, and (2) the East Central school board did not have the ability to bind Easton as its successor corporation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement could bind the reorganized school district. View "Northeast Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Easton Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 1997, Appellant began working for Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR). After Appellant retired in 2009, BPPR made a final calculation of Appellant’s pension, which yielded monthly payments significantly lower than earlier estimates had suggested. Seeking the higher amount he had expected, Appellant brought claims under ERISA, a theory of estoppel, and Puerto Rico contract law. The district court (1) dismissed the ERISA and contract claims, concluding that Appellant failed to state a claim under ERISA and that ERISA preempted the commonwealth claims; and (2) granted summary judgment against Appellant on the estoppel claim, concluding that the unambiguous terms of the benefits plan precluded a claim for estoppel. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellant could not recover under ERISA because he could not be awarded relief under the terms of BPPR’s retirement plan; (2) the district court properly held that Appellant’s commonwealth claims “relate to” the ERISA-regulated plan and, accordingly, they were preempted; and (3) because Appellant did not show any ambiguity in the plan, his equitable estoppel claim necessarily failed. View "Guerra-Delgado v. Banco Popular de P.R." on Justia Law