Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Franklin Building Supply Co., Inc. (“FBS”) filed suit against Aaron Michael Hymas to recover money owed on an open account for construction supplies, equipment, and labor supplied to Crestwood Construction, Inc. FBS claims that Hymas guarantied any unpaid balance on Crestwood’s account. The district court granted FBS’s motion for summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, the district court permitted FBS to correct an error in an affidavit submitted in support of summary judgment regarding the amount of interest owed on the outstanding balance. Hymas twice moved the court to reconsider its order granting summary judgment and the district court denied both motions. He timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Franklin Building Supply Co. v. Hymas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant each owned fifty percent of an LLC, which owned commercial real estate (the premises). Plaintiff agreed to sell his interest in the LLC to Defendant. The parties subsequently executed a buyout agreement that provided for a certain purchase price and contained a contingency clause requiring Defendant to pay Plaintiff an addition to the purchase price if specified conditions were met. The parties closed on the sale under the buyout agreement. Defendant then sold the entire premises to a third party. Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against Defendant alleging that Defendant breached the buyout agreement by not paying Plaintiff a contingent addition to the purchase price as required by the contingency clause. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. A divided Appellate Court panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) properly determined that the contract at issue was unambiguous; and (2) properly affirmed the trial court’s postjudgment interest award where the trial court declined to award prejudgment interest. View "Salce v. Wolczek" on Justia Law

AIDG Properties, LLC, a real-estate holding company managed by Anjan Dutta-Gupta, purchased property. AIDG obtained loans from BankNewport (Defendant) to finance the purchase and to perform improvements. Dutta-Gupta personally guaranteed the loans. Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc. and Tecta America New England, LLC (collectively, Plaintiffs) served as subcontractors on the project. Plaintiffs substantially completed the renovations, and BankNewport deposited the loan proceeds into AIDG’s account. After Dutta-Gupta was arrested, Defendant declared Dutta-Gupta to be in default and accelerated the loans. Defendant then set off the deposit it made previously by reversing it. As a result, AIDG was unable to pay Plaintiffs for the work they had performed. Defendant, who was granted possession of the property, later foreclosed. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to recover compensation for their work under the theory of unjust enrichment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that due to the absence of a relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendant and the lack of any allegation that Defendant engaged in any type of misconduct or fraud, Defendant’s retention of the property, including the improvements, was not inequitable under the Court’s jurisprudence on unjust enrichment. View "Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. BankNewport" on Justia Law

Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. ("TCVH"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of First Tuskegee Bank on breach-of-fiduciary-duty and fraud claims stemming from a construction loan TCVH received from First Tuskegee in September 2004. The gravamen of those claims was that TCVH was injured by First Tuskegee's alleged insistence that TCVH use PJ Construction as the general contractor on the project although PJ Construction was not licensed as a general contractor in Alabama, that PJ Construction's work product was below what one would expect from a properly licensed general contractor, and that using PJ Construction resulted in delays, cost overruns, and, TCVH argued, the ultimate failure of its business. However, because TCVH's claims accrued in approximately July 2005 and TCVH did not formally assert them until after it initiated this action in April 2009, those claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that governed them. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of First Tuskegee was affirmed. View "Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. v. First Tuskegee Bank " on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court consolidated cases that arose out of an action brought by Guy Willis against three defendants: Alaska Bush Adventures, LLC ("Alaska Bush") and Hugh and Ryan Krank (collectively, the defendants). The Kranks are the owners and operators of Alaska Bush, an outfitter that provided guided hunting trips in Alaska. In December 2011, Willis entered into a written contract with Alaska Bush pursuant to which Alaska Bush would lead a guided hunting trip in Alaska. Willis also claimed that he entered into a separate oral contract to hunt black bears during that guided hunting trip. The guided hunting trip took place in September 2012. A few months after the trip, Willis sued the defendants in Alabama seeking damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and suppression. Willis's claims against defendants centered primarily on his allegations that the equipment Alaska Bush provided for the hunting expedition was inadequate in number, unsafe, and inoperable, and he also alleged that he lost hunting time because the defendants were providing services to other hunters who were apparently not included in the guided hunting trip. Willis claimed that he lost most of his personal hunting equipment and had to leave the trip early because he "was caused to be thrown from an improperly repaired, inspected, and/or working motorized boat ...." Willis further alleged that the defendants misrepresented the quantity of wild game that would be available on the hunt. Willis filed an application for the entry of a default judgment against Ryan, and, on the following day, he filed a similar application against Alaska Bush and Hugh. On December 21, 2012, defendants filed an answer to Willis's complaint and an objection to Willis's applications for entry of a default judgment. Thereafter, defendants filed a motion to compel Willis to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement found in the written contract. Defendants then each filed an individual motion to dismiss Willis's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court issued an order denying the defendants' respective motions to dismiss and their motion to compel arbitration. In case no. 1130184, defendants petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to challenge the denial of their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; in case no. 1130231, they appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court concluded after review that defendants were not entitled to mandamus relief on the jurisdiction question, but met their burden in their motion to compel arbitration. View "Willis v. Alaska Bush Adventures, LLC et al." on Justia Law

JM Leasing purchased a brand‐new semi‐truck from PACCAR in 2007. Approximately four years and 3,000 miles later, JM concluded that the truck was a lemon and sought a refund from PACCAR under Wisconsin’s Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. 218.0171.1 PACCAR agreed to refund the purchase price, but a dispute arose over reimbursement of a $53.00 title fee and escalated into a debate over the “reasonable allowance for use” to which PACCAR was entitled . Ultimately JM won an interest‐bearing judgment of $369,196.06, plus $157,697.25 in attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting PACCAR’s claims that it complied with all relevant provisions of the Lemon Law and that the district court erred in calculating pecuniary loss. View "James Michael Leasing Co. v. Paccar, Inc." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with NCR Corporation, Plaintiff brought suit, alleging thirteen causes of action. The district court dismissed eleven of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court subsequently granted summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s remaining two claims for wrongful discharge in breach of an employment contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Specifically, the court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to present evidence of an employment contract between the parties sufficient to overcome the presumption of at-will employment under Utah law. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, concluding that NCR’s corporate policy manual could be read to create an implied contract rebutting the presumption that Plaintiff was an at-will employee. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the language contained in NCR’s policy manual evidenced an intent to form an implied-in-fact contract sufficient to overcome the presumption of at-will employment. View "Tomlinson v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc., alleging that Quicken committed common law fraud and violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in connection with a loan agreement between Plaintiff and Quicken. The circuit court found in favor of Plaintiff on all but one of her claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that the circuit court improperly cancelled Plaintiff’s obligation to repay the loan principal, failed to support its punitive damages award with the correct analysis, and failed to offset the compensatory damages award against Plaintiff’s pretrial settlement with defendants who did not proceed to trial. After remand, the circuit court entered an opinion and order. The Supreme Court again reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) improperly created a lien on Plaintiff’s property; (2) erred in increasing the compensatory damages award to Plaintiff; (3) erred in awarding attorney fees and costs for both the first appellate proceeding and the post-appellate proceedings; (4) improperly increased the punitive damages award; and (5) erred in refusing to offset Plaintiff’s award of attorney fees and costs by a pretrial settlement between Plaintiff and the codefendants. Remanded. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an architectural firm, signed an agreement with the Rhode Island Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide architectural and engineering services for renovations at a state-owned property. A Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) referencing the agreement stated that the compensation was not to exceed a certain amount. When Plaintiff requested additional compensation without success, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the superior court seeking relief. The matter was held in abeyance while a statutory arbitration procedure was underway. The arbitrator concluded that, while Plaintiff rendered additional services to DHS, the additional work was not authorized under the BPA, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to additional compensation. Plaintiff then filed a petition to compel arbitration in the superior court against DHS. The trial justice denied relief, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred Plaintiff’s claims. View "Torrado Architects v. R.I. Dep’t of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs DISH Network Corporation and DISH Network LLC sought a declaratory judgment that their commercial general liability and excess liability insurers (collectively the Insurers), Arch Specialty Insurance Company, Arrowood Indemnity Company, Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, XL Insurance America, Inc., and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., had a duty to defend and indemnify plaintiffs in an underlying patent infringement action. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Insurers, plaintiffs appealed, and the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the Insurers moved again for summary judgment, but on different grounds. The district court granted the Insurers’ motions, and plaintiffs appealed. Finding no reversible error this time, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Dish Network v. Arch Specialty Insurance" on Justia Law